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Since 2002, over 180000 new dwellings have been built in Toronto through condominium 
ownership, filling the downtown core with towers and locking much of the city’s society 
into a relatively new model of property ownership – the condominium. The social, political, 
and economic structures necessary to make condominium ownership possible as a strategic 
form of high-density space production in the downtown, will have a profound impact on 
how this new residential fabric evolves as an extension of the city. The urban dwelling has 
traditionally been the starting point for the individual’s belonging and agency within the 
city. Habitus, as the patterns and banal practices of everyday life, allow people to create 
places of significance, comfort, and security in dynamic material and political landscapes. 
Critiques of the condominium as a product of neoliberal private-property narratives, and 
extreme urban densification as the result of economic, rather than social forces, however, 
frame the condominium dwelling as a structure that alienates habitus from within the city. 
As the towers are going to stand within the urban fabric of Toronto for the next fifty to one-
hundred years throughout changing social, economic, and political contexts, this condition 
of alienation will be a key factor in how each tower ages, decays, and is maintained in the 
urban society. To understand the futures of agency and alienation, each condominium must 
be considered as a microcosm of the city; first as a fabric of individual dwellings, then as 
an economic geography, next as a self-contained polity, and finally as a real and dynamic 
infrastructure. As the product of these four frameworks, we find that the organizational 
structure of the condominium operates against the human and civic functions of dwelling, 
and will produce an urban society paralyzed by economics, rather than activated by its 
own urban condition. While the condominium towers of downtown Toronto are built on 
economic strategies that alienate habitus from the urban dwelling, this vital dimension can be 
restored through the telling of alternative narratives of their possible futures that disrupt the 
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Cities are complex and wonderful things – infrastructures, economies, ecologies, 
geographies, works of art, images of a society.1 2 In studying and designing the city’s 
complexity, it is common to focus on overarching theories, systems, and discourses, and to 
lose sight of the city as the space of everyday life for everyday people. In The Architecture 
of the City, Aldo Rossi calls the city the “urban artifact;” an object of study, telling stories 
about the agendas and agents that produce the city, and of urban life that unfolds therein. 
The shape of the city teaches us about the people of the city and their daily conflict with 
the power structures that organize it.3 As different social, political, and economic contexts 
unfold in a time and place, they give rise to new means of spatial organization in the form 
of architectural type, which reifies these abstract contexts into physical and material form.4 
Since the 1960’s until today, Toronto has seen the rise of a new type of urban form – the 
condominium podium tower. Condominium podium towers are the architectural product 
of a whole host of contemporary urban issues and ideologies; modernity, sustainability, 
new building technologies, urban renewal, and the translation of the mid-century tower-
in-the-park into a city of increasing density and land costs. Among these, however, one 
of the most powerful drivers of the condominium tower as an urban form has been the 
intricate relationship between our cultural conceptions of a dwelling or home¸ and the 
financialization of private property in the urban march of capitalism. Reified in the built form 
and spatial practice of the condominium tower,5 these social relationships of an increasingly 
financialized urban society are projected into the residential fabric of Toronto for decades to 
come. 
There are two key dimensions of this reification that are fundamental to our understanding 
of the production of the city and condominiums. The first is found in Lefebvre’s spatial 
triad of conceived, perceived, and lived spaces. (Fig. 1) This trialectical relationship give 
1.  Aldo Rossi and Peter Eisenman, The Architecture of the City, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), 29. 
2.  Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1991), 73.
3.  Pier Vittorio Aureli, “City as Political Form: Four Archetypes of Urban Transformation,” Architectural 
Design 81, no. 1 (January 2011): 35, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ad.1186.
4.  Rossi, The Architecture of the City,40-1. 
5.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 75. 
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rise to the production of social space in the city. When considering the reification of socio-
political agendas in the production of the city, our principal consideration is that of conceived 
space, defined as our understanding of space within theoretical discourse and representation. 
How architects, developers, and politicians understand the functioning of space in society 
is hugely important in how the space of the city is built. In The Practice of Everyday Life, 
Michel de Certeau uses the word strategy, to identify how conceptions of space are used to 
impose structures and ideologies on those that inhabit the space produced.6 Conceived space 
therefore codes perceived space.7  
The second dimension that is important to our consideration of spatial practice in the new 
urban form of the condominium dwelling is the concept of habitus. Habitus was originally 
defined by Pierre Bourdieu as the individual’s intuition of negotiating their day-to-day 
actions in the objective and social structure – culture – that they live. American philosopher 
Edward J. Casey uses the Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, to frame how habitual spatial 
practice creates for the individual, the feeling of belonging in place.8 Our concern with 
habitus is as the content of the residential fabric of the city, and therein, it’s capacity to affect 
change on material space in time.9 Bourdieu’s original conception of habitus was formulated 
to explain cultural stability and continuity, and as such, he held it to be a subconscious 
social mechanism – “docta ignorantia” or learned ignorance.10 Both Casey and de Certeau, 
however, assert that while habitus operates within existing structures of the city, in must be 
more than a sub-conscious behaviouralism if it is to achieve anything beyond the “faithful 
reproduction” of the existing structure.11 For belonging to be meaningful, and for habitus to 
instil belonging in space, it must be the expression of an individual in negotiation for and 
against the structure in which they live. Through their daily patterns of habitus, the urban 
dweller both reinforces and subverts – “improvises upon” – produced urban space.
6.  de Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1984), xix. 
7.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 33.
8.  E.S. Casey, “Body, Self and Landscape: A Geophilosophical Inquiry into the Place-World,” Textures as 
Place: Exploring Humanist Geographies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 409-13. 
9.  Rossi, The Architecture of the City,48-9.
10.  Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977), 19. 
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Fig�1 Lefebvre’s spatial triad
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To this end, de Certeau mobilizes habitus through his concept of tactic, a mobilization that 
will frame our understanding of the power of conceived urban space, and the potential for 
social and spatial change within the structure of the condominium. de Certeau frames the 
individuals appropriation of structure in the tactical turn, (Fig. 2) in which the strategy of a 
conceived space, which he posits as force, is confronted by memory of an individual. In the 
occasion (time) of confrontation the individual is consciously reoriented (the metaphysical 
Kairos) in their relation to the space that they occupy. This conscious turning allows the 
individual to change – either behaviourally or materially – the structure. de Certeau calls this 
moment of appropriative action, tactic. He animates the force of this turn by demonstrating 
that the more totalizing the power of the structure surrounding the habitus of the subject, 
the less often that the memory of the individual will manifest itself in Kairos. Within more 
strongly conceived structures, greater amounts of time are required, and produce decreased 
subversion of the structure itself. 12  
The condominium tower has emerged as a popular strategy of city building from neoliberal 
thought and policy over the past century.13 As a form of legal land division (independent 
of the architectural type of the condominium tower), the condominium was popularized 
around the world in the period following the Second World War. It was the ideological 
sum of two mid-century dogmas; the high-rise towers that was developed by the European 
modernists, and the cultural currency of home ownership in post-war industrialized nations. 
The combined forces of Keynesian fiscal policy, the de-industrialization of North America in 
the 1980’s, and various space planning policies through the 1990’s and 2000’s changed the 
economic and cultural roles of real-estate in Toronto and lead to geographies of production 
through real-estate value. With reviving interest of inner-city renewal, and a growing social 
consciousness of the environmental impacts of sprawl, condominiums became the means 
by which to produce private property titles at unprecedented densities. As the ideology 
of place-based real-estate ownership has become increasingly important in the health of 
liberal economies, the skyline of condominiums in Toronto has become a physical index 
12.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 82-5. 
13.  Hazel Easthope, The Politics and Practices of Apartment Living, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd, 2019), 157.
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Fig�2 In his spatial turn (a), de Certeau frames tactial action as the de-alienating appropriation of space that 
has been structured by power dynamics. In the diagram below (b), de Certeau’s terms have been substituted to 






























of this mentality.14 Since 2000, the increasing importance of condominiums has been so 
rapid that it has caused the monetary value of real-estate to become disassociated from 
the use value of condos as dwellings. This disassociation is the result of nearly a century 
of cultural financialization, transforming the dwelling into a tool of capital accumulation, 
speculation, and extraction. This cultural transformation has affected not only developers 
but anyone with access to capital , especially through mortgage lending. The financial 
mobilization of vast portions of the residential fabric of a city, which have traditionally 
been the foundation of the human urban engagement, depends on the creation of radically 
alienated and a-political downtown societies and on eroding democratic notions of the city 
which condominium institutions are ideologically but superficially based on. In time, this 
socio-political alienation from the concrete framework of the condominium itself, will lead 
to widespread disinvestment, asphyxiating downtown Toronto in the phenomenon of the 
“tragedy of the anticommons,”15 – the alienation of use value by the over-fragmentation of 
private ownership.16
Insofar as the landscape of towers has already become a structure in which an urban society 
lives, this gridlock caused by the economic totalization of the urban fabric can start to be 
undone when architects begin to act tactically within the existing structures. If the urban 
structure of the condominium relies on a centrally conceived narrative being perpetuated 
in the daily life of their inhabitants, these structured pattens of alienating behaviour can be 
subverted through the telling of alternative narratives. By exploring scenarios in which the 
future of the condominium tower is driven by individual agency and actions which freely 
14.  The importance of real-estate for the health and well-being of the Canadian economy and Canadian Dollar 
is based on two considerations. First, real-estate became an extremely important commodity for foreign 
investment in the Canadian economy, particularly after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Since the 
global abandonment of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971, and the normalization of fiat currency, the 
value of the Loonie has been dependent on international demand, relative to other currencies. Second, 
the Canadian economy is floated by consumer spending. In the absence of ‘productive’ manufacturing 
economies, consumer spending must be maintained through debt. In order to prevent this debt-ability 
from defaulting or being over-extended, it had to be securitized by a commodity, guaranteed to only ever 
increase in value at a rate faster than inflation. While the financial mechanism of securitizing the debt of 
a consumer economy through real-estate was popular policy in the States under President Roosevelt, it 
became necessary for the perpetuation of the post-industrial economy following the flight of industry from 
North America. 
15.  Brian Webb and Seven Webber, “The Implications of Condominium Neighbourhoods for Long-term 
Urban Revitalization,” Cities 61, no. 48-57. (2017): 51-2. 
16.  Michael Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: A Concise Introduction and Lexicon,” The Modern 
Law Review 76, no. 1 (January 2013), 6.
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transgress the status quo, the architect can disrupt the attitudes of inhabitants within the 
lived space of the tower. In telling alternative futures, the impact of decisions on space is 
demystified and the inhabitant of the condominium is equipped to take ownership of the 
space in which they dwell. 
0�1�1 Methodology
To understand the contradictory urban condition that condominium towers create in the built 
fabric of Toronto, it is important to understand the foundational elements of the city that are 
being alienated through specific elements of the condominium. Within the condominium, 
there are four foundational elements: the basic principle of the urban dwelling, the conceived 
function of the condominium unit as a commodity, the condominium as a space of politics 
and structure of power, and the decay and maintenance of the building in time. Finally, 
we will consider a toolkit for undermining the determinist output of these four elements to 
restore the condominium tower as dynamic and functional armature of the urban fabric. 
0�1�2 Habitus and the Urban Dwelling
First, we must establish the significance of the individual dwelling, which has traditionally 
formed the basis of both the social life17 and the morphology of the city.18 The rise of 
high-density living and condominium ownership in the contemporary city have greatly 
complicated our understanding of this private realm. It is therefore necessary first to re-
establish the foundational social and ontological importance that the dwelling holds in the 
space of the city. The basic value of the dwelling is as the locus of habitus;19 the practice of 
maintaining oneself. The dwelling gives the individual a place of security and belonging, 
within the material and political negotiations of the larger city. In Toronto, the cultural 
understanding of the dwelling in the condominium has been heavily flavoured by preceding 
decades of suburban sprawl.20 By investigating this chronology of suburban values, we 
establish a cultural understanding of peoples relationship to their dwelling unit. Establishing 
17.  Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 29-31.
18. George Baird, “Studies on Urban Morphology in North America,” Writings on Architecture and the City 
(London: Artifice Books on Architecture, 2015), 129.
19.  Hazel Easthope, “A Place Called Home,” Housing, Theory and Society 21, no. 3 (November 2010): 133.
20.  Hans Ibelings and PARTISANS, Rise and Sprawl: The Condominiumization of Toronto (Toronto: The 
Architecture Observer, 2016), 28-30.
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this dwelling as the basic building-block and cultural variable within the city, we are then 
able to unpack the influence of neoliberal codes of production, culture, and politics within the 
condominium.
0�1�3 Condo Morphology and the Totalizing March of Financialization
The neoliberal codes that structure the production of residential fabric of the city are the next 
aspect of the condominium to be considered. As condominiums are typologically the product 
of capitalist codes of speculative city building,21 the dwelling has become a commodity, 
characterized by its homogeneity for the sake of exchangeability.22 With increasing 
globalization, the exchange value of condominium units became increasingly referential to 
geographies of real-estate values, and disassociated from the use-value of units.23 Because 
it was useful for accumulating large volumes of capital in specific geographies, methods of 
space production were re-designed around this disassociation. This was endorsed through 
culturally liberal preconceptions about the purpose of private property and with fiscal and 
space planning policies. Global super centres of real-estate investment like London, New 
York, Dubai, and Toronto became important mechanisms for generating and securing capital 
growth within consumption-based economies, following de-industrialization throughout the 
1980’s and 1990’s.24 Housing in these cities became increasingly viewed as commodities of 
exchange, rather than as places to live. In a cycle of self-validation, geographies of property 
values are both perpetuating the artificial inflation of the exchange value of condominiums, 
and providing financial incentive for the localized hyper-densification of the city through 
the ongoing construction of taller and denser condominium towers. The conscious disparity 
between the exchange value and use value of units is creating a socio-economic precipice 
that increasingly alienates urban political (divergent) action for fear of undermining the 
precarious accumulation of capital.25 
21.  Easthope, Politics and Practices, 157.
22.  Lefebvre, The production of Space, 75. 
23.  Neil Smith, Uneven Development (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2008), 104. 
24.  Manuel B Aalbers, “Housing and Financialization,” A Research Agenda for Housing, ed. Markus Moos 
(Northamton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) 32.
25.  Webb, “The Implications of Condominium Neighbourhoods,” 54.
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0�1�4 Real and Abstract Political Spaces of the Condominium
From this foundational understanding of the unit as an increasingly alienating space within 
the city, we come to understand the city as a political field; a “space of appearance,” of the 
negotiation of values, and of the collective imagination.26 The condo-ized framing of political 
space in the neoliberal-built city transgresses the classical binary of public and private spaces 
to create a field of incremental publics.27 This incremental field is further politicized through 
the corporatized control of built space under the framework of the Ontario Condominium 
Act (OCA-98). This legislation gives each condominium corporation a semi-autonomous 
constitution, creating islands of micro-democracy within the field of the city. Participation 
in this micro-democracy is based on share-ownership rather than occupancy, reinforcing 
neo-liberal control.28 These two conceptions of the city as political space – the space of 
appearance and the corporatized policy of control over that space – are at odds with each 
other within the institution of the condominium as both an extension of urban public space, 
and a space under neoliberal control. Where-as the city as space of appearance is grounded in 
the appropriation of the built form, the political institutions of the condominium are founded 
on neoliberal codes of ownership, accumulation, and determinacy. To maintain the function 
of real-estate as a bank of capital within the global economy, these political codes are used 
strategically, to protect the integrity of the asset, rather than to promote the emergence of an 
urban polity.
0�1�5 The Decaying Neoliberal Artifact and the Tragedy of the Anticommons
The fourth consideration which undermines any strategies of stability in the condominium 
tower is the material tower itself. The material is, after all, the product of space and the 
provider of function. Material in time is not static. The material of buildings acts counter the 
expectation of economies of finance and capital growth. While the value of the real-estate 
asset is always hoped to increase based purely on the appreciation of the land on which it is 
built, the performance of building systems will only ever decrease.29 Unlike a gold ingot, a 
26.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 73. 
27.  Ute Lehrer and Loren March, “Verticality, Public Space and the Role of Resident Participation in 
Revitalizing Suburban High-rise Buildings,” Canadian Journal of Urban Research 28, no. 1 (Summer 
2019): 65-85. 
28.  Legislative Assembly of Ontario, “Condominium Act, 1998,” Statues of Ontario, 1998, (Toronto: Queen’s 
Printer for Ontario, 1998): s. 51(2).
29.  Hilliard MacBeth, When The Bubble Bursts: Surviving the Canadian Real Estate Crash, (Toronto: 
Dundurn Press, 2018), ch. 15.
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condominium requires constant decisions of capital investment for maintenance to retain its 
exchange value and, more importantly, its use value. The maintenance of the material tower 
is, therefore, the intersection of the tower as functional, political, and economic entities, all 
at once. With the power of agency fragmented into the tens or hundreds of private parcels 
through condominium title, contradictory views of ownership, common expectations of 
financial growth, and the natural tendency toward building degradation, create an economic 
stalemate known as the tragedy of the anticommons.30 In this tragic condition, the politics 
of ownership, functional potential, and material maintenance of condominiums are 
compromised to an ever-decreasing state, leading to the complete alienation of the use value 
of the condominium dwelling and its place in the city.31
0�1�6 Restoring Habitus through Disruptive ‘Planning’
After considering the framework of the condominium as dwelling, instrument of economic 
gain, political playing field, and catalyst for alienating decay, the question must be asked, 
what tools do architects have to subvert these spatial strategies of power? With the awareness 
of the spatial alienation, engineered by false applications of democracy and collectivism, this 
thesis proposes that the condominium tower, as a functional piece of the social city, resists 
comprehensive top-down ideological renewal as only a mechanism to reinforce strategies of 
power in space and daily life.32 In order to restore the agency of habitus, the architect must 
remove themselves from strategic discourse by using a tool-kit that appropriates the existing 
city into new futures,33 but simultaneously opens these futures for public interpretation and 
mass appropriation, rather than tying space down to a single utopic narrative. This can be 
done through scenario planning. Scenario planning expands the horizon of future possibilities 
beyond a single narrative by systematically exploring different outcomes from all facets 
of uncertainty of a given system or situation.34 In exploring different conceptions of daily 
life and decision making in the condominium through stories and images, the architect can 
interrupt the processes of spatial reproduction within the tower. By engaging the public’s 
imagination through spatial narratives, residents of the tower can use tactic, and in-so-doing, 
30.  Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” 6.
31.  Webb, “The Implications of Condominium Neighbourhoods,” 53-6.
32. de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 94. 
33.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 96. 
34.  Michael Godet, Philippe Durance, Strategic Foresight: For Corporate and Regional Development (Paris: 
Editions Dunod, 2011), 1-3.
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dis-alienate themselves from the space of the condominium. Within the decision making of 
daily life, the spatial agency of the many residents of the tower can be restored. This thesis 
will investigate a series of three alternative futures of a condominium tower in Toronto, 
to understand how decision making with regards to the four variables discussed above, 
radically influences the ability of these towers to sustain healthy urban life into the future. 
Acknowledging that the future is subject to innumerable influences and, therefore, beyond 
any single person’s ability to control or predict, scenario building, or in the words of John 
Urry, “post-modern planning,” explores the full spectrum of possible outcomes within the 
condominium community.35 
These scenarios are not intended to provide water-tight solutions to the innumerable problems 
that condominium towers pose. Rather, by telling stories about the diverse possible futures of 
the tower, the urban society within the by building can see the armature of the city that they 
inhabit many new and different lights. These pose as modes of daily operation, alternative to 
the single capitalist narrative that has generated and perpetuates the condominiums.36 Delving 
into the condominium towers as living and autonomous pieces of the new urban fabric, their 
occupants might be emancipated from financialized and institutionalized preconceptions of 
urban dwelling. This might allow for these tower structures, as permanent artifacts in the city, 
to evolve to become active and vibrant armatures of city life.
35. John Urry, What is the Future, digital (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2016), ch. 1. 
36.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 86-7. 
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Part 1:
Condominiums as the Urban Artifact of 
Neoliberal Determinacy
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1�1 The Dwelling as Urban Building Block 
The glass and concrete condominium towers have become the hallmark of living in Toronto 
with over 186 100 new units were registered in the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area 
between 2002 and 2018.37 The private dwelling has changed substantially over the past 
century, both in our cultural understanding of its role within the urban social landscape, and 
its physical function within the morphology of the city as a dynamic artifact. The need for 
‘home’ as a place of identity and security, is a “universal human practice.”38 As a practice, 
the making of home is based on the very personal and material process of appropriating 
the space that one inhabits to align with their daily needs. Throughout history, these daily 
practices formed and evolved the city, making it as the sum of many parts, a collective 
‘opus’ of a society,39 with the inconspicuous individual dwelling as the monomer unit for this 
construction.40 Over the past centuries, the reality of the city as the sum of its granular parts, 
has been slowly eroded, in exchange for totalized conceptions of neighbourhoods, districts 
and armatures. These conceptions are the imposition of structured power upon the otherwise 
political space of the city.41 In Toronto, this cultural shift can be traced from the earliest 
pastoral suburbs like Don Mills, through subsequent modes of city building like the utopic 
modernist towers, to the condominiums of today. These subsequent modes of producing 
residential urban fabric reify evolving strategies of political powers and have direct 
ontological implications for how people dwell in the city. To understand the relationship 
between hegemonic values of space production and the evolution of Toronto’s morphology 
through daily practice, we must first dig through the many-layered manifestations of 
power in the city to arrive at the basic building block of daily life, that is the dwelling unit; 
colloquially, the home. 
37.  Condominiums: Two Decades of Housing, Toronto City Planning, digital (Toronto: City of Toronto, May 
2020), https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/8f4f-City-Planning-Condominiums-Two-
Decades-of-New-Housing.pdf.
38.  David Madden and Peter Marcuse, In Defense of Housing: The Politics of Crisis. (London: Verso, 2016), 
53. 
39.  Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 33. 
40.  Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 50.
41.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 93-4.
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1�1�1 Habitus as the Basis of Dwelling (Maintenance and Change)
Stepping back from condominiums specifically to understand the interrelations of the 
dwelling to the urban fabric, we must first understand the ontological and material 
relationship between the urban individual and their dwelling. The dwelling– the private 
realm – is the foundation for the daily life of the urban citizen. Practically speaking, the 
use-value of the house is to accommodate basic corporeal maintenance; sleeping, eating, and 
hygiene.42 The human connection to place and home, however, runs much deeper. Hazell 
Easthope situates corporeal maintenance within the home using the word Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus, that is the rootedness in place across different scales, arising from the rhythms 
of daily life in familiar spaces and geographies. Habitus goes beyond purely corporeal care 
to incorporate the maintenance of the relationship between “nature (being) and culture, […] 
consciousness and the body, self and other, mechanism and teleology, determinism and 
freedom, and even between memory and imagination,”43 capturing the most intimate fibers 
of the socio-spatial dialectic. Habitus does not narrowly define the maintenance of the self 
– body and mind – but reciprocally includes the relations of these things in corporeal space 
in a maintenance or reproduction of the mechanisms that form it. It is the maintenance of the 
space of maintenance – the investment of time, effort, and materials (or capital) in keeping 
and making one’s dwelling both functional and good according to a certain code.44 
While Bourdieu, as a sociologist, defined habitus as a mechanism to isolate how societies 
act in a subconscious and cohesive way to reproduce themselves, de Certeau criticized his 
definition in the very notion of it being a subconscious and “unintentional” practice. While 
Bourdieu allowed for ‘improvisation’ within habitus as practice, he determined it to be 
regulated45 and therefore equally the learned product of the structure within which it operates, 
thus indiscernible. de Certeau revives habitus from within the structure that it operates by 
insisting that in being the primary driver of social mobility, habitus, and the improvisation 
for which it allows, must operate ‘other’ to the structure.46 The daily mechanism for dwelling 
therefore became the means to subvert structure. 
42.  Arendt, The Human Condition, 73-4. 
43.  Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory, 79. 
44.  Easthope, “A Place Called Home,”133. 
45.  Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory, 79.













Fig�3 From de Certeau’s spatial turn to a theory of habitus.
De Certeau’s tactical turn translated to habitus and the space of the condominium.
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de Certeau frames this reciprocal maintenance of space as appropriation of power; in a 
moment when space exerts force on the daily life of its inhabitant by being at odds with their 
tacit values or ideologies, the individual’s values manifest themselves, prompting them to 
appropriative action on space.47 de Certeau calls these small acts of appropriation tactics. By 
forming one’s home and daily habits according to how one judges best, the inhabitant asserts 
their individual values, simultaneously realizing their individuality, and the physical use-
value of their unit. It is this capacity of adaptation through habitus that the individual is able 
to make a place of privacy and belonging within the city. As the phenomenon of home is a 
basic human need, we are considering this ability for spatial adaptation as the inhabitants of a 
dwelling so see fit, the basic use-value of the dwelling.48
The implications of habitus, extend beyond the bounds of the private realm to make up 
the heterogeneous “urban experience.” As property lines around private lots collectively 
delimit the public realm in two dimensions,49 so the urban experience of the public realm is 
comprised of the landscape of many discreet buildings. In the scope of the street, district, 
or city, the spatial realizations of many individuals’ values result in diachronous evolution 
and heterogeneity of the urban fabric.50 This material variation ranges in scale, from paint 
and potted plants, to building morphology. In this eclectic expression of many individuals’ 
daily lives, the city has traditionally been analysed as the collective “work” – the result of 
daily, discreet, and decentralized negotiations between individuals.51 This quotidian cycle of 
adjustments and adaptations is the practice of habitus, establishing familiarity and belonging 
at the civic scale. 
1�1�2 Urbanism and the Extraction of Dwelling
Over the last few centuries, the idea of the city as a ‘work’ – the outcome of people’s 
unceasing appropriations and negotiations of their places of life and labour – has largely 
been lost due to totalizing conceptions and visions of what a city should be.52 This loss of 
47.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 85.
48.  Madden, In Defense of Housing, 53-4. 
49.  Baird, Vacant Lottery, 24. 
50.  George Baird, “Studies on Urban Morphology in North America,” 129. 
51.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 75.
52.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 93-4. 
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the city as an everyday ‘work’ is especially true for the residential fabric of North American 
cities, which over the past on hundred years was completely extracted from the city proper 
in the form of suburbs.53 Following modern doctrine, city planning had considered the 
emergence of the core-periphery hierarchy as a natural and necessary urban phenomenon. 
This model has cemented the common perception of the ‘city proper’ (propre) as the central 
business district and commercial areas – in the words of Irving Kristol, the city as a “service 
station”.54 What is often lost in this distinction is the ultimate centrality of residential fabric 
in the daily functioning, and the socio-cultural mobility of the city.55 While great public 
spaces, commercial districts, and monumental constructions are often considered the focal 
point of city building, it is the residential fabric that gives rise to the shape and ultimate 
vitality of the city. Residential fabric forms the matrix in which spaces of urban exchange 
emerge. Even in historic and contemporary instances where functional urban artifacts like 
fortifications, factories, or shopping centres pre-date a residential morphology, the necessity 
of daily habits has always been sufficient to reorient the concerns of urban life away from 
nodes of exception towards individual states of domesticity.56 From urban doctrines gone by, 
we have acquired the tendency of thinking that residential fabric as an appendix to the city 
proper, produced, static and idyllic, removed from sites of urban exchange – landscapes of 
consumption.57 This conception of the dwelling was present in the inception of the suburbs 
where spacious neighbourhoods were connected to distant shopping centres, employment 
zones, and the Toronto city centre through sinuous street networks and expressways, and is 
perpetuated today, when apartment units are stacked up away from the public, to be accessed 
through anonymous and alienating lobbies, elevators, and hallways.58 The extraction of the 
dwelling from the city has allowed the production of residential fabric to be instrumentalized 
more fully, concretizing totalized capitalist strategies into the daily life and spatial 
practices of the city.59 In the urban landscape of Toronto, we can trace this tradition from 
the conception of the suburbs of Don Mills to the condominium podium towers of the past 
twenty years. 
53.  John Sewell, The Shape of the City: Toronto’s Struggles with Modern Planning (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1993), 20-1.
54.  Barton Myers and George Baird, “Vacant Lottery,” Design Quarterly, no. 108 (1978): 8. 
55.  Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 48-9. 
56.  Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 70. 
57.  Smith, Uneven Development, 42.
58.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 30.
59.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 98.
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1�1�3 Don Mills and the Conceived Urban Experience
The building of architecture is the projection of ideals. As the placement of a single 
wall signifies a decision made, based on particular values, so the complete house is the 
manifestation of organizing principles. Likewise, the surveying of land and laying of roads 
projects the values of those in charge onto the urban fabric. Whereas the placement of a wall 
might impact on an individual’s daily life, buildings and infrastructure in cities organize 
whole societies according to specific socio-political structures. The emergence of master-
planned districts, therefore, not only influence rhythms and power structures of the city, but, 
in some capacity, choregraph them outright according to the ideals of developers, architects 
and people in positions of decision-making. When engineered as complete communities, 
armatures of the city precipitate principles of politics, society, and economics, according to 
views of the city as a finished product. For better or for worse, these prescribe ideologies, 
social structures, and patterns of life, conceived by an external authority, form the conceived 
space of the city.60
The production of residential communities as carefully calibrated and choreographed 
elements of the city did not begin in Toronto with the construction of condominium tower, 
but is demonstrated in early master-planned suburbs of the 50’s and 60’s. Macklin Hancock’s 
Don Mills is a hallmark example of this, not only because its formal qualities and civic 
ambitions, derived from Garden City principles that where manifested in many early suburbs 
across Canada and the States,61 but also because under the guiding management of the 
industrial E.P. Taylor, it represented the induction of Garden City aspirations into a highly 
profitable way of building urban fabric in the city.62
The building of Don Mills began in 1954. Recently returned from Harvard where he had 
been exposed to the latest discourses in European post-war planning, the young planner 
Macklin Hancock envisioned a clear set of formal principles for Don Mills to create the 
picture of ideal urban experience across the full ambit of the development. This calibrated 
experience extended from the scale of the home up to the social equilibrium of the 
60.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 10-1.
61.  Easterling, Keller, Organization space (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 142.
62.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 95.
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community as a whole. He based the organization on the then-emerging concept of the 
neighbourhood unit as a self-contained community, each with its own internal amenities like 
parks, schools, community centre, churches, and distinctly separated employment zones.63 
Hancock deployed a seemingly arbitrary network of curving streets which, when planted with 
trees, gave the neighbourhood a highly marketable park-like experience.64 More importantly, 
irregular street distribution made the neighbourhood impractical for people to use as through-
ways, discouraging strangers – the disruptive other – from the streets of this new city.65 The 
most culturally significant design principle, however, was the generous increasing of lot sizes 
to intentionally isolate the individual homes from each other and give residents ‘elbow room’ 
– the autonomy to live, move, and alter their homes, free from the need for neighbourly 
negotiation.66 Through these principles, the generation of the pastoral experience reduced the 
new shape of the city to a perfectly inoffensive ideal of city living. The suburb was produced 
as a quiet and pastoral domesticity – a landscape of consumption.67 
There was an undeniable social-civic aspiration to the plan for Don Mills as well. In a 
reformist Howardian spirit, the new city was designed as a passive experience, free from 
confrontation or offence.68  The eradication of the stranger and through-traveller, and isolation 
from the neighbour through the increase of lot sizes removed any need for social or political 
negotiation. Carefully calibrated mixing of economic classes guaranteed a balanced and 
agreeable society.69 The public institutions – school, church, and sports club – were to 
provide all the necessary amenity for civic and social engagement – erroneously equated 
with political engagement. Political engagement was envisioned as a bridge club.70 This is, 
perhaps, the core principle of the sub-urban experience – that one can live in the city and yet 
be liberated from the distinctly urban need for interpersonal negotiation. This liberation from 
negotiation has pervaded our conceptions of urban dwelling ever since.
63.  The separation of residential and employment areas of the city was another principle carried over from the 
quasi-religious zeal of nineteenth century urban reformers, believing places of industry to be damaging to 
the innocent and natural development of the family. Sewell, The Shape of the City, 10-1, 16. 
64.  The plan for Rosedale in Toronto, was based on Fredrick Law Olmsted’s 1869 plan for the upper-
class neighbourhood of Riverside, Chicago. Gently curving streets were used deliberately to give these 
neighbourhoods a leisurely and parklike quality of experience. Sewell, The Shape of the City, 21. 
65.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 86. 
66.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 84-90. 
67.  Smith, Uneven Development, 42.
68.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 22-7. 
69.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 90-1. 
70.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 85.
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Don Mills was a market success and highly profitable for E.P. Taylor, the developer. It had 
created a new lifestyle for the emerging post-war demographic of young atomic families, 
giving them places to spread out and to grow. In Don Mills, the marketability of Hancock’s 
spacious and idyllic lot, combined with Taylor’s industrialist mastery of financing, 
incentivized the Fordist development of vast portions of the city. The ideals embodied in this 
ready-made piece of the city became the codified template for the production of residential 
areas across the Canada.71 
While Hancock understood the importance of the city as the locus of belonging, for him the 
phenomenon of belonging was most productive as the experience of a static, preconceived 
environment, rather than the active participation in place-making and society building.72 
While Don Mills was a culmination of an emerging tradition of city planning,73 this new 
neighbourhood represented the intersection of the ideological conceptions of society and 
urban life with the corporate Fordist production of that space.74 In their calculated stability, 
the production of neighbourhoods by private industry was conceived of as the best means for 
leading the rapid expansion of Toronto. Extracting the dwelling from the core of the city and 
placing it in optimized landscapes, the city ceased to be a collective project, but was rather 
marketed as the experience of pre-assembled cultural ideals.
1�1�4 Towers and the Lifestyle Community
As the city of Toronto continued to grow, the notion of city building as the production of 
pre-conceived experience was fortified in each evolution of planned built form. This was 
demonstrated in the rise of modernist tower building projects from the 1960’s to the 1980’s. 
While many tower community projects punctuated the ever-expanding suburban carpet, the 
vision of the new city as a carefully composed utopic experience is seen most aggressively 
in downtown projects like Moss Park and St. James Town.75 These tower communities, 
founded on the modernist principles emerging from Europe, promised new and streamlined 
visions of living convenience. Targeted towards young urban professionals, St. James 
71.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 93-6.
72.  Easterling, Organization space, 129-30.
73.  Aureli, City as Political Form, 32. 
74.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 95.
75.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 102, 163-66.
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Fig�4 “Move to St. James Town just for the fun of it!”
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Town was marketed as an epicenter of casual and hedonistic downtown living.76 While the 
a priori image of carefree apartment dwelling was similar for projects across the Metro 
Toronto Planning Region, the downtown projects are the clearest example of the strategic 
production of the city under the modernist dogma of urban renewal. For renewal projects 
in the Toronto core, hundreds of individuals and families were displaced from a functional 
residential fabric which was deemed unsightly and unprofitable. In a land-clearing strategy 
known as ‘block-busting,’ developers used deliberate neglect and destruction of the existing 
urban fabric to make entire downtown neighbourhoods untenable, justifying their demolition 
and replacement.77 For St. James Town, 435 homes and private properties were assembled 
into a tabula rasa, on which 19 rental towers were built. A select handful of planners and 
developers provided a regenerated vision for what city living should look like. Since their 
construction, these high-modernist ideals of a preconceived vision of city life produced by 
the architects, developers, and land management corporations have been unable to adapt 
according to the true and evolving cultural and every-day needs of their inhabitants, causing 
disenfranchisement and alienation. The modernist towers have become object of neglect and 
notorious decay.78  
While public outrage surrounding urban renewal projects, fanned by the writings of Jane 
Jacobs, George Baird, and Barton Myers put to an end to such wholesale projects at the scale 
of St. James Town, the heroic vision of the residential tower, as the fetishized production of 
a complete lifestyle community was firmly embedded in the toolbox of the architect and the 
developer. 
The condominium, now the most common form of dwelling unit being built in Toronto,79 
emerged in Ontario, in 1967 as the combination of free-hold land title, with the speed and 
76.  E.R.A. Architects, University of Toronto, Mayor’s Tower Renewal: Opportunities Book (Toronto: City of 
Toronto, 2008), 18. 
77.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 164-66. 
78.  The statement of morphology being unable to adapt to the lived reality, as purely a dichotomy between 
form and function according to a simplified application of Soja’s socio-spatial dialectic is naïve. The 
power structures inherent in projects like St. James Town, necessary for developing these utopic socialized 
communities within the neoliberal framework – rental tenure – is both a product of the vision and a factor 
of its inhumane ends. 





















Fig�5 Figure ground morphology and property line evolution, 1903 – 1976.
This reproduction of the figure-ground and parcel studies of St. James Town, taken from George Baird’s Upper 
Jarvis Study, illustrates how the city lots, as parcels of private ideological agency, were assembled to create a 
highly produced vision for urban dwelling. 
Fig�6 Along Crumbling St. James Street - where 
the shadow of 200 evictions hangs-Mrs. Alberta 
Manduck goes house-hunting with her neighbor’s 
children
Fig�7 St. James Town Apartments: Houses 
being cleared for $50 million development
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efficiency of high-rise development. Despite this rapid growth from suburbs and rental 
towers, the City of Toronto was facing ongoing housing shortages. The carefully planned 
but sprawling communities of the suburbs could not provide residences at a sufficient speed 
or density.80 While the modernist towers provided both speed and density, these tower 
developments were all designed and built as strictly rental communities, which many of 
them remain today. When real-estate management companies developed land into high-rise 
communities, they were building long-term investments, paying themselves off over decades 
of rent income and represented commitments for property management and maintenance. 
The provincial government at the time believed that the removal of such commitments 
would accelerate development in high-density development. By allowing units to be sold 
individually, the private market, the responsibilities of property and maintenance could be 
passed on to the private home owners. What emerged was a typology that looked very much 
like the rental tower, complete with common rooms, pools, theaters, and concierges.81 
In the 1970’s, the use of condominiums was limited largely to the production of affordable 
housing. This was promoted through the Federal Assisted Home Ownership (AHOP) 
program which saw the ability for the accumulation of capital, afforded by mortgaged 
home-ownership, as the means to lift people out of poverty. Between 1967 and 1981, three 
years after AHOP was phased out, 85 728 condominium units were built in the Toronto 
Metropolitan Area. Once the federal incentive ended, the builders briefly tried to reorient into 
the market for luxury condominiums which could be sold to smaller wealthier households at 
a premium, but the recession and rising mortgage interest rates of 1980 quickly brought an 
end to this. At the time, City of Toronto Planning Commissioner Stephen McLaughlin noted 
how the economic down-turn chilled the initial “bandwagon effect,” casting a skepticism 
over the viability of condominiums.82 As a means of dividing a single parcel of land into 
many privately held titles, the condominium would remain in the background until it found 
new demand, beginning in the mid 1990’s. Smaller white-collar households, emerging urban 
theories on the necessity of density, and a renewed interest in Toronto’s inner city, catalyzed 
by the Two Kings policy of 1994, slowly coalesced in the form of the condominium podium 
80.  Jon Caulfield, “Making Toronto safe - once more - for the developers,” The City Book; The Politics and 
Planning of Canada’s Cities, (Toronto: Charlottetown Group Publishing, 1976): 139.
81.  R. C. Risk, “Condominiums and Canada,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 18, no. 1 (1968): 2-3.
82.  Stephen G. McLaughlin, Toronto condominiums – past, present and future. (City of Toronto Planning and 
Development Department: Toronto, 1982).
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tower.83 
Culturally, condominiums are still designed, produced, and marketed in the vision of a 
complete communities of experience. Marketing campaigns for preconstruction projects 
are integral for promoting lifestyles of consumptive experience. Architectural renderings 
depict attractive young people spending their evenings in dimly lit party rooms, or lounging 
beside the pool (Fig. 8).84 Developers tailor everything from the architectural messaging 
to the internal codes of conduct to create enclaves for utopian ways of living, which are 
only later to be filled with occupants to live them.85 Experience, rather than the production 
of either physical or social space, is portrayed as the new benchmark for civic life, much 
like the bridge club in the post-war suburbs. While internalized amenities like gyms and 
lounges create the illusion of an exclusive or insulated community, this rhythm is reinforced 
by the architectonics of daily life in the tower. As vertical enclaves, the condominium unit 
is idealized as a lofty retreat, elevated away from the business of life on the street. The 
feature of private elevators, with the appeal of exclusive service to penthouse enclaves whisk 
residents up from the public realm of the lobby without having to make eye contact with a 
neighbour, let alone a stranger.86 This is reminiscent of the winding safe and stranger-free 
streets of the suburbs. Continuing the suburban tradition, condominium towers are designed 
and constructed as residential enclaves within the city, that are appendix to the dynamism and 
vitality that we attribute to the city and have therein been ossified in superficial constructs of 
spatial experience.
1�1�5 The Strategy of Alienation
The idea of city as a produced framework for urban experience to be consumed, even if 
this consumption is enfolded in daily life, is fundamentally at odds with the idea of the 
83.  While city planning policy had already tried to reorient real estate investment from the sprawl of the 
suburbs back into the city centre as early as the Toronto’s Central Area Plan of 1976, the consecutive 
financial crises of the 1980’s and 90’s supressed any substantial building in the city until global economic 
turning of the mid-90’s. Ute Lehrer and Thorben Wieditz, “Condominium Development and Gentrification: 
The Relationship Between Policies, Building Activities and Socio-economic Development in Toronto,” 
Canadian Journal of Urban Research 18, no. 2 (January 2009): 86-7. 
84.  F, Rise and Sprawl, 90-9.
85.  Evan McKenzie, Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 145-6.
86.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 24, 30.
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Fig�8 Maverick Condo marketing 
images
Marketing images present a vision of 
a carefully calibrated lifestyle within 
the tower, strategically concieved 
for maximum appeal within a 
target market demographic. These 
marketing images taken from Empire 
Communities presents a chic and 
subdued lifestyle meant to appeal to 
young, ambitious professionals. 
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city as a social cultural product, that is as the collective work of a whole society.87 Singular 
visions of what the city should look like are the reification of a power on space and cannot 
accommodate ‘other’ modes of operation, such as the appropriative action of space. The 
city is, therefore, strategically reduced to an experience to be consumed but not acted upon, 
should its disruption undermine the structure of power. As the residential fabric of the city 
becomes an increasingly totalized conception of what urban dwelling ought to look like, 
habitus, as the ontological use-value of the dwelling, becomes necessarily alien. Singular 
theoretical visions are threatened by presence of the other ways of life.88
If the ontological value of the urban fabric is formed through its inhabitants’ ability to 
daily re-form their dwelling according to their needs and desires,89 this value is alienated 
when external power structures prevent appropriative action. Strategies, according to De 
Certeau, are means by which power structures – social, economic, or political – use space 
to support the daily reproduction of social structures and practices necessary for their own 
survival. These strategies can be embodied in perceived space, such as the heavy-handed 
compartmentalization of living space in a condominium unit which physically enforces 
particular space usage, or abstract by formulations of conceived space.90 Dwellings of the 
city are the product of contemporary hegemonic cultural values, fixing those cultural values 
into spatial practice and habits of daily life. When these hegemonic strategies come at odds 
with the dynamic individual spatial practice of habitus, the socio-spatial dialectic is tested 
with one of two outcomes. Either the space itself is adapted to the use of the individual, or 
the hegemonic power that produced the space asserts itself, alienating the ontological use-
value from the dwelling unit.91 When the dwelling unit is adapted to meet personal needs, the 
fabric of the city is changed, cared for, and politicized according to the quotidian activism of 
the urban dweller. The alienation of the dwelling unit’s use-value through strategic neoliberal 
structuring, conversely, will result in the de-politicisation and the material and emotional dis-
investment of the urban fabric of Toronto. Alienation of habitus becomes greater, the stronger 
the determinism of the dwellings that are produced. 
87.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space¸73-5. 
88.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 80.
89.  Easthope, “A Place Called Home,” 134.
90.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xix. 
91.  Madden, In Defense of Housing, 53-4. 
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Through the increasing determinism of our produced residential space, architects have 
increasingly fixed the residential fabric as zones of control and stability, justifying strategies 
for the alienation of the individual city-dweller’s values and agency. While this tradition is 
not new to Toronto, the migration of the dwelling from the sprawling grid of private parcels 
to the condominium tower, as a singular framework of urban architecture, has progressively 
obscured and alienated the individual within the urban framework. The residential framework 
of the condominium has been overlayed with mechanisms of economic and political 
control that demonstrate how these abstract strategies gave rise to the specific type of the 
condominium tower and perpetuate their internal counter-urban power dynamics into the 




















Fig�9 Strong conceptions of dwelling causing alienation
Dwellings that are the product of strong conceptions of space, eg. of economic policy and utopian architectural 
vision, more strongly suppress their own appropriation. This can be achieved through the strong coding of the 
perceived space itself, or through disciplinary social structures like mortgage debt and the threat of financial 
loss. 
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1�2 The Dwelling Unit as Economic Instrument
1�2�1 The Economy for Parcels of Liberal Freedoms
The condominium tower morphology in Toronto is the reification of the ascendency of 
private property ownership in our capitalist-hegemonic cultural and economic practices.92 
Over the past century, our perception of home and its relationship to private property has 
evolved significantly through the influence of cultural practice and policy frameworks 
concerning land title. As we have seen in the first section, home is central to the human 
experience. In Canada however, as in many liberal-democratic countries, the ontological 
understanding of home was institutionalized in private property as an economic and legal 
entity. Through a cultural heritage of old English common-law, 93 we conceive of private 
property not only as inherently natural, but as naturally economic94 – the dwelling as 
commodity. Since the Great Depression until today¸ our use of this dwelling-commodity 
has evolved through three key modes of financialization.95 While considered here 
chronologically, as they became important to the rise of the condominium tower, these modes 
of financialization aren’t exclusive to specific periods. 
In the first mode, following the Great Depression and World Wars, the liberal understanding 
of citizenship through private property ownership was instrumentalized under federal policies 
that increased access to mortgage debt as a strategy for giving lifeblood to the young Fordist 
economy. These policies sold the idea of home as an asset that could be used by the consumer 
class to accumulate capital through equity.96 Through the manipulation of cultural values 
using fiscal policy, the appeal of classical Lockean estate liberties prompted the sprawl 
of the suburbs as economically useful geographies. The second mode of financialization 
that was formative to the condominium unit commodity was the evolution of the free-hold 
92.  Easthope, Politics and Practices, 157.
93. Cathy Sherry, “Lessons in Personal Freedom and Functional Land Markets: What Strata and Community 
Land Title can Learn from Traditional Doctrines of Property.” UNSW Law Journal 36, no. 1 (April 2013): 
283. 
94.  Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 19-21. 
95.  Aalbers, “Housing and Financialization,” 31-2.
96.  Colin Crouch, “Privatized Keynesianism: An Unacknowledged Policy Regime,” The British Journal of 

















Fig�10 Three observable modes of financialization.
We can use three basic modes of financialization to frame the emergence of the condominium tower as the 
favoured mode of city-building in Toronto. Once the dwelling has been commodified, it is situated within the 
economic geography of exchange. Once the frontiers of geography have moved on and the gradual decline of 
land value makes the dwelling unit useless for speculation, it becomes a mechanism of extraction of ground-
rent. 
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title into a tool of speculation. While the suburbs were consumption-based landscapes,97 
being non-commercial and non-industrial, they were made economically productive for 
the average homeowner through dynamic real-estate values.98 While this appreciation was 
important for the individual homeowner, now able to climb up the capitalist ladder,99 it 
became a matter of national importance during the rapid expansion of the global economy 
and the de-industrialization of the global north-west. With the north-western transition to 
a principally post-industrial economy, the real-estate commodity became one of the key 
means of securing national economies.100 Exacerbated by provincial and municipal planning 
policies, concentrated demand for free-hold titles has justified the production of smaller and 
ever-increasing densities of private property parcels in downtown Toronto.101 As the spatial 
product of capitalist-hegemonic culture and policy,102 the condominium tower has become a 
key spatial strategy for fixing the neoliberal economy within our urban spatial practice and 
daily life. 
The third means of the financialization of the condominium unit discussed here is the 
transformation of the unit as an asset that passively accumulates capital value to an 
instrument for the extraction of labour value through rent tenancy.103 However, in the 
framework of the of the condominium tower as an urban artifact, this third means of 
financialization is proposed as the culmination of all four of the critical dimensions of the 
condominium considered here. We must therefore look at it in the context of the fourth 
section about the material realities of the condominium towers. 
1�2�2 Locke and the Liberal Lens on Privacy
To understand how the private-property title has become the basic building-block within 
the production of the city, we must go back to our shared cultural understanding private 
property ownership and how these values have driven changes in the production of the city 
over the past 100 years. The cultural foundation for the extreme financialization of real-estate 
97.  Smith, Uneven Development, 42.
98.  Smith, Uneven Development, 83.
99.  Urry, The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies, 151-2.
100.  Aalbers, “Housing and Financialization,” 32. 
101.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 18-24, 41.
102.  Easthope, Politics and Practices, 157. 
103.  Aalbers, “Housing and Financialization,” 32.
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in Toronto can be found in the political philosophy of John Locke (1632-1704).104 Locke’s 
well-known motto, “life, liberty, and estate,” was not only foundational for the formation 
of English liberal democracy, which Canada’s Constitution and legal systems are based on, 
but were also foundational to the principles of the American Declaration of Independence 
of which Canada has a strong cultural lineage.105 It is specifically Locke’s understanding 
for the right to estate – private property – that has allowed for the extreme commodification 
and financialization of real-estate within the culture of capitalism that have given rise to the 
condominium unit.
In the Lockean tradition, estate was not specifically a dwelling as defined in the ontological 
dimension of habitus. Rather for Locke, estate was the right to appropriate land as a means 
to produce what was necessary for one’s own subsistence.106 Locke’s ability to equate 
the appropriation of a legally defined parcel of land as a material necessity infused the 
individual’s liberal labour action into the production space, making private property an 
economic, rather than a social, concept.107 
As an adherent to natural philosophy, Locke defined the individual’s need for and right to 
land as primary, and social institutions like government and currency as derivative. Currency, 
specifically, complicated his utilitarian idea of private property in a way that he never saw 
the need to reconcile. While the right to land came with the responsibility to use it to its 
fullest for one’s own survival but without waste, the introduction of currency, exchange, and 
surplus value without an equitable formulation of profit, sidestepped natural human limits for 
property use and accumulation. This oversight effectively justified the infinite appropriation 
of finite land, 108 or conversely assigning a finite parcel of land with a theoretically infinite 
104.  Sherry, “Lessons in Personal Freedom,: 283. 
105.  “Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” is from the American Declaration of Independence. “Peace, 
order, and good government,” from the Canadian Constitution.
106.  Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 21. 
107.  Locke, Second Treatise of Government, §. 34.
108.  In §. 33, Locke qualifies the appropriation of land in his understanding that the supply of land was 
effectively inexhaustible. “No body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though 
he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst: and the 
case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.”  Locke, Second Treatise of 
Government, §. 33.  
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exchange value.109 While the commodification of land which has existed throughout history, 
Locke’s linking the natural need for property to the obligation for labour and productivity 
set a cultural root that was open to the alienation of the social and ontological necessities of 
private property, in the name of economic liberty. In connecting the natural liberty of private 
property to constitutional law, Locke institutionalized the proto-capitalist culture of land 
ownership. 
In Locke’s natural-philosophic understanding, rights of life, liberty, and private property 
preceded the formation of society and state. According to the Second Treatise of Government, 
the basic purpose of the state – or politics at large – was to protect estate as the site of ‘man’s’ 
most natural freedom,110 in much the same way as the condominium corporation was added to 
private title to protect the individual’s unit.111 It is our inherited understanding therefore, that 
the fullest of right and liberties is on land that is owned in free-hold title as it precludes social 
or political consideration.112 This conception of private property as a basic tenet of a free 
and moral society led to the innate and largely unquestioned understanding that the fullest 
of citizenship can only ultimately be attained through the ownership of one’s dwelling as an 
isolated and autonomous parcel.113 The culturally revered concept of home ownership as both 
economic instrument and pre-political right has allowed for the widespread financialization 
of the dwelling unit in Toronto and around the world; first in how the home mortgage was 
used to promise financial accumulation and security, second, in how the land deed as a means 
of speculation was leveraged in the global economy, and third, in the generation of passive 
income through rent extraction. 
1�2�3 Fordism and Privatized Keynesianism 
The first mode of financialization that reinforced private property into the capitalist-
109.  In §. 31 of his Second Treatise of Government, Locke established the rational boundaries of what an 
individual could accumulate, on the limits of what they can “enjoy” in a way that nothing goes to waste or 
spoil. Macpherson asserts, however, that the convertibility of all commodities into currency commodity 
overcomes, at least superficially, to the limits of what can be enjoyed and accumulated. Crawford.B. 
Macpherson, foreword to Second Treatise of Government, by John Locke (Indianapolis, IND: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1980),  xvii.
110.  Locke, Second Treatise of Government, §. 124.  
111.  Ontario, Condominium Act, c. 58(1)(a). 
112.  Locke, Second Treatise of Government, §. 89.
113.  Easterling, Organization Space, 189.
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hegemonic practice was the government policies following the First and Second World 
Wars which cemented the free-hold title as an asset for accumulating equity. While the 
policy objectives are more clearly demonstrated in American politics, Canadian culture 
and policies closely mirrored their logics. During the Great Depression, unprecedented 
unemployment and widespread financial uncertainty made the working class – the consumers 
on which the emerging Fordist economic model was based – reluctant to spend money on 
consumer goods. By establishing Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) to 
securitize medium and high-risk mortgages, U.S. President F. Roosevelt greatly expanded the 
middle-class capacity to buy private property through mortgage-debt. The financial security 
‘granted’ through mortgage debt gave the working class the confidence to buy into a society 
of consumers and collectively reinforce the growing Fordist socio-economic structure.114 
Following the economic shock of the Second World War, this instrumentalization of home 
ownership through mortgage finance was coupled with emerging Keynesian economic 
theory of supply-demand moderation to embed real-estate policy as one of governments’ 
key tools for regulating national economies by the housing market’s capacity to alternately 
fix large volumes of surplus capital or secure immense volumes of capital debt.115 In 1946, 
the Canadian Government established the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation 
(CMHC), which insured higher risk loans to expand access to mortgage debt for the working 
class.116 On the premise of public wealth and well-being, working-class homes were adopted 
as the cash-reserve for the Fordist economy.117 
Vast quantities of new homes became the symbol of autonomy and post-war liberty. The 
spatial framework of these suburbs was, of course, strongly insinuated with the Lockean 
ideal of the private parcel. In Hancock’s Don Mills, houses generously spaced along winding 
streets gave residents “elbow room” to use their property with as little interference from 
neighbours and strangers as possible.118 As the reformist ambitions of the Garden City 
114.  In The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies, John Urry describes how the superstructural elements of a 
hegemonic power-base are in constant need of adjusting the common liberties that they present, in order 
to maintain system hierarchies. He makes this argument directly responding to the widely held belief 
that democracy will only emerge under the conditions of capitalism. The expanded access of property 
ownership, granted by easier access to home  mortgages, can be seen as one such concession made by 
those in power, for the sake of securing Fordism. Urry, The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies, 151-2.
115.  Crouch, “Privatized Keynesianism,” 383-6.
116.  Andre Sorensen and Paul Hess, “Building suburbs, Toronto-style: land development regimes, institutions, 
critical junctures and path dependence,” Town Planning Review 86, no. 4 (January 2015), 431.
117.  Crouch, “Privatized Keynesianism,” 394. 
118.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 86-8. 
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were subsumed into the “corporate suburb” of Don Mills through private land sale,119 the 
ideal of the American Dream became one of the Canadian Government’s key strategies for 
moderating the consumer economy. 
 While the values of the suburban American Dream were a powerful cultural driver to 
mobilize the consumer-class, it was the prospect of capital accumulation and financial 
security in home equity that became the most powerful draw for the working class to 
mortgaged property ownership.120 CMHC and Fannie Mae not only allowed the consumer 
class to afford ‘ownership’ of homes much more readily than before. The increased 
accessibility of mortgage debt effectively lowered the bottom rung of the capitalist ladder, 
and the mortgaged property became the culturally normative way for the individual to 
accumulate wealth.121 Buying a home through mortgage debt became an unquestioned step 
towards civil liberties and long-term financial security.122 The financial dimension of the title 
became as important as the home itself.
1�2�4 Economic Geography as Monetary Policy
Once the home-owner’s asset for saving was placed in the economically unproductive 
landscape of the suburbs, the dwelling commodity was further financialized to become a 
widely accessible means of real-estate speculation. In his analysis of economic geographies, 
Neil Smith notes that, “the more it develops, the more capitalism depends upon the 
appropriation of relative surplus value.”123 In the culture of capitalism, therefore, the 
accumulation of equity through paying off a home-mortgage was perceived as no longer 
enough. It became the homeowner’s greatest concern that the value of the commodity 
increases through the appreciation of the real-estate.124 In this desire for appreciation, the 
dwelling turned to the second mode of financialization; the manipulation of value through 
economic geographies.125 
119.  Sewell, The Shape of the City, 95.
120.  Crouch, “Privatized Keynesianism,” 384.
121.  Smith, Uneven Development, 41. 
122.  Crouch, “Privatized Keynesianism,” 383-4.
123.  Smith, Uneven Development, 89.
124.  Smith, Uneven Development, 43.





Fig�11 Toronto sprawl before and after 1951.
Following the expanded access to home mortgages through the founding of CMHC in 1946, the City of Toronto 
rapidly sprawled outwards in the suburbs. While there were nodes of mid and high-density dwelling like at the 
core of Don Mills, the majority of land-use was for low-density single-family homes. 
Toronto sprawl before and after 1951:
37
Real-estate equity only becomes meaningful when the property title is sold, liquidating the 
exchange value of the dwelling commodity. As a commodity, however, the exchange value 
of real-estate fluctuates based on factors other than use value, such as demand.126 Throughout 
history, the demand of land was based on proximity to natural and artificial resources, 
limited by mobility. Over the last century, as mobility got faster and cheaper,127  functional 
proximity becomes less of a factor, and land values become increasingly defined by the 
values of properties around them. While this is a simplification of many factors at play, this 
core principle creates geographies of economic differentiation across the space of the city, 
with shifting frontiers of high and low values, determined only by pre-existing values. In this 
fluctuation, homeowners stand to win or loose considerable capital on their home as an asset. 
Property values mobilized the geography domestic real-estate into the capitalist expectation 
for growth, ‘striving for relative surplus’ in the eventual sale. While land speculation is 
probably as old as private property itself, with examples coming to us from ancient Rome 
and beyond,128 once the need for functional proximity had been substantially diminished, the 
speculative value of the dwelling became the key factor of relative exchange values in the 
landscape of economic differentiation.129 
The geography of economic differentiation was important not only on a regional scale but 
also globally across national boarders. While suburban development was important in New 
Deal and Post-war economies, the deindustrialization of the global north-west has pushed 
real-estate to the forefront of Canada’s monetary policy. As manufacturing and the production 
of real goods began to leave North America for south-east Asia in the early 80’s, Canada and 
the U.S. consumer economies became increasingly dependent on the import of goods and 
services. The consumer spending that the Fordist economic model had been predicated on, 
was not sustainable within the contained currency in the absence of the internal production 
of value by primary and secondary economic activity. Real-estate was one of the principal 
commodities, within the Canadian geography and economy that was both widely accessible, 
and virtually guaranteed to increase in value based on sustained demand and inflation.130 This 
increase in value was necessary to provide a continuous source of value in the absence of 
real economic growth through production, diminished by the vacation of manufacturing from 
126.  Smith, Uneven Development, 40-1.
127.  Smith, Uneven Development, 104. 
128.  Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 71. 
129.  Smith, Uneven Development, 136-8.
130.  Crouch, “Privatized Keynesianism,” 390-1. 
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the Canadian economy. In the words of M. Aalbers, housing became, “both a way to fuel the 
economy by propping up consumption and to ‘compensate’ labor for decades of negligible or 
even negative real income growth.”131 The health of real-estate growth was necessary for the 
healthy growth of a countries GDP and to maintain the value of the currency.132 Sustaining 
the constant increase of real-estate values has become a key concern for central banks in 
managing national economies.133
As the relative exchange value of real-estate scaled up from being a private matter to 
becoming a matter of the federal economy, the scope of economic geography expanded 
globally. The production of increasing amounts of capital requires the increased concentration 
of capital investment.134 For real-estate to continue to be profitable as a speculative 
commodity, it requires the perpetual increase in demand and, therefore the continued growth 
of concentration and centralization.135 This centralization of capital investment in real-estate 
has led to the rise of “global cities” and financial centres like London, New York, Singapore, 
and Toronto, which are strategically used to geographically secure currency through real-
estate investment.136  
1�2�5 Policies and Neoliberal Strategies
Throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s the City of Toronto published a series of policies 
with the ambition of securing the city’s place within the new post-industrial global 
geography. In 2000, council commissioned the Toronto Competes audit of the city’s 
economic competitiveness on the world stage. The express intent of this audit was to 
determine how city-building strategies could be used to attract foreign investment and 
131.  Aalbers, “Housing and Financialization,” 32. 
132.  The Asian Financial Crisis was initiated when the Thai Baht lost over half of its value against the USD 
from which it had been recently floated. This was caused in large part, by the rapid collapse of foreign 
real-estate speculation in the developing economy. Achara Deboonme, “What have we learnt from the 
Tom Yam Keung Crisis?” The National Thailand, June 23, 2014, https://www.nationthailand.com/
opinion/30236928. 
133.  Stephen Punwasi, “Bank of Canada Wants a Housing Bubble, While Other Central Banks Try To Pop 
Them,” Better Dwelling, March 9, 2021, https://betterdwelling.com/bank-of-canada-wants-a-housing-
bubble-while-other-central-banks-try-to-pop-them/#_. 
134.  Smith, Uneven Development, 123-4. 
135.  Smith, Uneven Development, 121-3.
136.  Lehrer, “Condominium Development,” 90.
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prompt capital development in the knowledge economy.137 The innovative Secondary Zoning 
Area Plans 15 & 16 – “The Two Kings Policy” – enacted six years earlier by Mayor Barbara 
Hall in 1994, had already de-regulated zoning in two ex-industrial districts on East and West 
King St, 138 and set a framework for the translation of the existing industrial fabric into the 
new post-industrial city-scape.139 In 2003, the city’s Toronto’s Culture Plan for the Creative 
City,  outlined the strategy for creating a dense and consumable cultural landscape which 
was imperative for attracting and housing a new class of knowledge workers to form the core 
of the emerging economy.140 These policies had, and still have, the unequivocal intent of 
reinforcing Toronto within the post-Fordist economy, and bringing “employment and wealth” 
to the city. They reinforced the conception of the city as neoliberal product, rather than a 
socio-cultural work. The body of planning policies produced by the city is unequivocal in this 
point; encouraging free-market competition for the construction of a highly calculated and 
consumable urban experience to appeal to the young and mobile knowledge-worker class.141 
The condominium has become the key tool in this calculated production of the new urban 
fabric. Though the condominium form of ownership was created in Ontario in 1967, it was 
not until the shifting of the economy that it became a useful tool in the neoliberal agenda. 
This began as early as the 1980’s when the termination of the federal government’s AHOP 
program caused a marked geographic transition from high-affordability condominiums being 
built in the suburbs as their purpose-built-rental predecessors, to luxury condominiums in 
the core for speculative investment.142 With the emerging knowledge economy, however, 
that the concentration of knowledge capital became dependent the Condominium Act as the 
tool by which, free-hold-title commodity could be produced at the necessary density. While 
early condominiums like the Palace Pier Condos (1978) model the tower-in-the-park logic, 
projecting luxury by being built out of the central core, the of lofts and condos built after in 
the mid 90’s and onwards are decidedly within the downtown core or subsequent nodes of 
intensity. 
137.  Lehrer, “Condominium Development,” 88-9. 
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built from 1967–82: built 2002-18:
North York: 37.4% Toronto: 12.7%
Scarborough: 25.4% York: 4.4%
Etobicoke: 17% East York: 3.2%
1 condominium
1 3 5km
Fig�12 Historic and contemporary distributions of condominiums.
Early condominiums were located on cheap land in the suburbs, as they were built as affordable, privately 
owned housing under the Province of Ontario’s Assisted Home Ownership Program. Following the end of this 
program in 1978, the luxury condominium market emerged, seeing a reversal of distribution. Condominiums 
built from 2002-2018 are concentrated in the city core as they require concentration to validate them as a 
speculative investment. 
Distribution of condominiums 
built in Toronto in two eras:
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Like the luxury condos of the 1980’s, density has become a guarantee of the title-
commodity’s value for the buyer. While the physical use-value of the condominium unit is 
substantially less than the suburban parcel, the extreme density of high-value titles makes up 
for the use-value disparity by affirming the increased exchange value to the investor, albeit 
self-referentially.143 
1�2�6 The Strategy of the Condominium Experience – The Unit Itself
Under the neoliberal regime of space production, the podium tower condominium has 
become the product of escalating forces of capitalism under the auspices of neoliberal 
policy. Opening the space of the city to the capitalist forces of space-production,144 with the 
expressed intent of creating a high concentration of capital within the city, it is only to be 
expected that the dwellings produced would be increasingly reflect these capitalist logics.145 
To increase the fix of capital within the space of the city, unit-commodities had to be 
increasingly fixed in their form; increasingly totalized according to capitalist organizational 
logic. The production of the sprawling suburbs was made profitable through the Fordist 
standardization of home-building.146 As the production of housing became increasingly 
integrated into the strategy of the neoliberal agenda, the condominium unit became the bond 
of choice at an even greater homogenization and fixity. As construction techniques got more 
elaborate to provide property titles at greater densities, the units themselves became more 
standardized and locked into structural grids. Ibelings observes that this homogenization 
of units is desirable and expected, not only for the sake of efficient production, but for the 
security of the produced asset. The increasing similarity of the unit to every other unit in the 
city acts as an assurance to the buyer that it will be sellable again, when the time comes.147 
Similarity guarantees a certain fungibility that uniqueness and openness cannot,148 allowing 
the purchaser to believe that whatever dimensions of dwelling that are lost in the purchasing 
of the prescriptive condominium will be made up with profit, once someone else buys it.149
143.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 19. 
144.  Lehrer, “Condominium Development,” 88. 
145.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 75.
146. Sewell, The Shape of the City, 95. 
147.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 19. 
148.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 75. 
149.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 19.
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The totalizing force of this conception goes beyond the unit to the architecture of the 
condominium itself, as the production of a self-contained community experience. The legal 
structure of the condominium demands some form of communalism. There has emerged 
a list of commonly agreed upon amenities – party room, theater, gym, rooftop terrace, 
pool, and business centre – that seem obligatory in every condominium building.150 While 
many of these amenities such as green space and pools could be better supported as public 
amenities within the density of the larger city, these features have become part of the 
marketing language that assures the condominium buyer that their investment provides 
the promise of a ‘vibrant,’ fulfilling, and effortless urban life. Yet, with the need to provide 
specifically marketable amenity programs, any generosity of common space is fragmented 
into hyper-specific situations of use. As a direct response to the compromised liveability of 
individual units, these spaces are designed as necessary extensions of intimate conditions of 
the dwelling. In the need to be quantitatively commodifiable, they are sold as hyper-defined 
extensions of the dwelling ‘experience.’  
With the cultural appeal of isolated suburban dwelling still living in the imaginations of 
many young people targeted to live in the towers, it is no secret that condominiums have 
become a necessary stepping-stone-investment for ‘getting into the market.’ Using both the 
mortgage capacity to build capital through equity, and passive land-value appreciation, the 
demographic residents of the condominiums understand their units not first-and-foremost as 
dwellings, but as economic instruments for private wealth accumulation by which to move 
elsewhere.151 
The combination of policy shifts and the cultural predilection for private property have 
given rise to the condominium tower as the favoured mode of city building in Toronto, 
as an explicit product of the commodification and financialization of the dwelling. These 
new frameworks of condominium ownership will reciprocally influence how occupants 
dwell in them. Through this process that has taken the better part of a century, our cultural 
understanding of private property and its associated liberties has become intrinsically and 
paradoxically tied to neoliberal institutions of finance and governance. Aging and fermenting, 
our institutions of space production have created the condominium unit, not as a dwelling, 
150.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 19-20.
151.  Webb, “The Implications of Condominium Neighbourhoods,” 49.
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Social life within the condominium 
is situated within the hyper-specific 
contexts of amenity spaces which 
have been pre-programmed for 
marketing purposes. 
Fig�13 Ten York Condos – The spin 
room
Fig�14 Lighthouse West – The jam room
Fig�15 DNA3 – The rain room Fig�16 The Wyatt – The bouldering cave
Fig�17 The Saint – The salt room
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but as a stock in the economy. 
1�2�7 The Need for Growth
Through our cultural foundations of private property as an economic, rather than ontological 
necessity, the dwelling has been transformed from the dynamic grain of the urban fabric, 
to a bond of stability within the emerging city. Promoted by fiscal and planning policies, 
and the cultural drive for accumulation, the condominium unit has become the vehicle 
by which developers and architects delivered necessarily high densities of free-hold land 
titles within the core of the city. While these cultural and economic forces have produced 
Toronto as we see it today, the physical condominium projects the cultural need for capital 
accumulation into the future life and culture of the city. The continued expectation for 
capital real-estate gains by whoever has invested in a unit justifies, not only the determinist 
architecture of the unit itself, but also a whole set of social and behavioural practices meant 
to secure the commodity stability of the unit. Under increasing architectural determinism, the 
condominium unit’s capacity as a dwelling that can accommodate change is being alienated. 
The architecture produced by neoliberalism reproduces its own totalizing logic onto the lives 
of those who dwell in the towers. If hegemony is the ability for capitalism to survive in spite 
of itself, the political structure of the condominium corporation is the hegemonic practice by 
which the residents and owners of condominiums participate in their own alienation from the 
place that “they” call home. 
The ability to sell a condominium unit with predictable capital gains is to ensure that 
nothing about the property-title is objectionable to any potential buyer.152 Disruptive noises, 
mis-matched curtains, shoes in the hallway, any sign that any more negotiation between 
neighbours is required in condominium life than in the spacious suburbs will undermine this 
composed stability and compromise the exchange value of the unit. Anything that disrupts 
the space of appearance, requiring civic negotiation, becomes a threat to everybody’s 
financial well-being. The material space of the condominium is stabilized by the widespread 
distribution of financial stake across the entire body of owners. 


















infill party wall – rated for fire and sound
steel-framed partition
1 bedroom + den unit
25 Telegram Mews, Toronto, ON (2009)
55.3 m2
Fig�18 The condominium unit as an exercise in fixity.
In construction, efficiency and economization are achieved by repeating unit layouts from floor to floor This 
stacking locks each dwelling into a specific configuration. Structural shear walls limit the possibility to combine 
adjacent units to accomodate larger households. Units that are not at corners, receive light from only one side, 
limiting the location of living spaces. Hot, cold and chilled water for general use and for heating and cooling 
restrict the location of plumbing fixtures and fan-coil units. It is, however, the waste-water stacks that provide 
the greatest limitation as they have a greater diameter and rely on gravity to flow properly. None of these 
utilities can be interrupted or relocated without compromising service to the floors above and below.
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1�3 Real and Abstract Political Frameworks
Having established that the condominium is not pure material artifact, built of concrete and 
glass, but rather a vertical armature of the city fabric, made up of many discreet private 
dwellings, and produced by the unleashed forces of neoliberalism, it becomes necessary to 
consider the collective framework of the condominium tower as inescapably political. The 
condominium as an armature of urban and political space poses a unique condition in the 
city for two reasons. The first is the physical form in what Hannah Arendt calls “the space 
of appearance” within the condominium tower.153 Unlike the classical models of public 
space – the agora, forum, or street – the space of appearance within the condominium tower 
is made up of fragmented utilitarian spaces, divided over many floors. For this reason is 
often not considered as a site for ‘political’ appearance in the city.154 In reality, it is these 
banal spaces of the condominium that form the site of an emerging urban polity within the 
tower community, despite the functionalist logic that produced them.155 The second political 
condition of the condominium tower that makes it distinct from the surrounding urban fabric 
of the city is that the tower exists within in its own of internal government, below municipal, 
provincial, and federal governments. This internalized structure of control, legitimized under 
the Ontario Condominium Act of 1967 (OCA-67), creates situational publics within the 
public field of the city. The neoliberal ideological base of this situational polity corporatizes 
the structure of social relations within the condo, functioning in opposition to the space of 
appearance.156 According to Stefan Kipfer, the essence of hegemony is for “capitalism to 
survive despite itself.”157 The strategically a-political spaces of appearance and the institution 
of corporate decision making as a simulacrum of democracy within, form a disciplinary 
structure to reproduce neoliberal spatial practice within the framework of everyday life.  
While these two structures each give the impression of agency and liberty, they are both 
engineered to safe-guard the value of the unit-commodity and protect each unit-owner’s 
individual financial stake. At its most extreme, this stabilization of space through the absolute 
153.  Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 197-98.
154.  Lehrer, “Verticality, Public Space and the Role of Resident Participation,” 67. 
155.  Lefebvre, The production of Space, 75. 
156.  In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt speaks at length about the western cultural evolution from the 
political as the content of the public to the social, the consensus of acceptable behaviour. The displacement 
of the public with social is the product of the cartesian appeal of behaviour, and is required for and 
reinforced by the corporate deterministic rational of the neoliberal hegemony. 
157. Stefan Kipfer, “Urbanization, Everyday Life and the Survival of Capitalism: Lefebvre, Gramsci, and the 
Problematic of Hegemony,” Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 13, no. 2 (June 2002): 126. 
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division of a shared space into many private property titles will result in what Columbia 
real-estate law professor Michael Heller has coined as the tragedy of the anticommons – 
the alienation of property’s use value, caused by the inability to negotiate between a large 
number of private stakeholders with opposing agendas. 
1�3�1 The Space of Appearance
In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt defines two co-dependent definitions of the 
public. She identifies the first definition as the space of appearance, which is an incidental 
condition that arises between two or more people – neighbours and strangers – each time that 
they interact through speech or action.158 These deliberate appearances become political in 
that they demonstrate other values and spatial practices to both the actor and the observer. 
It is through the negotiation of this shared demonstration that the humanity of both the 
witness and actor are realized.159 This making real of the individual through exchange with 
neighbours and strangers is, above all else, the allure of the city; it defines urban existence.160 
The space of appearance, therefore, makes political any place in which two individuals 
might run into each other, be that a sidewalk, an elevator cab, or a hallway.
While the public is on one hand, the temporal space of appearance, it simultaneously 
describes the very real and material shared world that these exchanges necessarily occur in.161 
In the words of Hannah Arendt: 
“[…] the term “public” signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of 
us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it. […]To live together in the 
world means essentially that a world of things is located between those who have it in 
common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every 
158.  Arendt, The Human Condition, 175-6.
159.  Action and appearance do not include what is only overtly political demonstration. The simple act of 
occupying the same elevator cab as another person, even in silence, is an act of mutual appearance, despite 
being apparently negligible in its disruption, impact, or the conscious negotiation that it requires. Arendt, 
The Human Condition, 198-99.
160.  George Baird, “The Space of Appearance,” The Space of Appearance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 
306-7. 
161.  Arendt, The Human Condition, 52. 
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in-between, relates and separates men at the same time.”
The form of this “shared table” as the real space of political negotiation becomes incredibly 
important. When we consider the condominium tower, not as a single work of urban 
architecture – homogenous in ideology and content – but rather as the assembly of private 
residences, our conceptions of the interior space of the tower are inverted from being passive 
circulation cores and amenities spaces, to being public and political urban interstices.162
The political nature of this interstitial space between dwelling units in a condominium 
is validated, not only in the nature of the space as being outside the realm of the private 
dwelling. More importantly, the interstices of the condominium become political because 
of the social heterogeneity that the liberal dimension of the condominium rhetorically 
allows.163 The natural plurality of humans living out habitus within the parceled units of the 
tower makes the interstitial spaces, inescapably the space of negotiation of private values.164 
This simple sociological dimension is often forgotten because of the totalizing cultural 
homogeneity presented in the conception and representation of most condominiums; condo 
marketing campaigns provide a convincing argument that all condominium owners have 
largely the same guiding values when looking for a place to live.165 The homogenization of 
space necessary for the condominium unit as space-commodity, seeks to eliminate the reality 
that an urban population is always necessarily the collection of diverse individuals that need 
and often desire to navigate these differences, from passively brushing shoulders in a narrow 
hallways, to actively debating the modification of the space that they mutually inhabit.166  
The true publicity of the perceived space within condominiums is, fairly enough, called 
162.  Lehrer, “Verticality, Public Space and the Role of Resident Participation,” 79. 
163.  Easthope, Politics and Practices, 157. 
164.  Easthope, Politics and Practices, 158-9. 
165.  Hans Ibelings with Partisans Architects’ analysis of the colour schemes within recently constructed 
projects suggests that the neoliberal hegemony has universalized urban dwellers taste in paint colours. 
While this conclusion of cultural totalization has some truth, hegemonic forces have not yet advanced 
so far as to render unnecessary the need for Condo Boards to have the authority of arbitration amongst 
residents. A condominium community is still very much a society of independently willed individuals. 
Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 88-103. 
166.  Baird, “The Space of Appearance,” 306. 
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into question but only insofar as one subjects the urban analysis of the condominium to the 
classical public-private dichotomy of the polis.167 The common interstices and amenities of 
condominium towers are not public places in the sense that they are universally accessible 
to every individual in the city. The space within the condominium is, after all, private 
property, owned collectively by the condominium corporation. Furthermore, condo tower 
communities are almost always ‘gated’ with fobbed access and usually have a concierge or 
security guard. This restriction of access controls who is allowed into the towers and creates 
a space of curated appearance.168 While all of this signifies the space within the condominium 
as private, nevertheless, the simple reality of the social heterogeneity of the occupants of the 
condominium tower give rise to the possibility of spaces of appearance, occurring anywhere 
within the communal space of the tower making it simultaneously private and public. This 
superimposition of the two states gives shared condominium space an ambiguous nature.169 
But the urban realm is full of such ambiguity – space that can be defined neither simply as 
public, nor purely as private. This blurring of two designations is counterposed to the clear 
classical distinction of the public and the private.170 The reality of urban engagement is that it 
exists in a field of incrementalism.171
The incrementalism of urban public space is the product of the emergent neo-liberal city 
as a means of regulating urban behaviour. In the modern (and post-modern) absence of 
predetermined social roles or demonstrations of power through building, as was in the 
polis and the baroque cities¸ the ubiquity of the public realm became ‘policed’ through 
the fragmentation of spaces using conditions of ‘situational freedoms.’ This was achieved 
through the fragmentation of space into architectural compartments of powers and the 
framing of situational codes of conduct.172 In time, the form of these situational freedoms 
evolved from normative behaviour and prohibitions on the use of civic space, through 
the ‘altruism’ of privately owned and controlled public spaces,173 to the gating of spaces 
shared by a community with collective financial interests, such as the common spaces of a 
condominium. 
167.  Lehrer, “Verticality, Public Space and the Role of Resident Participation,” 67. 
168.  Easthope, Politics and Practices, 156. 
169.  Lehrer, “Verticality, Public Space and the Role of Resident Participation,” 67. 
170.  Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 28-31. 
171.  Aureli, “City as Political Form,” 35.
172.  Aureli, “City as Political Form,” 35.
173.  Lehrer, “Verticality, Public Space and the Role of Residential Participation,” 67. 
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While a great deal of the strategic control is codified into the space of appearance, daily life 
presents broad segments of human behaviour that condominium architecture alone, is unable 
to control. In this gap of strategic control that architecture cannot choreograph, a second 
framework of power was required to ensure the security and continuity of the condominium 
asset. This framework is the OCA-98. 
1�3�2 The Democratic Structure in the Ontario Condominium Act
In City as Political Form, Pier Vittorio Aureli traces the how urban typologies are direct 
responses to paradigms of urban power structures.174 As the synthesis of liberal suburban 
planning, heroic modernist tower, and the totalizing dominance of capitalism, the podium 
tower condominium is the apotheosis of neoliberal urban control through situational 
legislation.175 The framework for this legislation which was institutionalized in the OCA-
67, is divided into four strata – Declaration, Description, By-laws and Rules – each with 
particular types of control over the spatial practices within the condominium tower. Through 
the Ontario Condominium Act, mechanisms of corporatist democracy,176 control of social 
behaviors,177 and alienating codes of ownership are normalized into the conceived space of 
the city. 
As previously discussed, condominium ownership was created by the Province of Ontario in 
1967, to allow for the production of high quantities of free-hold homes with the speed and 
efficiency of the mid-century apartment towers.178 To allow for free-hold home ownership 
in this highly efficient and buildable way, governments had to create a new legal definition 
of property ownership. This was done in the creation of the condominium. The private 
ownership of units within a tower created a very pragmatic problem. While the traditional 
definition of free-hold title stipulates that the use of one parcel cannot and should not impact 
the use value of any adjacent parcels, stacking parcels in a tower creates a very immediate 
mutual dependency for all units on a shared structure, electrical and mechanicals systems, 
174.  Aureli, “City as Political Form,” 35.
175.  Easthope, Politics and Practices, 157. 
176.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 123.
177. Cathy Sherry, “Lessons in Personal Freedom,” 299. 
178.  Risk, “Condominiums and Canada,” 2-3.
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Fig�19 The structure of decision-making in Ontario condominiums. 
The structure of decision-making, provided by the O.C.A.-98 is theoretically consensus-based. Unit-owners 
have the right to vote on amendments to declarations and by-laws, and can requisition meetings to oppose 
rules created by the board. While amendments to the Declaration and Description require an 80 or 90% super-
majority, depending on the nature of the change, and making them virtually impossible to change, rules and 
restrictions require a simple majority from a meeting with a 15% quorum. These polarized thresholds of 
restriction create a culture of protectionism towards the tower as the only shared common interest. 
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circulation, and enclosure.179 The common dependence of each free-hold title on systems that 
must be collectively maintained for the simple continuation of their existence creates a legal 
paradox in the traditional common-law understanding of private property.180 It attached the 
estate – the Lockean parcel of utmost freedom – to a circumstantial ‘covenant’ obligation – 
the mutual responsibility for the tower structure. This leveraging of covenant for the creation 
of free-hold apartments titles was not resolved, but was rather instrumentalized to create a 
corporate-democratic governing structure to enforce apparently voluntary maintenance of 
the neoliberal solution to dwelling.181 The nature of power within each of the condominium’s 
guiding documents, demonstrates how the OCA-98 strategically regulates the actions of 
individuals within the mutually dependent tower asset.
At the foundation of every condominium is the parcel of land. While the tower is being 
built, there is legally no differentiation between units in the tower. The property exists in 
one title and address. This changes on the day that the developer files a Declaration and 
Description (D&D) with the Land Registry Office.182 Though filed and often discussed as a 
single document, the Description and Declaration are two separate documents and fulfil two 
important but distinct functions within the condominium. The Description is spatial – in fact 
architectural. The Declaration is political. The two of them work together to create the socio-
spatial co-dependency that becomes the condominium.
At an architectonic level, there is very little difference between a rental apartment tower and 
a condominium tower. They both fundamentally consist of floors of dwelling units arranged 
around a central hallway and stacked around vertical circulation cores. What differentiates the 
condominium from the rental apartment is the superimposition of abstract private property 
lines onto the real structure, creating individual free-hold units. These property boundaries 
are spatialized in the Description with text and diagrams, locating the legal boundaries of 
179.  Risk, “Condominiums and Canada,” 2.
180.  Common law only recognized eight distinct forms of land tenure. Free-hold (fee-simple) and covenant are 
two distinct classifications which, under the principle of numerus clausus cannot be blended to create new 
or unprecedented combinations of tenure. While condominium purchasers are hopefully fully informed 
when buying into the obligations of the condominium, Sherry argues that the ability for the board to enact 
unforeseen by-laws and obligations in the future effectively creates a “New Feudalism” in the city. Cathy 
Sherry, “Lessons in Personal Freedom,” 289-96. 
181.  Sherry, “Lessons in Personal Freedom,” 296.   
182.  Ontario, Condominium Act, s.s. 2(3).
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each unit to the physical structure and ‘monuments’ of the building itself.183 The Description 
takes a building as a whole title and fragments it into tens or hundreds of individual property 
titles. The Description is responsible for tying the abstract situational legalities of the private 
ownership of space to the material tower.
While the Description of the condominium situates private property within the material, the 
Declaration of the tower institutes the social, political, and financial structures regarding the 
collective ownership of the tower. The Declaration establishes the condominium corporation 
in attachment to the property on which the tower is built. Once the Declaration is registered 
with the Land Titles Office, the newly formed corporation becomes the owner of the 
common elements and structure of the building. In that the Description is responsible for the 
definition of the lawful status of the individual apartments as real-estate within the tower, 
the ownership of a unit is inseparable from membership in the condominium corporation.184 
Home ownership within a condominium is therefore corporatized and the political function 
of the community is formulated according to the corporate structure.185 
Through the totalizing authority of the Declaration, the residents of the condominium tower 
– owners and tenants – are organized under corporate codes of conduct.186 While codes of 
conduct are common in most corporations of all types, for the purposes of condominiums 
the OCA-98 breaks them up into two bodies of legislation, namely the By-laws and Rules, 
managed internally by the corporation’s elected board of directors.187 Fully enforceable under 
the OCA-98, By-laws and Rules institute the situational control of behaviours and the use of 
space of the condominium over its internal public. 
The first structure of control is the condominium By-laws which outline the governance 
of the corporation itself. Everything from the structure of the board of directors, to the 
procedure of elections, to the all-important managing of finances and building maintenance 
183.  Ontario, Condominium Act, s.s. 8(1).
184.  Ontario, Condominium Act, s.s. 11(4).
185.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 124-6.
186.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 144-5. 
187.  Ontario, Condominium Act, s.s. 56(1).
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are outlined in a condominium’s By-laws.188 While Declarations follow a standard format 
issued by the Province, By-laws made and maintained independently by each condominium 
corporation. As such, they vary from community to community and tower to tower. Strategies 
of maintenance, determining monthly condo fees, permission for taking on debt, and the 
capacity for arbitration between tenants gives the By-laws significant sway over the culture 
maintained and promoted within the tower.189 
The practical authority of the Condominium Board over the public behavior of the occupants 
of the condominium falls within the fourth level of legislation – the Rules. The OCA-98 
gives two objectives for the creation of rules within a condominium. The first is to “promote 
the safety, security or welfare of the owners and of the property and the assets, if any, of 
the corporation […]” The second reason is for the prevention of “unreasonable interference 
with the use and enjoyment of the units, the common elements or the assets, if any, of the 
corporation.”190 Within the bounds of these two objectives is the whole range of residents’ 
daily activities, not only in the public spaces of the tower, but also within the confines 
of the private dwelling units that can be qualified as inhibiting the use and enjoyment of 
neighbouring units.191 The Rules, therefore, become a very powerful tool for managing even 
the most mundane aspects of daily life of the residence of condominium towers. Through the 
Rules, the board of director’s authority over the use of both common and privately owned 
space, Rules create an intersectionality between habitus of the dwelling unit and the structure 
of corporate governance.
1�3�3 Joint Neoliberal Structures of Alienation
Perceived space and corporate governance work jointly within the condominium to reproduce 
neoliberal power relations within daily life and the dwelling. While the board of directors 
is itself based on the appearance of democratic engagement (and agency), the nature of the 
corporation’s authority over the occupants of the tower reduces the politics of the tower 
to corporate managerialism.192 While this managerialism is a necessary strategy for the 
188.  Ontario, Condominium Act, s. 56.
189.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 127.
190.  Ontario, Condominium Act, s.s. 58(1).
191.  Sherry, “Lessons in Personal Freedom,” 310-1. 
192.  McKenzie, Privatopia¸ 146.
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disciplining of spatial relations in the tower where architecture is insufficient to do so, the 
space of the tower works to diffuse the emergence of a true polity, leaving management of the 
community by the board of directors unchallenged in its crusade to protect the asset of the 
unit and alienating daily urban life from the tower.
During initial conception of each individual condominium development, Rules and By-
laws are used by developers, to produce marketable and profitable life-style experiences. 
Registrants are responsible for writing a condo’s first By-laws and Rules and use these 
tools to institute lifestyles that appeal to their target buyer market.193 Habits and behaviors 
in the private and semi-public spaces of the tower are therefore enfolded into the market-
based logics of space production. After hand-over of the tower from the declarant to 
the condominium corporation Rules are a Board’s authority for maintaining the original 
conceptions and values of the tower, both explicit (marketed) and tacit (hegemonic). 
Now in typical corporations, codes of conduct are intended to restrict the actions of 
employees and to optimize the productivity of the corporation. Corporate codes of conduct 
can never concern the rights and freedoms of employees and shareholders as corporations 
are legally private entities – neither public nor political.194 Insofar as condominium decision 
making is limited to the issuing of restrictions on private and semi-public spaces, rather 
than the collective maintaining of rights within space, decision making is not driven by 
discussions of community need.195 Rather, Rules and By-laws are issued by boards in defense 
of the corporate interests and assets – the real-estate value of the tower.
The basis for the board’s authority over the residents of the condominium tower is in 
preventing negative action196 for the protection of the property197 rather than the promotion 
civic engagement and the appropriation of the space as a community’s own. This prioritizing 
of the market value of a unit over rights commonly associated with privacy is, in effect, 
193.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 127-8.
194.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 147-8.
195.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 146-8.
196.  Sherry, “Lessons in Personal Freedom,” 301.
197.  Ontario, Condominium Act, c. 58(1)(a).
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the substitution in the condo-dwellers mind of “rights” in a political sense, with “property 
rights,” in an economic sense.198 Having prohibitive jurisdiction over both common and 
private spaces, the Board of Directors has direct power over the manifestation of habitus 
within the condominium dwellings. 
Even though decision making for condominium regulations is set within an ostensibly 
consensus-by-majority process,199 it is neither political nor democratic, but rather a strategy 
for coercing hegemonic accord within the framework of financialized dwellings. With 
codes of conduct widely recognized as the prohibitive mechanism that they are, individuals 
are typically reluctant to engage the decision-making process, save to defend personal 
economic interests.200 It is worth noting that the OCA-98 establishes the quorum for Annual 
General Meetings, where board members are elected, to be as little as 15% of the tower’s 
voting owners.201 This piece of legislation is the provincial government’s admission to an 
expectation of low political engagement. When compared with suburban dwelling, the 
bureaucratic structures of condominiums are considered a necessary inconvenience for 
the maintenance of mutually dependent investments rather than a platform for political 
engagement. The board is relegated to a managerial position, doing what is required protect 
the real-estate value of every owner’s unit.202
Though cynical, this utilitarian view of board governance is in step with the neoliberal 
attitude towards the nature of corporations in 1967 when the Ontario Condominium Act 
was first written. In his influential New York Times article titled, The Social Responsibility 
198.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 140. 
199.  Provision is made in the OCA-98 for unit owners to contest rules that have been enacted if at least 15% 
of unit owners requisition a meeting in which to discuss and vote on the rule. While the argument has in 
the past been made that by buying a condominium, a person is putting themselves into under the Rules and 
By-laws by their own will. Sherry contests this argument by pointing out that while an individual might 
be aggregable to the restrictions at the time of purchase, the power-structure allows for the board to create 
and enforce unforeseen restrictions which the members of the community must then adhere to or move. 
She equates this dynamic of control to a new feudalism within our cities. Sherry, “Lessons in Personal 
Freedom,” 302. 
200.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 145.
201.  While the official quorum is set at 25%, the OCA-98 has included a clause stipulating that if a quorum 
is not met at two consecutive meetings, it shall be lowered to 15%. Ontario, Condominium Act, c. 19, c. 
50(1.1)(c).
202.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 148-9.
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of Business is to Increase Profits published in 1970, Milton Friedman argued that corporate 
executives have the sole responsibility to their shareholders to perpetually increase profits, 
rather than to engage in social improvement.203 To see condominium directors as corporate 
executives and unit owners as corporate share holders, which they both by policy definition 
are,204 the basis of the condominium tower is for individual profit, not for ontological 
actualization of a place to live. The board of directors, albeit probably unwittingly, takes its 
position as the disciplinary arm of a capitalist grip on daily dwelling, with the authority to 
restrict peoples’ daily lives. While the board does hold the very real authority to discipline 
residents for violating codes of conduct, the widespread cultural understanding that the 
Board and Rules exist for the financial preservation of the investment – a necessary evil. The 
corporation’s disciplinary authority is through the threat of financially compromising the 
condominium asset, rather than actual executive discipline. 
The perceived space of the typical condominium only acts to promote the ambiguity of 
political engagement on behalf of residents. While the shared space of appearance within 
condominiums is indisputably located on the spectrum of the public-private realm,205 it 
acts against the formation, or even the awareness of the political society within the tower. 
The vast majority, of the common space within the average Toronto condominium tower 
(excluding balconies and parking garages) is in circulation spaces, divided over forty, sixty, 
or even eighty floors. While hallways can be political space, each hallway becomes the 
space of representation for the very small percentage of occupants that live on that floor. 
This hyper-division of common space neutralizes the possibility for the community to ever 
assemble as a whole, or even as a meaningful special-interest group. Now one can say that 
this is hardly a strategy for political oppression, and that creating the tight core is simply the 
most practical way to configure the building, but that only serves to reinforce the point. It is 
the logic of economy at the expense of habitus and place-making that prevents the formation 
of a polity and maintains the productivity of the unit-commodity through the space’s very 
neutrality.206
203.  Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,” Corporate Ethics and 
Corporate Governance, ed. Walthur Zimmerli et. al. (Berlin: Springer, 2007) 178.
204.  Ontario, Condominium Act, c. 19,s. 11, and s. 27.
205.   Lehrer, “Verticality, Public Space and the Role of Resident Participation,” 67. 
206.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 55-6.
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hallways on residential floors
25 Telegram Mews, Toronto
penthouse: floors 26–47










allocation of common space
Fig�20 Floor area distribution of common spaces in 25 Telegram Mews.
In Montage Condominiums (25 Telegram Mews, Toronto, ON), the example provided above, the amenities have 
been placed in a pavilion on top of the podium, apart from the tower itself. In this example, comprise 66.4% 
of the interior common space, divided over 46 residential floors. While the largest common space – the party 
room – represents a little under 3% and can accommodate small gatherings, the remainder of the assembly 
space is split up into specific programs, including two theaters, a cards room and a games room. Montage 
Condominiums, completed in 2009, contains 529 dwelling units. The parking garage have been excluded from 
floor-area estimates.  
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floor area comparison
amenity pavilion: 2nd floor























Beyond the space of the hallways, the formal amenity spaces, likewise, resist the formation 
of societies and polities. What condominium has ever included an assembly space large 
enough for all of the voting members to assemble at once, let alone the entire community?207 
The aforementioned pantheon of amenity spaces all imply hyper-specified purposes for use, 
and thus defy spontaneous gathering or appropriation. This lack of spontaneity is often only 
further reinforced by the dogmatic managerialism of the board, creating booking schedules, 
damage deposits, insurance requirements, and additional codes of conduct within common 
spaces. Though common, these are not civic, but anti-civic spaces, that keep the community 
compartmentalized in predetermined relationships. Through the dispersion of any political 
society, the space of the condominium strategically resists the formation of any ideas, ideals 
and social discourses that might threaten its stability.
As the product of the neoliberal hegemony and the site of an emerging urban culture, the 
condominium tower is the hallmark of strategic instrumentalization in the contemporary 
urban fabric and elements of everyday life.208 While the social density of condominium 
towers gives them more in common with cities of history and antiquity than the Garden City, 
the condominiums are still expected to provide a dwelling experience like that of the suburb, 
that is as disassociated from the vitality and dynamism – the need for negotiation – as the 
spacious suburbs that they are culturally derived from.209 As in the suburbs, this engineered 
isolation of the condominium is the key strategy by which the social and political landscapes 
of the city are neutralized, stabilizing the residential urban fabric as a safe investment.210 It 
is with this image that condominiums are marketed and sold, and it is in this image that the 
board and inhabitants of condominiums strive to maintain their home.211
This combination of restriction-based managerialism and the obstruction of political 
formation is the toxic combination which creates the socio-economic condition that Heller 
coined as the tragedy of the anticommons. As the complimentary inverse of Garrett Hardin’s 
tragedy of the commons, Heller, a professor of real-estate law, characterizes the tragedy of 
207.  Votes are distributed one per unit. The community of residents within the tower can be two or three times 
the size of the ‘electorate.’ 
208.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 84-5. 
209.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 19. 
210.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 28-30.

























Fig�21 The structure of decision-making under financialization.
The prioritization of financial interests in the tower creates a culture of disengagement form decision-making 
in the tower. In this condition, the owner’s only responsibility to the community is the paying of their 
condominium fee, while the board is relegated to a position of managerialism, making decisions for, rather than 
on behalf of the tower occupants. 
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the anticommons by as an underuse of commonly owned land, rather than its overuse. This 
underuse is caused by too many people having private ownership interest in the land and 
being unable to agree on its best use.212 As a simple example, we can look at a condominium 
party room over which the board, in protection of the room itself, has enacted a series of 
booking and insurance policies. While many owners may agree that these policies are a good 
and sensible measure for the protection of the common asset, the cost and convolution of 
the booking process makes many tenants reluctant to use the space at all. It therefore sits 
vacant and unused for most days of the year, of no practical benefit to anyone, even in its 
well-maintained condition. This capacity for action-prohibition extends through all layers of 
condo management from the rules that govern space-usage, all the way up to the declaration 
and description. A key dimension of good space-use is its ability to adapt to changing needs. 
The super-majorities required to adapt the declaration and description, however, make such 
adaptations in condominiums nearly impossible, either from neighbours and owners willingly 
obstructing the changes out of personal economic interest, or simply by failing to meet 
majority approval because of political disengagement.213 
In the following statement, Heller reflects both the cause and effect of the tragedy of the 
anti-commons. “Cooperative mechanisms may break down if there are too many newcomers 
coming and going, if people don’t know each other, or if it is otherwise hard to discipline 
deviants.”214 While the board maintains the full authority to “discipline deviants,” the lack of 
community familiarity215 – the absence of a political society – through the fragmentation of 
space, reduces the cooperative mechanism from the common interest of the condominium. In 
its absence, the board is left to issue compounding restrictions on space, further limiting its 
use.
212.  Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” 6-7.
213.  Webb, “The Implications of Condominium Neighbourhoods,” 51.
214.  Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” 12. 
215.  Beyond being a strictly architectural problem, the lack of community familiarity is also a demographic 
problem, this also being influenced by the architecture of condominium units. While the StatCan 2016 
census records the one-year mobility rate – the number of households that have moved into their current 
dwelling over the past year – as 14.2% in Census Dissemination Area (DA) 35204820, in Concord 
CityPlace between Spadina Ave. and Telegram Mews/Brunel Court, the one-year mobility rate was 33.8%. 
The five-year mobility rate was 80.1% despite all construction in the DA being completed more than five 
years earlier. 
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1�4 The Material Realities of Condominium Real-estate
We have to this point, considered the condominium towers of downtown Toronto to the 
extents of the forces that form them – as dwelling places, as instruments of financial 
accumulation, and as armatures of the urban-political matrix. As an artifact of neoliberal 
space production, each dimension of the condominium depends upon fixity and the alienation 
of spatial agency.216 Owners, investors, the FIRE sector,217 and governments at all levels hope, 
if not expect, the trend of upward property value appreciation to continue indefinitely.218 
At the heart of these abstract dimensions, however, we are left with the artifact of the 
produced space – the material tower as urban artifact. While our common understanding 
of condominiums is based on stasis, the material reality of the towers is opposed to this 
expectation. On one hand, the infrastructure of the reinforced concrete tower will remain 
as an artifact in the Toronto skyline for quite some time. As the structure that enables 
stacked real-estate titles, the durability of the concrete framework could project the power 
structures of condominiums over a century into the future of the urban fabric. On the other 
hand, the actual use value of the dwelling unit is provided by systems of common assets 
such mechanical, plumbing, electrical work, elevators, interior finishes, and the building 
envelope. Each of these material assets have functional lifespans ranging from just a few 
to fifty years.219 To perpetuate the exchange value of the condominium units, the inevitable 
decay of these systems creates the need for maintenance – a reinvestment of some kind. As 
the towers age, these financial responsibilities compound. Even if the abstract attributes of 
the condominium such as the neutralized polity and rising property values were to continue, 
at a certain moment the cost of maintenance in an aging tower will surpass the expectation 
of capital gain, undermining the expectation of infinite financial accumulation. Without 
the reprioritization of the condominium dwelling’s use value over its exchange value, 
the increasing need for maintenance will push its many unit owners to maintain margins 
of capital extraction at the expense of the physical tower itself. In time, this will cause 
architectural decay and the alienation not only of the condominium’s ontological value, but 
also of the tower’s basic capacity to provide shelter and safety. Despite this decay, the over-
216.  Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, trans. John Moore, (London: Verso, 1991), 230.
217.  Finance, Insurance, and Real-estate
218.  Punwasi, “Bank of Canada Wants a Housing Bubble,” webpage. 
219.  David Albrice, “How Long do Buildings Last?” RDH Building Science, website (RDH Inc, January 2015), 
https://www.rdh.com/blog/long-buildings-last/.
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fragmentation of ownership that made the condominium so valuable an instrument to the 
neoliberal agenda in the first place, will only now lock the tower into its state of decay and 
urban (economic) sclerosis, reinforcing the anticommons. 
1�4�1 A Durable Urban Infrastructure
With increasing land costs downtown, the production of free-hold title commodities at 
economically profitable densities could only be achieved through tall building, ranging 
from nine to over eighty storeys. Depending on the area of the floor slab, each storey can 
accommodate anywhere from four to twenty-five or more units per floor220 – each unit its 
own free-hold parcel. Through the structure of the condominium tower, property boundaries 
have been abstracted from two dimensions to three. By defining private units according 
to the material building itself, the Description inverts the function of the private parcel 
in urban morphology by making the material of the built tower the a priori condition to 
the stacking of the private units. The titles for these units are only registered once the 
tower has been constructed.221,222 The function of the Description as part of the registration 
package, is to delimit the bounds of each unit-in-space, “by reference to the buildings or 
other monuments,”223 meaning that the title of the land is not simply a perceived space as 
traditional property lines, evolving beneath the urban fabric.224 While a normal parcel of 
land is bound to the relatively static real geography, the condominium title is dependent 
on the material tower itself.225 The artifact of the tower becomes the legal lynch pin for the 
stakeholders of the corporation.  
As the majority of the condominium towers in downtown Toronto have been built with 
reinforced concrete structures,226 they are of typological interest here, not only because they 
are so commonly used for condominium structures, but because of their durability within 
the fabric of the city. The concrete skeletons of the condominium towers are projected to 
220.  Above fifteen units per floor seems to be a-typical for podium tower condominiums. 
221.  While the Ontario Condominium Act covers several types of condominium, that the building be 
substantially complete for the property to be registered, is specifically true for condominium apartment 
towers which are classified as Common Element Condominium Corporations. Ontario, Condominium Act, 
s.s. 6(2).
222.  Ontario, Condominium Act, c. 8(1)(e).
223.   Ontario, Condominium Act, c. 8(1)(c).
224.  Baird, “Studies on Urban Morphology,” 126.
225.  Ontario, Condominium Act, s.s. 11(4).
226.  Ted Kesik, “The Glass Condo Conundrum,” University of Toronto, 2011, 1. 
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last from seventy to one hundred years or more.227 There is the temptation to think that 
they will stay in their economically privileged position as high-demand real-estate for the 
duration of their life. However, this is not the nature of capitalist real-estate geographies. 
Nor can we assume that the towers will just be torn down once they become obsolete or 
loose their economic edge. While the environmental cost of that would be unconscionable, 
it is the economic considerations that would make it improbable. The cost of disassembling 
forty-storey reinforced concrete towers from dense urban environments is as-of-yet, not well 
known but is projected to be quite high.228 If the economic forces that are currently shaping 
the downtown persist, the cost would have to be a functional investment, clearing the way 
for an architecture of even greater profit extraction. While such economic conditions that 
would make demolition of the dense concrete landscape profitably viable are possible, they 
are extreme and unlikely, especially given the number of towers now built.229 It is therefore 
necessary to consider the condominium towers as permanent monuments and infrastructures 
within the city landscape, capable of hosting both good and bad emerging urbanities for at 
least a century to come.230 
1�4�2 Inescapable Maintenance
Within the urban space of the durable tower structure, society’s spatial practices of habitus, 
politics, and economics impact the care given to less durable systems of the building. While 
the exchange value of the unit is inalienably tied to an abstract parcel in the space of the 
tower structure,231 the use value is in the alienable capacity of the unit to provide security 
and shelter.232 Within the concrete skeleton of a structure, the function of home is provided 
by eight systems layered over the concrete structure. The enclosure (roofing membranes, 
facades) and interior finishes provide shelter, security, and privacy. Electrical, mechanical 
and elevator systems provide practical services and comfort, and fire safety systems protects 
the wellbeing of the building and its occupants. Finally, amenity spaces and site work 
227.  David Albrice, “How Long do Buildings Last?” webpage. 
228.  Jon Kelly, “How do you demolish a skyscraper?” BBC News, November 30, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/
news/magazine-20535821 
229.  Easthope, Politics and Practices, 135. 
230.  Sandra Löschke and Hazel Easthope, “Postproduced: How adaptive redesign and participatory approaches 
can transform ageing housing,” From Conflict to Inclusion in Housing, ed. Georgios Artopoulos, Graham 
Cairns, and Kristen Day (London: UCL Press, 2017), 74.
231.  Ontario, Condominium Act, s.s. 11(4).
232.  Ted Kesik, “The Glass Condo Conundrum,” 1.
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frame the corporate structure of the condominium into a collective spatial experience – a 
tangible delivery on the promise of a complete community experience.233 As each of these 
systems works for all of the units in common, they are common assets of the corporation. 
Unlike the concrete structure which we are here considering inert, however, these systems 
have much shorter lifespans, from three to fifty years.234 The natural decay of any of these 
systems compromises the use value of the unit and challenges the exchange value of the unit-
commodity. 
It is therefore these eight manipulatable systems that tell stories about agency, decision-
making, and structures of power within the space of the towers. The lifespans and 
maintenance of these systems become a key factor when observing the societies, politics, and 
economics of the tower, responding year over year to the decisions made by condominium 
owners and boards. 
The eight volatile systems are separated in into three “durability classes,” the shortest spans 
from 1-16, the medium durability class spans from 17-29 years, and longest spans from 30-
50 years. Different components of each of the eight systems can fall within more than one 
durability classes. For example, while water recirculating pumps and the central boiler are 
both considered part of the mechanical system, the former falls into the short durability class 
while the latter is considered medium. Furthermore, the lifespan of all durability classes is 
cyclical so if short term overhead gate motors for the parking garage must be replaced in 
the first ten years of the tower’s life, it can be assumed that the gate motor will need to be 
replaced every ten years thereafter. Maintenance concerns therefore compound as the tower 
ages. While there are many technicalities, nuances, and eventualities that could be unpacked 
233.  ASTM-1557, Uniformat II has organized the systems of the building into nine categories which, with 
the addition of structure, are listed here; enclosures including roofing, finishes, electrical, mechanical, 
elevators, fire safety, amenities and site work. 
234.  David Albrice and Tsai-Sun Lee, “The capital load of the building enclosure system relative to other 
systems and its impact on the total cost of ownership of condominium buildings in British Columbia,” 
International Conference on Building Envelope Systems and Technologies, (Aachen, Germany; RDH 

















































Fig�22 The nine systems in a condominium tower.
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for the durability of each of the building systems,235 what is important here, is that the decay 
of each component represents the periodic and quantifiable devaluation of both the home and 
the asset, and the necessity for capital reinvestment.236 
235.  Many of the short-life common assets within the condominium tower are elements that undergo constant 
or periodic use. Water-heaters, water circulating pumps, and garage door motors often need to be replaced 
in the first three to ten years and every three to ten years after.  For high-use systems like water pumps, 
the quality (or conversely, the economy) of the replacement fittings has big implications on the periodic 
need for capital re-investment in the tower. 
Many of the high-capital maintenance and repairs occur happen in the medium-life horizon of the building. 
One reason for this is simply obsolescence. Technology for things like elevators, fan coil units, and fire 
safety are continuously evolving. Because of obsolescence, many elements will in time, not be able to be 
repaired but will rather need to be replaced. Furthermore, in this time-frame, many of the systems will 
simply have reached the end of their functional life-span. System wide infrastructures like plumbing and 
electrical can be expected to need a complete overhaul between seventeen and twenty-nine years. 
The most significant element which has many building-systems experts particularly anxious about 
the future of the condominium towers in dense urban areas is the enclosure – roofing and cladding. 
Condominium towers are typically clad with glass window-wall systems. Over the past twenty-five years 
of rapid condominium tower construction, especially in Toronto and Vancouver, window-wall construction 
has evolved significantly, getting faster, lighter, and cheaper. It seems almost gratuitous to state just how 
important the enclosure is for the function of the building. Especially in Canadian climates, the enclosure is 
the singular protection for the occupants of the tower against the cold and damp. Degrading window walls 
can severely compromise the liveability, longevity, and safety of the tower. 
While most of these common assets operate hidden from view, only considered by the average owner if 
they fail, interior finishes and amenities spaces are unique because they directly influence the resale value 
of condominium units in their visual appeal. Amenity spaces such as lounges, theatres, party rooms, and 
pools are notoriously underused, they are regarded as an indicator of the wellbeing of the tower and its 
financial management. These largely vacant spaces are “the space of appearance” which, in their respective 
conditions, testify to a potential buyer, how well or unwell – how politically or how neutrally – the society 
of the corporation, and specifically the board, are using and moderating the condition of the collective 
building. The state of the amenity spaces indicate the stability of the hegemonic vision that a buyer hopes 
to buy and an owner hopes to sell. As the amenity spaces relate back to a specific yet generic (“fungible”) 
vision of urban living, contrived by the developer, here again, we see the creation of a least-objectionable 
common denominator. Amenity spaces must, in general, never accumulate any material indications 
that have been appropriated – made home of – by any specific person or society. They stay universally 
accessible and appealing in their market exchangeability in the maintenance of their peerless and generic 
state.
236.  Albrice, “The capital load of the building enclosure systems,” 6.
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1�4�3 In Spite of Neoliberal Logic 
Within the legal framework of OCA-98, the owner’s obligations for maintenance were 
reduced to the single factor of the condominium fee.237 The monthly fee, based on the 
square footage and class designation of the unit, goes to the daily maintenance of the 
building systems, retention of staff, and the reserve fund to be used for high-cost and 
emergency repairs. There has been rising concern over the past twenty years that many of the 
condominiums in Toronto are maintaining reserve funds that are not equipped to deal with 
the full breadth of maintenance and repairs that will be necessary to keep the buildings as 
functional fabrics of the city.238 The cause for this under-contribution is, of course, the desire 
by boards and residents alike, to keep condominium fees low for the sake of maximizing 
capital extraction from the property.239 High condo fees can scare off potential buyers.  
Here we arrive at the core of the conflict of values inherent in condominiums as the 
neoliberal mode of city building. The increased exchange value of the condominium unit 
cannot be generated simply by maintaining the building in perfect condition, even if it was 
possible to do so. Material buildings must age and loose material value.240 Condominium 
prices can rise, only based on the increase in local land value. It is the “location, location, 
location” within the economic geography that investors rely on to create profit, with the 
functional unit principally as bond to the location. On average, only ten percent of the real 
cost of a condominium unit accounts for the cost of the land that the tower is built on. To 
maintain the functional value of the tower – of the ninety percent material cost – the value of 
the land must appreciate at a rate that keeps pace with the accelerating cost of maintenance. 
For the unit to be worth more for the owner at the time of sale than at the time of purchase, 
the use value of the unit – the physical state of the building – must have decayed less than 
local and global forces of economic geography have driven real-estate prices up. While this 
has been the case for the condominiums in Toronto so far, most towers are no more than 
16 years old and are quite early on in the fifty-year maintenance cycle. It is an economic 
paradox, but one all too commonly believed, that the labour cost of maintenance can be paid 
for indefinitely – and with surplus – by increasing real-estate value.241 This tension between 
237.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 149.
238.  Webb, “The Implications of Condominium Neighbourhoods,” 55.
239.  Webb, “The Implications of Condominium Neighbourhoods,” 56.
240.  Neil Smith, “Gentrification and Uneven Development,” Economic Geography 58, no. 2 (April 1982): 147.
241.  MacBeth When the Bubble Bursts, e-book, loc. 3099.
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real material and abstract market values of the condominium are demonstrated graphically in 
the timeline on pages 74-5. 
For the individual unit owner, the increase in exchange value has become the ultimate 
barometer for reinvesting in the maintenance of the tower. As the condominium towers grow 
into middle and old age, however, investors will go to increasingly extreme ends to stabilize 
the value of their unit assets against the ever-increasing cost of maintenance. Those who own 
units to dwell in them, as a means of buying into the real-estate market ladder, will find that 
this strategy is no longer logical or appealing. Therefore, resident owners will be displaced. 
While the tenure by resident owners in condos is approximately 66.7% across the Toronto 
CMA, it falls as low as 26.6% in some CityPlace towers. This is down from 58% in the 
2011 census and is only expected to decrease even farther.242  The first and second normative 
modes of financialization as investigated in the economics section, will be displaced, in 
favour of the third, that is the instrumentalization of the unit as a means of extraction. Rental 
of the units will, in time, become the only way to extract capital from the condominium 
units.243 
As seen in the structure of the constitutions set out by the OCA-98, the condominium was 
based on a premise of liberal democracy and cooperation – the negotiation of individual 
values for the best common outcome.244 Through the emergence of capitalist hegemonic 
understandings of private property ownership in Canada, however, the ontological value 
of the condominium unit has already been consensually made secondary to the financial 
instrument of the free-hold title. This creation of hundreds of liberally minded economic 
stakeholders, each with their own ambitions of financial extraction, creates the condition for 
Heller’s tragedy of the anticommons. Decision-making is reduced to the creating of rules and 
regulations to maintain the appearance of financial stability, while simultaneously minimizing 
personal financial obligations like condo fees for maintaining the material of the tower with 
any long view to the future.245 Beyond alienating the situational use-value of space within the 
242.  These statistics are based on the Dissemination Area 35204819 at the west end of Concord CityPlace from 
2011 and 2016 StatCan data. “MountainMath: CensusMapper,” MountainMath, website (MountainMath 
Analytics, 2016), https://mountainmath.ca/mountain_math/canada_census_map. 
243.  MacBeth, When the Bubble Bursts, e-book, loc. 3143. 
244.  Risk, “Condominiums and Canada,” 39.
245.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 146. 
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condos through rules, this political stalemate of the anticommons will in time lock out the 
physical safety and maintenance of the tower. 
As the scope of various rehabilitation projects within the tower grows, so does the number 
of unit owners, required for consensus. Amendments to unit boundaries, responsibilities of 
repair, and elements like balconies that are commonly held but have limited access, require 
an 80 or 90% super majority as prescribed by the OCA-98.246 In such cases, a very small 
number of unit owners hold the “rights of exclusion” and can prevent beneficial repairs 
from being done for any number of personal reasons. In the absence of a healthy polity and 
collective vision, important reinvestment would be left undone. A current example of this 
is found in the City of Toronto’s High-Rise Retrofit Improvement Support Program, which 
is working with the Tower Renewal Partnership for high-efficiency retrofits to mid-century 
towers in Toronto. While there are ongoing projects with privately owned rental towers, 
not a single condominium has qualified for the City’s program because it requires 100% 
supermajority among the unit owners.247 
A more distant concern is when the tower reaches a point of obsolescence or decay, and 
the best option is for the corporation to be dissolved and the tower liquidated. Even so, the 
likelihood of engaging over 90% of the owners and achieving consensus is highly unlikely, 
resulting in a condition identified as the tragedy of the anticommons. Reasons for this would 
be highly circumstantial, for example the irreparable damage to a certain number of units.248 
The result is the economic and functional stagnation of a common asset caused the inability 
of members in a commons to negotiate their different values. The trait of the anticommons is 
underuse, rather than overuse.249 
Through the collective will to exploit the financial value of the condominium units, both 
246.  Votes to determine the amendment of unit boundaries, the fees associated with each unit and unit class, 
and the dissolution of the corporation itself require a 90% supermajority. All other issues require 80%. 
Ontario, Condominium Act, c. 107(2)(d).
247.  Löschke, “Postproduced,” 74-5.
248.  Webb, “The implications of condominium neighbourhoods,” 51-3.
249.  Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” 9.
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*Value ratio estimates and trends are based on real estate values












Fig�23 Timeline of tower’s exchange values and projected maintenance reinvestment 
The timeline above is a speculative projection of the relative values of the various systems in Montage Condo, 
completed in Toronto CityPlace in 2009. The cumulative real-estate value of all of the units within the tower 
is shown in red at the top of the graph. 10% of this cumulative value is accounted for by the cost of land. 
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The remaining 90% is comprised of the hard-costs of the remaining 9 systems. As the building ages, these 
systems functionally decay, declining in value. Upward notches in each systems line represent a moment in 
time, when the board makes significant investment into the repair or maintenance of the system. Despite these 
compounding investments, the net material value of building will decrease in time, creating a looming disparity 
between use-value and speculative real-estate value. 
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the ontological and material use value will be slowly but progressively alienated. With 
the abandonment of resident owners, democratic representation that was framed into the 
constitution of condominium through voting rights will be extracted completely from the 
space of the tower. As tenants, the new occupants of the tower will have no representation in 
decision making over the place where they live. There is often a concern in condominiums 
about the board’s Rules that are oppressively restrictive for the sake of maintaining the 
investment appeal of the condominium assets. While this is already the case when there is a 
substantial presence of owner occupants to object to unfair restrictions,250 once occupants of 
the tower have no representation in decision making, the board will have no regulation for 
the restrictions to be enforced on the spaces, both pubic and private, within the tower. 
As the margin of capital gains extracted from private titles within the towers continue to 
fall, as is the nature of capitalist flows, the owners will deem it necessary to maintain profits 
through the absolute minimization of maintenance reinvestment costs. It is reasonable to 
expect that the physical state of the building will degrade in time.251 In Toronto, there is 
already precedent for this in the mid-century rental apartment blocks, notorious for being 
poorly maintained. The comfort, security, and personal dignity that should be intrinsic to the 
architecture of habitus and of home, will be alienated, in a slow but diminishing exchange for 
exchange value. 
Our understanding of home as the locus of identity within the city demonstrates the immense 
capacity that the condominium tower as a novel morphology in the urban fabric, has of 
generating complex and socially rich political landscapes. At the same time, the short but 
relatively dense history of private property in Canada reveals to us how these towers are the 
reification of neoliberal policies and cultural values. The dwelling has become an instrument 
of financial accumulation. If we do not reorient our collective valuation of the residential 
fabric of the city, the political and spatial stasis required to maintain the illusion of surplus 
real-estate value will alienate us from the new city until the towers themselves become 
materially and socially untenable. 
250.  MacKenzie, Privatopia, 140. 
251.  Webb, “The implications of condominium neighbourhoods,” 56.
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In the words of Hans Ibelings, “One does not have to be clairvoyant to foresee that the swift 
and unyielding condominiumization of Toronto has all the right ingredients to become a 
recipe for the future’s past mistake on a scale that will likely dwarf the Gardiner.”252




How to Start a 30 Year Revolution
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2�1 Urban Indeterminacy 
The role that architects have played in bringing about the present form of the city as the 
product of capitalist-cultural and financializing forces has been to this point understated; 
in trying to understand the condominium as an urban artifact, the apparently responsible 
approach is not about unpacking poor design decisions of the past but understanding the city 
as it now is and what these buildings hold for the future. While a critical understanding of 
what has led to the extreme condominiumization of Toronto can help dismantle extractive 
driving forces in the future development of the city, at this moment, we are still faced with 
the critical question of what the city of towers as it now stands, is to become. Based on their 
internal conflicting structures of cultural-capitalist expectations and coorperativism, it’s 
safe to assume nothing good.253  When looking at this emerging problem, it’s tempting for 
architects to want to come up with design solutions; to conceive of architectural answers 
for a problem that is much deeper than architecture itself. In the past few decades, several 
architects have made notable critiques, proposing how designers should respond to problems 
posed by high-rise urbanism in Toronto. The first is the work of Graeme Stuart and the Tower 
Renewal Partnership in addressing the maintenance, performance, and the transformation of 
the urban fabric around tall buildings in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Areas.254 While 
Tower Renewal and its many partner organizations address a very comprehensive range of 
problems surrounding aging apartment towers, including sponsoring the new RAC zoning 
by-law in Toronto which provides huge opportunities for urban growth and transformation,255 
their model of intervention currently focuses on purpose-built rental towers with single 
corporate owners.256 The second critique is Rise and Sprawl: The Condominiumization 
of Toronto, written by Hans Ibelings with PARTISANS in 2016 which explores the form 
253.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 39. 
254.  E.R.A. Architects, Mayor’s Tower Renewal, 4-5.
255.  Between 2013 and 2016, the Tower Renewal Partnership and E.R.A., along with other organizations, 
worked with the City of Toronto and the Ontario Municipal Planning Board to create the Residential 
Apartment Zoning Commercial zoning (RAC) by-law which allows for mixed-use development on what 
were previously strictly residential sites of mid-century apartment towers. While this policy initiative 
does create possibilities to transform the civic fabric surrounding the mid-century towers in very positive 
ways and is therefore worth acknowledging, the policy does not address the anticommons condition that is 
created in the prevention of diachronous and ‘economic’ evolution through defensive neoliberal attitudes. 
City of Toronto, By-law no. 569-2013. (Toronto: City of Toronto, 2013), Vol. 1. 
256.  Tower Renewal Partnership, Retrofit Finance Towards a Resilient Canadian Housing Stock – Summary, 
(Toronto: Tower Renewal Partnership, 2018): 1. 
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of condominium architecture as the product of economic functionalism.257 While these 
projects are extremely valuable in different ways, neither of them addresses the particular 
civic problems posed by the ageing of the towers of deeply fragmented ownership and how 
this will exacerbate alienating power dynamics within the city. Though they have different 
focusses, together these critiques outline a blind spot in our strategies for the future of 
condominium towers as a unique civic construct in the urban landscape. Most strategies 
to address ageing towers present top-down solutions, either on behalf of the municipality 
or of free market. Coming from within the discourse that produced alienating structure of 
the condominium towers, these solutions propose revolution, without providing any real 
framework for restoring the architecture profession or society’s understanding of urban 
living; solutions designed from within the discourse promote no systemic cultural change.258 
It is my proposal that critical theories of individual agency and plurality in everyday life 
prompt architects to look at the emerging field of planning by scenarios as a toolset to better 
understand and transform the relation of societies to and within condominium towers. This 
can be achieved by altering space as it is conceived by architects, policy writers, and most 
importantly those who will live their daily lives within the condominiums decades from now. 
It is not by refreshing utopian conceptions of failed urban structures that we restore the value 
of good space to people.259. Rather, it is in liberating people to act on their space and to live in 
it as they best know how, that people realize ontological value of space.
2�1�1 The Problem with Revitalization Plans 
While the future of condominiums in Toronto as they currently stand, is one of alienation, 
decay, and exploitation, for architects to authorially design a way out of this problem would 
only perpetuate power structures within the space of the city as the work of architects is 
usually commissioned by the corporate free-market or the state.260 In Walking in the City, de 
Certeau, seems to say that capacity of the architect in the renewal of urban space is not the 
production of healthy social frameworks, but merely the reinforcing of alienating frameworks 
257.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl, 116-7. 
258.  Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, 49. 
259.  Kipfer, “Urbanization, Everyday Life and the Survival of Capitalism,” 133. 
260.  This is not to be taken for saying that architects and planners shouldn’t rise to the challenge of either 
emancipating condominiums from commodification through the capacity of their profession, or work to 
mediate decaying and inhospitable cityscapes. Nevertheless, they should do so conscious of their role 
within economic and political geographies and the impacts of their interventions. 
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from a different perspective within the same discourse.261 Such interventions on the city are 
necessarily based in theory and the projection of ‘utopian’ visions of what the city should 
be, other than what it is. The product of logical conception, singular utopian visions cannot 
accommodate for uncertainties – “pollutions that would compromise them” – and so, these 
uncertainties must be displaced.262 Individual agency cannot, therefore, be a driving urban 
factor in such a conceived city. This is necessarily true for state-sponsored housing policies 
which, despite good intentions, have the inescapable tendency to politicise and bureaucratize 
matters of housing.263  The projection of power dynamics would only be all the more extreme 
in corporate free-market projects for urban regeneration of towers as it is specifically the 
corporate need for profit that produced the condominium framework in the first place. Within 
their existing logics of space production and reproduction, when architects act as the agents 
of either of these entities, the space produced can only be for the continued alienation of 
spatial agency among the residents of the city tower, insofar as the space produced will be 
the product of pre-existing discourses. The exception to this, and not to underappreciated, 
is the work of many architects and organizations who have operated tactically within their 
role as designers to advocate for the social and human needs of the people who are to inhabit 
projects.264 Nor do I intend to discourage such efforts in the future where opportunities are 
made, but insofar as these projects are tactical – David not playing by Goliath’s rules – they 
remain exceptional in the fullest sense. Operating within the existing concrete structure 
of Toronto and the neoliberal forces that have produced it, normative top-down means of 
planning and design struggle to affect meaningful reorientation of social and political space 
within the condominiums because they necessarily operate within existing structures of 
finance-driven urbanization.
2�1�2 Daily Life as Activism
To find an alternative to the inescapable closed-ness of the discourse of urban decay 
261.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 96. 
262.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 94. 
263.  Madden, In Defense of Housing, 119-20. 
264.  A well-known example of such tactical operation is Alejandro Aravena with ELEMENTAL’s affordable 
housing in Quinta Monroy. Working within a structure of economic constraints, the architects used an 
architecturally disruptive half-house model to afford and advocate for a site that better suited the long-term 
well-being of the houses future occupants. A second popular example of architects acting strategically 
within the framework of architectural production is Giancarlo di Carlo’s advocacy for the participation of 
future residents in the design of workers housing for the Terni Steelworks. 
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and renewal, we return to the basic building block of the city – the dwelling as the site 
of everyday life.265 When considering the form of the city, architects typically disregard 
private action and habitus as an urban force, even if they acknowledge their importance on 
an individual ontological level. In his Critique of Everyday Life however, Henri Lefebvre 
dresses down “intellectuals [and] cultivated men,” for dismissing the practices of daily 
life as “trivialities.” Rather, he directs us to study daily practice as the core artifact of each 
person’s consciousness (ontology), and by extent, the driving force of society and the city.266 
In the capitalist spatial practice for daily life which has evolved over the past century into 
the form of the condominiums, lived space has been fixed as the reproduction of the means 
of production. Daily habits are guided – controlled through strategies of space and codes of 
conduct where architectural language is insufficient – to uphold the economic productivity of 
the real-estate commodity.267 The use of force to guide peoples’ daily lives creates a disparity 
between how people are living in condominiums and how one might live in an apartment 
tower in a self- and socially-actualizing way.268 As the alienation of ontological value, this 
disparity is commonly recognized but not widely engaged.  Yet, the broadening of this gap in 
the daily lives of people gives rise to the creation of choice to act in a way ‘other’ than what 
is prescribed by structures in what de Certeau calls tactics.269
We return to the diagram in which de Certeau’s frames the tactical turn. Produced space 
is codified with strategic structures intended to reproduce their own power in the spatial 
practice of their inhabitants. These strategies of power are disrupted in moments when they 
conflict with the memory – “invisible knowledge” – of the inhabitants.270 Outside the bounds 
of strategy, memory is the individual’s knowledge toward agency. This conflict between 
strategy and memory results in action that appropriates space and action that transgresses the 
totalizing logic of strategy.271 Tactics are not revolution; they do not take part in a coherent 
theoretical discourse. Rather, tactics arise in the form of decisions – “opportunities that are 
seized” – in which the individual acts against the strategy governing the space that they 
265.  Madden, In Defense of Housing, 164-5.
266.  Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, 239.
267.  Madden, In Defense of Housing, 53-4. 
268.  Madden, In Defense of Housing, 53-4.
269.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 32-9. 
270.  de Certeau calls these moments Kairos. They are not simply the conflict between strategic and personal 
ideologies. Rather, Kairos is the specific occasion – the set of conditions – in which strategy and memory 
conflict in a way that moves a person to ingenuity and the desire for appropriative action. 
271.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 83-6. 
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occupy.272 While on an individual level, tactics in daily practices are the basis of ontological 
actualization – “of goals and desires”273 – they collectively comprise the sustained power 
to disrupt and redirect the predetermined structure of the condominium tower. As the place 
where people make the most consistent and intimate decisions about how they desire to 
live, the dwelling unit becomes the principal site of tactics and disruption of the neoliberal 
institutions of the condominium.274
The capacity for disruptive tactics is especially present within the parallel structures of the 
condominium tower where the notion of home is subjected to strategic architecture and 
politics. The increasing fixity and lack of generosity in condominium units by which to 
their exchangeability as commodities is maintained, prescribes daily routines and household 
politics in a language that is unprecedented in residential development.275 The standardization 
and economization of units alienate the practice of habitus, and the hyper-fragmentation of 
common space defies the formation of the civic. Where architecture has been insufficient 
to moderate behaviour within the space of the condos, the board of directors is given 
the authority to create codes of conduct which, we have seen, are based on enforceable 
restrictions, and not enabling liberties.276 With these strategies totalizing the lived space of the 
condominium towers, the alienation of dwelling is high. This increases the context, though 
not necessarily the motive power, for tactical action to occur.277 
The possibility for tactical improvisation against conceptualized space is heightened by the 
tenuous language of power and enforcement within condominium corporation. Situational 
power is not demonstrated in the condominium through explicit architectural languages as 
it was in Imperial, renaissance, and baroque cities.278 There are few, if any, spatial signifiers 
of the authority of the Corporation.279 Rather than visual representations of authority, more 
272.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xix. 
273.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xxii.
274.  Madden, In Defense of Housing, 94. 
275.  Ibelings, Rise and Sprawl,19.; Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 75.
276.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 146-8.
277.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 30, 37. 
278.  Aureli, “City as Political Form,” 35.
279.  Logos and branding around front lobbies, concierge desks, and posted notifications on rec-room doors 
are the few explicit signifiers of the corporation and board’s authority in the perceived space of the 
condominium. 
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totalized space relies on the agreement between authorial conceptions and daily uses of 
space to be upheld through everybody’s subscription to hegemonic cultural ideals.280 The 
condominium relies on self-policing and ‘cooperation’ to uphold its totalizing vision of 
wealth accumulation.281 This cooperation is, of course, only nominal if you consider that 
the Board of Directors also has the authority of a judiciary to enforce penalties (economic) 
for the violating the rules,282 but in the gaps of visible power, the alienating structure 
is maintained by the banal decision of the common resident, even if it is maintained 
unconsciously.283  
If hegemony is this unconscious cooperation with strategies in daily life, Lefebvre holds 
that “commoners” exist in a gap between reality and possibility, caught up in the capitalist 
narrative of the condominium and unable to imagine alternative values of operation.284 When 
considering de Certeau’s diagram of the socio-spatial turn, stronger strategies of power in 
space, be they perceived (embodied in material space) or conceived (the narratives that 
overlay that space) supress the appropriation of space in imagination.285 The conceived 
image of the condominium community, sold in glossy renderings and the promise of 
capital gain, lives on in the collective making of mundane decision, according to the rules, 
written and unwritten.286 What is necessary to free the condominium for appropriative 
action is to disrupt the authority of hegemonic conceptions over the lived space of the 
condominium, thereby disrupting the consciousness of decisions made by occupants of the 
tower. While the representation of the Creative City condominium narrative is necessary for 
propelling preconceptions of lived space into the public imagination,287 the representation of 
alternative spatial narratives can be used to overturn the spatial practice of a condominium 
community.288 If the proposal of renewal projects into the realm of conceived space is too 
prone to fix space under structure of control because it is necessarily based on discourses of 
conceived ideology, the only tool to bridge the gap between reality and possibility within 
the urban practice of the condominium tower, that does not reinforce hierarchical power 
280.  Kipfer, Urbanization, Everyday Life and the Survival of Capitalism, 127-8.
281.  Risk, “Condominiums and Canada,” 3. 
282.  McKenzie, Privatopia, 129. 
283.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everday Life, 38.
284.  Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, 246. 
285.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 83-5.
286.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 41-2.
287.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 42. 
288.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 86.
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Fig�24 The increasing strength of the strategic structuring of daily life creates the potential for rupture where 



















structures, is through the creation of memory in representational space through the telling of 
alternative stories.289
2�1�3 Alternative Narratives as Catalyst
de Certeau spends a good deal of The Practice of Everyday Life, discussing the importance of 
myths, stories, and spatial narratives in the creation of tactical – “other” modes of operation. 
He cites many writers and urban theorists who rely on “narration” to engage theoretical 
discourse, rather to produce pure descriptive (object) theory. Unlike objective theoretical 
production, narrative engages with, and maintains the importance of the spaces and actions 
of everyday life. Narratives therefore use language and representation as ways of operating 
rather than purely observing or representing, as to obscure as little as possible, the “practice” 
of operating itself.290 While the production of narratives for the condominium towers by 
developers and marketing team present singular ideologies of space as structures to which 
‘consumers’ are subjected,291 narratives about the past and speculative futures of space can 
propose ways of operating in space, rather than merely consuming it.292 While real life is the 
process of making decisions and the acting upon of values in and upon space, these habits 
are confronted and questioned through the exploration of alternative narratives – “successive 
configurations of knowledge [..] providing a panoply of schemas for action.”293 Using 
narratives that show the production or diachronous evolution of space as the product of daily 
action,294 the story-teller creates memories that engage with real spaces and patterns – habits 
– of daily life.295 When occasions for appropriation and tactic arise, the occupant responds 
beyond the status quo of habit, from their own translations of narratives banked in memory.296 
The creation of other spatial narratives supplants previously unquestioned ways of operating 
in lived space. The banal opportunities of daily life are accounted for, if not celebrated, and 
the sterilizing gridlock of heterogeneity is broken. 
289.  “Stories turn spaces into places and places into spaces.” de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 117-8.
290.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 77-8. 
291.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xiv. 
292.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xi. 
293.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 70.
294.  “Memory mediates spatial transformations.” De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 85. 
295.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 89-90.


















Fig�25 The margin between the daily life of alienation and the appropriative potential that space holds 
presents a margin for intervention. 
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Is it enough for the architect to sit down, pen in hand, and draw fantastic images of radically 
transformed condominiums at some distant and uncertain future? Maybe, but probably not. 
Fantasy, unlike myth, legend, and history, are not grounded in familiar territory and language 
– utopos. Through raw creativity, the architect might generate a fascinating spatial story 
about the space of a condominium tower in the future, but being un-grounded, it would be 
equally alienated from modes of daily operation of the occupants.297 What is required is a 
method that enables the architect to tell stories and appropriate the existing structural logics 
of the condominium as future histories, in a convincing way.298  
In recent years, there has been a growing interest among urban planners in the practice of 
planning by scenarios as a means of envisioning futures in cities with innumerable actors 
and endless uncertainty.299 Developed as a more resilient alternative to business forecasting, 
planning by scenarios is being coopted by planners and designers as an instrument for 
generating visions for futures, independent from authorial, utilitarian, or purely economic 
goals.300 Planning by scenarios was developed by the military and Shell Oil throughout the 
middle of the twentieth century as a way of operating resiliently in an increasingly globalized 
world with “unknown unknowns.”  Scenario panning takes advantage of uncertain futures 
through the construction of narratives that explore the entire breadth of possible, rather than 
probable or “inevitable”, real-world events as they relate to a certain complex problem.301 
When coopted by humanities and design, scenario planning explores the power of pluralist 
agent-based decision making on complex systems like urban landscapes.302 By exploring 
futures of the condominium in the full breadth of its strategic frameworks, scenario planning 
is totalizing in its scope, capable of creating various narratives of varying possibility. Yet 
through developing multiple narrative timelines, it is entirely pluralistic in its execution, not 
operating within any single set of totalizing ideologies.303 It therefore blends the language 
of existing logics with an expanded field of speculative possibility to create alternative 
spatial narratives that are on one hand, unlikely, and on the other, engaging in their logical 
297.  Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, 246. 
298.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 79. 
299.  Milica Stojanovic, Petar Mitkovic, and Mihailo Mitcovic, “The scenario method in urban planning,” Facta 
universitatis, series: Architecture and Civil Engineering 12, no. 1 (January, 2014): 82.
300.  Urry, What is the Future, ch. 1.
301.  Stojanovic, “The scenario method in urban planning,” 84.
302.  Urry, What is the Future, ch. 1.






















Fig�26 Writing speculative narratives that overlay the space and time of real futures, disrupts the alienation 




In his exploration of scenario planning of the future, John Urry refers to the practice as 
post-modern planning because it is a tactical departure from the planning tradition of 
master-narrative objectives and probabilities in favour of an exploration of unexpected 
possibilities.304 This decentralized visioning exercise can be appropriated by architects and 
planners to disrupt collective but destructive and extractive practices of decision-making 
within the tower. 
2�1�4 Generating/Undermining Narratives through Scenario Planning
Scenario planning upends traditional authorial methods of urban space production through 
its dependence on uncertainty of the future and the likelihood of single-author visions to fail 
because of this uncertainty.305 At its simplest, scenario planning exercises are systematized 
ways of breaking down the full scope of causal uncertainty in a way that is neither naïve, nor 
cripplingly complex.306 The first step in this is determining a timeframe for inquiry through 
a planning horizon. (Fig. 26)(1) Facilitators then identify the full range of drivers or factors 
of uncertainty that are relevant to the timeframe and system in question – in this case, the 
condominium tower. (2) This expansive set of drivers is categorized into component buckets, 
or key questions, that sum up the uncertainty of the system. (3) The plausible outcomes 
to these key questions represent the full possibility of futures for the condominium. (4) 
Components are then configured into plausible (though not necessarily probable) sets which 
together, capture the full diversity of possibilities that the future holds. (5) These outcome 
sets are written into narratives that use people and events through time to show how futures 
might emerge.307 Because the process of scenario planning relies heavily on intuition, 
creativity, and plurality in an aim to overcome constraining linear logics, it thrives on the 
304.  Urry, What is the Future, ch. 1.
305.  Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 41.
306.  Godet, Strategic Foresight, 22.
307. Michel Godet, “The Art of Scenarios and Strategic Planning: Tools and Pitfalls,” Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 65, no. 1 (September 2000): 11.
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broad engagement of the community, stakeholders, and experts.308, 309
The first step in scenario planning is to establish a planning horizon.310 The creation of 
a horizon concretizes the relation of time and space in both conception and materials of 
the condominium. To ask, “Where will this condominium tower look like in 30 years?” 
confronts the capitalist expectation of perpetual economic growth and undermines the public 
conception of the condominium tower as an ageless artifact.311 Establishing a planning 
horizon also creates a window for both action and patience. As a passing decision, tactic 
never possesses space. It is therefore a conquest of time.312 For daily life to be effective as 
activism, it requires a social durability – a persistence of action through time.313 To create a 
planning horizon sets the temporal bounds in which tactic becomes significant.314 To set a 
planning horizon unites a disparate group of community actors into a single understanding 
of the present. While different owners, owner-occupants, and tenants each have their own 
agendas for when to buy, sell, move in, and move out of the towers, to set a planning horizon 
relates the heterogenous present to a common future.315 The scope of the timeframe can vary, 
depending on the purpose of the individuals engaged in the planning exercise. 
If the purpose of scenario planning is to fully explore unknown unknowns through viable 
yet unexpected narratives, it is important to understand all the dimensions of the future in 
question. All moving parts of the question must be named and systematized to understand 
their relations. This naming requires input from both professional experts and stakeholders. 
Professional experts are necessary to understand the technical parameters of all problems 
(eg. building science and global economic forces). Discussions with resident owners, 
landlords, and tenants are necessary to establish strategies of operation within the tower. 
308.  Godet, Strategic Foresight, 26. 
309.  The scenario building exercise completed for the purpose of this thesis, as an exploration of the future 
lives of condominium communities, was completed independently by the author. While this, no doubt, 
impacted the logical constraints of the output narratives, the value of the narratives is still twofold. The first 
is in familiarizing the reader with uncertainty and the logic framework of scenario planning. The second, 
and more salient is the output narrative as a tool for engaging discourses of urban space.  
310.  Godet, Strategic Foresight, 6. 
311.  Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, 246.
312.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xix. 
313.  Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, 49.
314.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 82. 
315.  Urry, What is the Future?” ch. 1. 
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Fig�27 Method for building planning scenarios. 
Building scenarios clarifies the uncertainty of future decisions by organizing the full spectrum of a system’s 
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These strategies form the critical relations between the drivers-in-time. It is in the process 
of creating an exhaustive list of variables that participants identify the full scope and 
complexity of the system in question.316 To capture the full extent of relevant uncertainty, 
these lists can range from thirty to eighty variables, depending on the complexity of the 
system.317 Once the extent of the system is grasped, participants work together to organize 
the variables into component buckets. Participants [unconsciously] use their own perceptions 
of the relations of spatial practice to resolve the associations within the list of drivers. They 
are, in effect, identifying the syntax of lived space. These associations are used to form 
buckets of drivers; each bucket forms a key uncertainty or question within the future of the 
system. In order to maintain the scope of possibilities that can be considered, the components 
should capture as many of the variables as possible, with as little overlap between them as 
possible. The number of components generated will also vary from exercise to exercise but 
participants must generate as few component questions as possible without compromising 
their comprehensiveness as each component question becomes a multiplier of possible 
outcomes.318 Ten or fewer components is ideal. 
By organizing the variables into broad component questions, the future of the tower is 
delaminated and then repackaged into a series specific of questions, and the discussion of 
the tower’s future expands beyond the single question of exchange value. As participants in 
the futures exercise work through the process of generating outcomes for these component 
questions, these outcomes become understood as active causal results, rather than passive 
occurrences. Because the components together represent the entirety of uncertainty 
surrounding the future of the tower, bringing together one possible outcome from each 
of the component buckets creates a comprehensive and viable – though not necessarily 
ideal or probable – alternative for what the future could look like. When creating possible 
combinations, it is important to remember that the purpose of exploratory futures is not 
to generate specifically ideal or viable futures. Rather, its function is to create a discourse 
around potential and unexpected futures based on the actions of individuals over the timeline 
of the planning horizon.319 While the number of outcome sets being created can vary, in this 
step as well, it is beneficial to have as few options as necessary to capture the full spectrum 
316.  Godet, “The Art of Scenarios and Strategic Planning,” 9-14.
317.  Godet, Strategic Foresight, 63. 
318.  Godet, Strategic Foresight, 74-5.
319.  Milica Stojanovic, Petar Mitkovic, and Mihailo Mitkovic, “The scenario method in urban planning,” 
Facta universitatis - series Architecture and Civil Engineering 12, no. 1 (January 2014): 83-4. 
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of possible outcomes; the creation of more than six possible narratives typically generates 
too many nuances and becomes incomprehensible, thereby uninstructive and impractical.320 
Furthermore, too few narratives often leads communities to fall into the convention of 
creating ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ and ‘neutral’ options.321 Michel Godet from La Prospective, a French 
thinktank that specializes in scenarios methodology, encourages that such convention and 
predictability be avoided at all costs as it compromises the methodological strength of 
generating scenarios that capture the full scope of possible futures. Conventional thinking 
is often the product of insinuated strategic thinking, which precludes disruptive and 
unconventional, but nevertheless possible, outcomes.322 
2�1�5 Narratives in the Restoration of Habitus
Once component outcomes have been combined into a diverse and comprehensive set of 
futures, the author creates narratives of how the component outcomes could occur within 
the given planning horizon. It is in this process that the full scope of uncertainty and agent-
causality are explored, presenting the future of the condominium as the result of individual 
agency.323 The strategies of the condominium institution, and the tactics of residents play 
out within the represented space of the tower. While in the context of business and military 
scenario planning exercises, these narratives are often written by economists, technologists, 
and specialists, in scenario planning for a condominium, the architect would fill the 
role as the narrative writier, blending abstract and technical dimensions into engaging 
representations of a society in place. Drawings and visualizations do not promise a stylized 
world that will never be. Rather, self-conscious of their own narrative speculation, they can 
embrace decay, ad-hoc adaptations, and highly individual appropriation.324 Through the 
telling of these stories, owners and residents become active participants in the uncertain 
320.  Michel Godet, “The Art of Scenarios and Strategic Planning,” 20.
321.  This is, undeniably, what happened in the creation of scenarios, later in this thesis. While the three 
narratives produced are presented as the objective outcomes of individual actions, because the scenario 
planning exercise here was created within the framework of a larger systemic critique of the futures of 
the condominium, the component outcomes were already understood within this critical spectrum. In 
an isolated scenario planning exercise, the unbalanced use of narratives as critiques – that is to say the 
idealization of one scenario over another – can be a warning sign of inconsistent and unobjective logics. 
This neutralizes the exploratory power of scenario planning in which case, the people engaging in the 
exercise might have been just as well off, creating a single idealized plan. 
322.  Godet, Strategic Foresight, 22-3.
323.  Godet, “The Art of Scenarios and Strategic Planning,” 11.
324.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 89. 
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future of the tower. In much the same way these scenario outcomes are not generated as 
predictions of the future but rather, when read as a series, in their comprehensiveness, they 
illustrate many viewpoints around what the future could be, leaving the future open for 
action.325 
Planning by scenarios will not cause radical change in the space of the city over a week, 
month, or year. That radical and immediate transformation is not it’s purpose here.326 If we 
build to last, we need to adapt our social and personal obligations to act accordingly; to 
play the long game. Through the creation and telling of stories around the futures (since we 
have erased stories of the past), we as architects can revive in peoples memories, shadows 
of how they might reclaim the spaces that they inhabit; how on a daily basis, they can make 
decisions that ground them in, rather than alienate them from structures that were never 
produced for them in which to feel grounded. In his expansion of the socio-spatial dialectic, 
de Certeau integrates memory and time so that “at the right moment,” memories created 
through future fictions of inhabited space rise to challenge patterns of life that alienate 
human existence. In these moments, value-based action appropriates space giving rise to the 
production of social space.327 
This disruption of daily action and the creation of social space will, it is hoped, thaw the 
internal political framework, used to control the space of condominiums. While the current 
board-led structure allows owners to avoid condominium politics in alienation and apathy, 
disrupting the static narrative of a tacit common future will inspire residents to engage 
and negotiate their space and future with their neighbours. Addressing people face-to-
face concerning noise violations can be either destructive or productive but is, either way, 
mutually beneficial for the mutual realization of both parties need to coexist. This is a 
325.  Janae Futrell from the Journal of the American Planning Association identifies the power of scenario 
planning with three possible outcomes; strategic direction, action identification, and education and 
awareness. While all three outcomes have the potential to be impactful in liberating the condominium 
towers of downtown Toronto from the complete alienation of human value, it is the third outcome of 
education and awareness that has the most capacity for impact in the context of the complex socio-political 
condition of the condominiums and our interest in daily action as the production of the city. 
326.  Lefebvre asserts that revolution is an illusion, comparing it to a ‘magic wand,’ a conceived ideal that 
causes immediate social transformation. Rather, in recognizing the reinforcing power of daily practices and 
habits, we are encouraged to adopt farther reaching temporal horizons. Lefebvre, The Critique of Everyday 
Life, 49-50. 
327.  de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 84-6. 
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rather simple example, but the principle extends all the way from discussing the colour that 
someone paints their hall door, to negotiating project financing strategies with the board at 
the annual general meeting. Engagement is key, not only for the survival of the tower, but for 
the ontological realization of belonging and the survival of the city. 
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2�2  Scenario Planning Exercise: 
Montage Condominiums – 25 Telegram Mews, Toronto, ON 
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Have you ever wondered what your condo will look 
like in the future? If look out from your unit onto the 
city, vibrant and dynamic, we know it will look much 
different in thirty years time, but what if you look 
back at your unit; your kitchen, your bedroom, your 
washroom – your home. How will it look in thirty 
years? Have you ever thought about it? Our homes 
play an important role in how we live our daily lives. 
They slowly evolve with us as our daily needs and 
habits change. These changes can be small things like 
reorganizing the furniture, or it can be bigger changes 
like moving walls. The condominium unit, like any 
other house, will change over time, if you are able to 
adapt it to make it a home. In this way, the city itself 
evolves in time. 
Many things influence how the city, your 
condominium community and your unit will evolve 
in time. The different people in your community, 
how they work together to live in the building, 
the economic wellbeing of the residents and the 
surrounding city and the well-being of the tower 
itself, will all have an impact on how the tower ages, 
according to the decisions of people such as yourself, 
that inhabit it.
You and your neighbours above, below and all 
around you share the tower as a home. How you get 
along with your neighbours can have a big impact 
on the tower’s future. The condo tower is, after all a 
democracy of owners who all share the power to vote 
for the board and collectively make decisions about 
how the building is managed and maintained. Your 
relationship with your neighbours and your personal 
investment in the spaces that you share will impact 
how you, the board of directors, and the whole 
community decide to use and care for these spaces. 
Real-estate and economics will also strongly 
influence how people in your community relate to 
the tower they call home. If you own your unit, you 
probably hope to sell it sometime in the future and 
hopefully for more than you bought it. The value that 
you place on your home influences how you take care 
of it. For example, in strong real-estate market, you 
might feel less pressure to re-paint before selling. If 
the condominium market takes a turn for the worse, 
however, you might be willing to invest more time, 
effort, and money to boost its market value. The same 
principle applies if you are renting your unit. There 
is likely a very specific standard of maintenance that 
your landlord wants to keep the unit in. For better or 
worse, their attitude towards the value of the condo 
will greatly influence how they expect you to live in 
the unit. 
Finally, there is the tower itself; something that we 
tend to take for granted. While the physical tower is 
a very robust concrete structure that could stand in 
Toronto for more than 100 years, the many systems, 
such as electrical, mechanical and plumbing, that 
make it a comfortable place to live require constant 
maintenance. While your Condo Board often takes 
care of these systems, every time that they invest in 
maintenance, it represents a decision made. In time, 
these accumulated decisions can have a big impact 
on what your condo looks like.
When we move into a condominium, we like to think 
of it as static. Condominium towers, however, are 
complex things. They are made up of a community 
of diverse people with diverse tastes and needs, all 
trying to make their home in the heart of the city. 
Juggling the needs of the community, economics, and 
the tower itself, it could not stay exactly the same for 
thirty, twenty, or even ten years! So what will your 
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The day-to-day decisions for managing your condominium are made by the Board of Directors whom you 
elect at the annual general meeting. As outlined in the Ontario Condominium Act, there are three key ways in 
which the Board governs your condominium and community; the Declaration and Description, the By-laws, 
and the Rules. While the Board manages and changes these documents as necessary, most big changes require 
voting owners to approve the Board’s decisions before coming into effect. Owners can vote on rules if +15% 
requisition a meeting to contest the boards decision. 
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2 bedroom + den:
area: 950–1 170 ft²
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condo fee: 665–819
rent: 2 800–3 500
40
2 bedroom:
area: 762–1 186 ft²
est. value: 950 040.00
condo fee: 548–830
rent: 2 300–3 500
135
1 bedroom + den:
area: 670 ft²








rent: 1 600–1 900
37.8%53.9% 6.0% 1.4%
1 person 2 person 3 person 4 5





























2 bedroom + den:
area: 950–1 170 ft²
est. value: 996,280.00
condo fee: 665–819
rent: 2 800–3 500
40
2 bedroom:
area: 762–1 186 ft²
est. value: 950 040.00
condo fee: 548–830
rent: 2 300–3 500
135
1 bedroom + den:
area: 670 ft²








rent: 1 600–1 900
37.8%53.9% 6.0% 1.4%
1 person 2 person 3 person 4 5






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































household size and composition
income demographics
internal social relations
unit morphology (number and size)



















...how will the common 




...how will the legal 
structure of property 









...who will own and/or 
control decision-making 
in the tower?
residents landlord(s) public nobody
...how will the material 
tower have been cared 
for and maintained?
unsafe for














What is the future?
daily basis(1). This is the full complexity of all the 
elements controlling the tower’s future and contains 
far too many uncertainties for us to break down into 
a useful speculation of the future, so we reduce the 
list into a few key questions (2). These key questions 
allow us to consider the future of the tower within 
a long time frame, without getting lost in detail. 
We then explore all the possible answers for each 
question (3) and create sets of outcomes that make 
sense together. These sets make up possible future 
scenarios (4).
View to the Future
So what is the future of Montage Condominiums? 
You live in a community of nearly one-thousand 
people who each day, make decisions about how 
to feel at home in one of the tower’s 529 units. 
Countless internal and external forces such as 
economics and government policies inform how 
and when people move in and out, and the tower 
itself, ages and decays with time, destabilizing your 
relationship to the unit as an investment. With so 
much complexity and uncertainty, we are faced with 
‘wicked problems’ where the answer to one question 
is blocked by numerous other unknowns, making the 
future impossible to project. 
If we can’t predict one future, why not explore 
many? By considering the full range of possibilities 
based on all of these unknowns, we can explore the 
fullness of opportunities, good and bad, that your 
condominium tower holds. 
In the first step of our exploratory framework, we 
look at all of the different things that influence your 
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As hypothetical proposals to what the future of the 
tower could look like, we then use these sets of 
outcomes to tell stories about the everyday lives 
and small decisions of occupants of the tower (5). 
Together, we will walk through three such stories 
about the possible futures of Montage Condos. Each 
of these stories takes place over 30 years, ending in 
2051.  
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It was the fall of 2021. The ongoing Covid-19 
pandemic disrupted production and supply chains 
around the world, causing rippling effects in the 
availability of goods and services. With central banks 
injecting unprecedented amounts of money into 
economies, inflation rates of the Canadian Dollar 
skyrocketed. While high rates of inflation worked to 
cool the exuberant housing market down from the 
spring of 2021, it prevented a much-needed pricing 
correction. Rather, the cost of living was rising to 
meet overinflated housing costs.
While many young owners who lived in Montage 
Condominiums wanted to move out of the towers 
into single free-standing houses, widespread 
economic uncertainty brought the real-estate market 
to a standstill. With rising costs and disruptions in 
building materials, housing starts across Toronto 
slowed to a halt, despite the ongoing housing 
shortage. Rates of land transfer radically slowed and 
condo dwellers felt locked into their position. They 
had very little option but to try to maintain their units 
in a stable and desirable condition and wait for the 
housing market to thaw. 
Landlords who rented out units in the tower, on the 
other hand, realizing that rental income did not have 
nearly the currency that it used to. Encouraged by an 
ongoing demand for rental housing, they were in a 
race to increase rents quickly and by any means they 
could. Rising rents across the city exacerbated the 
already unaffordable living conditions.
Between 2020 and the end of 2021, the provincial 
government had placed a moratorium on rent 
increases across the province in response to the 
ongoing pandemic. As 2021 was drawing to a 
close, many landlords had already sent notices to 
their tenants that they were going to increase rent 
by the maximum of 1.2% as set by the Residential 
Tenancies Act, in alignment with the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) and inflation.  Across 2022 and 2023, 
however, inflation rose to an average of 7.4% per 
year.  To increase rents by this amount year-over-
year, would only exacerbate unaffordability in the 
city. To protect tenants, the provincial government 
locked the permissible annual rent increase at 1.5%, 
well below inflation. 
Federal, provincial, and municipal governments 
looked at the housing situation in Toronto with 
trepidation, unable to agree of whether what was 
happening was in any way better than had there 
been a rapid market correction.  With wide-spread 
over-leveraged mortgage debt from the extended 
market exuberance in late 2020 and early 2021, a 
rapid increase in interest rates would cause high 
levels of mortgage default rates. The rapid and 
widespread devaluation of housing stock would 
threaten the Canadian economy from the top, down, 
by destabilizing the housing asset that stored so much 
of the Canadian economy’s value through mortgage 
debt.  
While both landlords who had invested in the tower, 
and resident owners of units wanted to sell their units 
as soon as possible, that this should be caused by 
a decrease in house prices was out of the question. 
They went on paying condo fees, to maintain the 
building in a good and marketable condition. 
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In the early spring of 2024, the board of directors for 
Montage Condos was struggling to balance between 
the cost of maintenance and ongoing inflation.  While 
they had managed this, in part, by slowly increasing 
the condominium fees, rising maintenance costs 
had thrown the operating budget out of equilibrium. 
A recent building performance audit revealed that 
increasing costs had eaten away contributions to 
the reserve fund, the balance of which had virtually 
stagnated. 
The building inspection had also found that the pool 
filter and heating system were not working properly 
but was culturing high volumes of bacteria in the 
water. This was a costly and unexpected repair. The 
replacement pump needed to be brought from the 
States; the inflated Canadian dollar would drive costs 
even higher. The board considered closing the pools 
and putting the repairs on hold until funds could be 
raised but after several complaints from owners, 
it was determined that delaying the repair of such 
a significant amenity would further drag down the 
already lagging resale value of the units in the tower. 
Instead, the board decided to enact a borrowing 
by-law that would allow them to cover the cost of 
the necessary repairs with a loan. Until now, the 
Bank of Canada had fought to keep borrowing 
costs low. Even in the face of high inflation, the 
bank had maintained interest rates at a balance to 
avoid catastrophe with over-leveraged debt across 
the country. Even the moderate increases in interest 
rates had forced people to sell their units and settle 
their mortgages.  The board decided that it would 
take advantage of this low rate despite the minor 
risks. Their only other option was to issue a special 
assessment, collecting the necessary funds directly 
from the condo owners in a one-time payment.  
Rhetorically, they realized that with rising costs of 
living, many unit owners would be unable to afford 
a special assessment. In reality, members of the 
board did not want to pay a lump-sum fee when the 
cost for the pool repairs could be defrayed over ten 
or more years and pushed off onto future owners. 
Nevertheless, once the board secured the loan, the 
condominium fee once again increased, in order to 
cover monthly loan payments.  
2026
As condominium fees and mortgage interest rates 
continued to creep higher, many owners who lived 
in their units – mostly young professionals whose 
incomes were not rising with inflation – became 
hard-pressed to meet monthly obligations. Those who 
were unable to sell because of the depressed market, 
had their homes repossessed bank auctions, often 
picked up by opportunistic investors. Landlords in 
the tower were in the constant process of adjusting 
rents to maintain their own cash-flows while pushing 
unaffordability higher and higher. For them, it was 
an act of between how much they could legally raise 
rent from year to year, and the ever-encroaching cost 
of condominium fees.
To compound this upward pressure, the province 
introduced new policies that dictated reserve fund 
contributions as a function of the towers height, age, 
and maintenance records among other factors, rather 
than simply the balance of the budget after standard 
maintenance. This policy had been made to combat a 
growing concern that with rising costs, condominium 
corporations would become increasingly delinquent 
preparing for the future. As a result of the policy, 
condominium fees rose even higher, and the standard 
of maintenance fell even farther. 
2024 – 2027 Narrative I
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It was in this context, caught between the 
condominium corporation’s ever-rising fees, and 
tightening rent restrictions that landlords and 
investors of the tower began to get vocal about the 
board’s financial decision-making. They lobbied 
the government to lose restrictions, and the board 
to do anything to decrease monthly fees. Over 
three years, they elected to the seven-person board, 
representatives who shared their agenda to prioritize 
money over matter. Their efforts were effective 
but at the expense of building maintenance and 
contributions to the reserve fund. 
Montage Condominiums was not the only tower 
community facing this financial impasse. Across 
the city, condominium corporations were taking 
on increasing debts to finance emergency repairs. 
The corporations became increasingly financially 
unfeasible and were falling into disrepair. The 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing blamed 
this rapid deterioration to financial mismanagement 
– an accusation that was at least half true – and 
became increasingly involved in the operations of 
each condo corporation. A seat on the board of each 
struggling corporation was reserved for an advisory 
member from the Ministry.  As they cut costs, 
calibrated maintenance regimes, gave landlords 
directives on how much should be charged for rent, 
and desperately tried to balance budgets, it became 
clear that efforts were futile and only causing great 
consternation among many investors. Realizing the 
tenuous situation of their investments – that they 
were not actually making secure income from rental 
units – many investors were in the constant frame of 
mind of being ready to sell should the opportunity 
arise. To this end, they were still concerned about the 
investment appeal of Montage and how it compared 
with neighbouring towers. They were opposed to 
the Ministry-recommended cuts to staffing, window 
washing, and floor cleaning. On the other hand, there 
was a growing group of investors who had given 
up all together. Their goal now was to extract from 
the tower all that they could, before it came to an 
inevitable end of abandonment. 
2030
These differing attitudes towards the tower became 
flash-points when certain big decisions had to be 
made about maintenance expenditures. In July of 
2030, a fresh-water pipe in a vacant unit on the forty-
first-floor burst, causing tens of thousand of dollars 
in damage to units beside and below. While the level 
of damage from this occurrence was unprecedented, 
bursting pipes were getting increasingly common 
in the past few years. The board was concerned 
that the plumbing distribution system in the tower 
would need to be completely refitted – a costly 
undertaking. Instead of continually patching pipes 
when they burst, the board grudgingly voted to use 
the reserve fund that the government had mandated, 
in order to pay for the system replacement. This 
decision polarized the community of landlords. On 
one hand, owners who were still hopeful of selling 
their units or who still lived in the tower, recognized 
that continuously doing remedial maintenance was 
damaging to the reputation of the tower in real-
estate circles. Though costly, taking advantage of 
the reserve fund would be a good opportunity to 
give potential buyers confidence in the tower. Those 
who did not expect the tower to be around for too 
much longer, however, thought it a lost cause. Most 
plumbing incidents did not cause this much damage 
and were cheaper to replace piecemeal, for now, 
than replacing the whole system. They expected 
that depleting the reserve fund on this project would 
drive condo fees higher yet again or introduce some 
new legislation. The discussion got heated. When 
the board planned to move ahead with the system 
renewal, owners requisitioned a meeting to contest 
the action. One year and eleven burst pipes later, the 
board received a court order to secure contracts for 
the project. 
As sure as thunder follows lightening, condominium 
fees were raised once again to begin rebuilding a 
capital reserve. To meet the increasing fees, landlords 
began renting their units beyond legal capacity. 
Maintenance of individual units stopped entirely. 
A few investors – mostly from out of country – 
abandoned their units all together, refusing to pay 
condo fees. Payment arrears, and long power-of-
sale and eviction processes only multiplied the 
administrative duties of the board. 
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By 2035, everyone was exasperated. Landlords had 
exhausted all avenues for making money from rental 
properties, outmaneuvered on all sides by policy. 
Governments at all three levels were likewise at 
their wits end. In spite of the never-ending stream of 
legislations, trying to re-engineer the condominiums 
as affordable communities in the downtown core, 
negotiating among the hoards of landlords, each 
with their own agendas and strategies for exploiting 
loopholes or simply operating outside of the law, 
they were running out of options. Exorbitant rents 
and the high cost of living compounded with poor 
maintenance were forcing tenants into crowded and 
poor living conditions. 
With rising financial unfeasibility, there was a 
movement among absentee owners to disband the 
condominium corporation all together. Similar 
initiatives were talking place in other condominium 
towers across the city. Recognizing that they were no 
longer able to sell their units and that any attempt to 
maintain them as rental properties was economically 
unsustainable, many landlords wanted to sell the 
land and tower in hopes to recuperate whatever they 
could. There were two problems with this. The first 
was finding a buyer who would consider the tower, 
or at least the land that it stood on, worthwhile. 
The second problem was that 18% of the unit 
owners – corporation members – still lived in the 
tower. While they recognized that the finances of 
the tower were in bad shape and units were nearly 
impossible to sell and they had nowhere to go. As 
much as they disliked it, the condominium tower 
was their temporary home. Disbanding the tower 
would inevitably leave them unable to afford houses 
anywhere else. Even if a buyer came along, the 
purchase was not likely to receive the 90% approval 
that it needed from the tower’s voting population to 
proceed. 
A few condominiums across the city had been 
dissolved and sold wholesale to Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (R.E.I.T.s) who could manage the 
tower much more economically as a rental. Many of 
the towers were not yet that old, so if a deal could be 
made, such investment trusts were willing to buy out 
towers. 
Montage Condominiums, however, found itself in 
a particularly difficult situation. Investment trusts 
looking to buy out condominium towers controlled 
the market and could be selective about which towers 
to buy. While the Montage tower was only 26 years 
old, the window-wall façade was quickly reaching 
the end of its life. A significant portion of the annual 
budget was already directed to patching and resealing 
leaks and repairing water damage in units. The most 
recent reserve fund audit estimated that the rapidly 
decreasing performance of the building enclosure 
was increasing heating and cooling costs by about 
30%, and that the entire envelope would soon need to 
be replaced. No investment firms were willing to buy 
a property that presented such a high initial cost of 
refurbishment. The tower community was trapped.
2036
Governments at all three levels were deeply 
concerned about the declining situation in the city. 
Increasing housing shortages and unaffordability 
were ironically coupled with rising vacancies 
as landlords pushed to empty and sell their 
condominiums to large land-holding firms. Housing 
in the downtown core could soon be monopolized 
by a few private companies or left completely 
abandoned. The municipal government felt it had a 
responsibility to set standards of affordability and 
maintenance, so the city council made the radical 
policy choice to purchase some towers and put 
them in the management of the Toronto Community 
Housing Corporation (T.C.H.C). 
After a brief period of negotiation with the residents 
and owners of the tower, the province received a 
court order to acquire 25 Telegram Mews from TSCC 
2016 for an at-market price. 
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94 units combined into 47




Once T.C.H.C. took control of the tower, a huge 
percent of their tower-renewal budget was directed 
to re-cladding the building. While a few nearby 
towers that were still privately owned had recently 
replaced their window-wall facades at great expense, 
the committee overseeing the renovation of the 
tower found that they could save considerable 
amounts of money by replacing the window walls 
with prefabricated wall panels containing punched 
windows and then over-cladding the building from 
the outside. This would also improve the thermal and 
energy performance of the building, and lower long-
term operation costs. It wasn’t the most aesthetic 
solution, but aesthetics was not really a concern for 
the steering committee. 
Since the T.C.H.C. took full control of the tower, 
the Description that had previously defined each of 
the units within the tower dissolved into air. In their 
original feasibility studies, the City recognized that 
the greatest needs for stable housing in the downtown 
core were for seniors and large households. The 
city converted seventy-five of the 521 units to fully 
accessible units on the lower floors and ninety units 
were merged into three and four-bedroom apartments 
for families. While the project was receiving funding 
from municipal, provincial, and federal governments, 
all funding streams these days were meager. Work 
was economized as much as possible through the 
standardization of units. While units had been slowly 
adapted by previous owners, the city’s renovation 
brought the units back to a consistent baseline were 
as little work as possible was done to make them 
tenant-ready as soon as possible.
The committee responsible for the tower renovation 
had committed to revitalizing the amenities to 
promote a strong community within the tower. A 
pool, two small theater rooms, a games room and 
a party room with a kitchen had all been built and 
maintained under a shared facilities agreement with 
the neighbouring Neo Condos. However, because so 
much of the city’s project budget had to be directed 
to building necessities such as the façade, work on 
the amenity spaces was kept to a minimum. After 
a fresh new coat of paint and a few new armchairs, 
all that was left was for administration to write a 
use-policy and event booking forms. The gym and 
pool would not require booking of course. The 
original building had featured a small climbing wall 
on the outdoor terrace. This was deemed a liability 
so the ‘rocks’ were removed and the committee hired 
a local artist to paint a community oriented mural, 
revitalizing the outdoor gathering space. 
2038
In the fall of 2038, residents began moving into the 
tower. The entire tower was dedicated as subsidized 
and deeply affordable housing. Many of the units 
newly renovated for accessibility were given to 
individuals who would have retired in the last 
five years, had they also not been unemployed by 
the decade of economic disruptions. Left without 
retirement savings or pensions, these people 
needed a secure place to live. On the other hand 
the municipality hoped that the accommodation of 
families would create an economic fly-wheel effect, 
activating business and services in the downtown 
core. The T.C.H.C. implemented a rent-geared-to-
income scheme promoted that would allow tenants to 
remain in place longer, hopefully, in time, generating 
an economic sustainability. Many of the households 
that moved in were comprised of middle-aged people 
who had been participants of the original surge in the 
knowledge economy but now, with age and families, 
were unable to adapt to the shifting economy, 
emerging at the peripheries of the city. Displaced 
from the suburbs, they moved downtown both for 
the promise of affordable housing, and the chance of 
finding work in the businesses that remained.  
Even though many of the residents, were seniors and 
retired, and therefore not expected to be active in 
the labour force, there was still a significant number 
of unemployed people who, according to StatCan, 
could. Unable to find work, they spent much of their 
day in and around the tower, either in their units or in 
the common spaces. To promote social programming 
within the tower, and to stave off depression and 
other challenges associated with joblessness, a local 
charity helped the city in hosting employment and 
entrepreneurialism workshops in the event room of 
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Seven years, after being converted into deeply 
affordable housing, life in the tower seemed to be 
going well. The effort to diversify the downtown 
population through the creation of three- and 
four-bedroom units provided new populations for 
reviving service and knowledge-based economies 
downtown. While the economic framework was 
slowly being rebuilt, employment within the tower 
was still below the provincial average. While the 
dwindling community employment sessions had been 
only partially successful in helping to revitalize the 
local economy, they had provided a setting in which 
residents of the tower had gotten to know each other, 
forming networks within the tower. They had all 
moved into the city and into the tower for a common 
reason. This emerging society began to spill out into 
the common spaces of the tower. With little reason 
to leave the tower, people started going up five floors 
or down three, to visit friends. Run-ins in the spartan 
hallway turned into half-hour discussions about 
the great weather or the bad economy. During the 
summer, the rooftop patio, one of the few amenities 
that was not locked, was full of neighbour-kids 
playing soccer on the pavers. On winter afternoons, 
a small group of old people sat in the front lobby in 
the late afternoon sun from across the rail corridor, 
watching kids walked home from the school just 
across Fort York Boulevard. 
Life in the tower was by no means idyllic. The 
tower itself became a point of conflict between the 
residents and the management team. In the speed 
with which the municipality had renovated the 
tower, they had made some functional oversights. 
In the name of economy when the making of larger 
units for families and bigger households, the project 
architect had designed the new kitchens simply as 
replacements of those that had originally been built 
into the condominium. These kitchens had been 
designed as tight and efficient for one and two-
person households who ate out often. Many residents 
complained that the kitchens were simply too small 
to be practical for a family. The use and care of the 
common spaces also became a talking point among 
tower residents. With relatively small and crowded 
apartments, people wanted places to meet. Parents 
had expected that the amenity spaces would be open 
access as a place for kids to go and in bad weather. 
The superintendent, however, maintained the event 
space booking policy to the letter of the law. The 
rooms in the amenity pavilion were kept locked up 
most of the time. Many residents of the tower felt 
that maintenance and programming funds were being 
wasted or mis-directed but had no tangible way to 
raise their concerns with management.  
2043
For a while, someone put a suggestion box in the 
lobby, but it is difficult to tell if it had any real 
impact. In the fall of 2043, a watershed municipal 
election precipitated cultures change at city hall. 
City staff from housing wanted to resurrect the 
T.C.H.C. Tennant Engagement System from years 
gone by, in which each housing property nominated 
tenant- representatives to discuss concerns and bring 
initiatives for the community. This initiative from 
the city was greeted with great enthusiasm from the 
communities and tenant-representative council was 
set up. For the first year, four representatives from 
Montage Condominiums met diligently, discussing 
concerns from the community, and improving 
life within the tower. They accomplished a few 
things; getting the emergency exit signs on the 
seventh, twelfth, nineteenth, and forty-first floors 
replaced, reviving the planter boxes by the front 
entrance, and organizing a community potluck in 
late August. Despite their strong desire to better 
their community, however, some of their most 
important initiatives were failing to be taken up by 
management. Among their requests were for for 
some of the smaller common rooms, like the poker 
room and theater, be merged into an open-access art 
room for kids. The second request was for staffed 
hours of the pool area, which some parents felt had 
fallen under-maintained and un-safe. The building 
representatives also requested that T.C.H.C. review 
the adequacy of the kitchens provided in many of 
the four-bedroom units, possibly renovating them to 
accommodate larger households. Finally, they asked 
for more collapsible tables and chairs to be provided 
in the events room, and that booking process be 
streamlined, and fees removed, as to actually 
promote community and family gatherings. Last that 
they heard, the management team was “considering 
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In 2047, an electrical fire broke out in the distribution 
panel on the 33rd floor. While the electrical system in 
the tower had been maintained piecemeal, the overall 
infrastructure was now close to forty years. As the 
years progressed, regular inspections had become 
increasingly lax. As families and communities had 
began to settle in place, the occupancy of the tower 
had slowly climbed over what the systems were 
designed for, under the management’s radar. While 
the fire was suppressed and contained, residents from 
the 33rd and 34th floors had to be moved out for 
several months for repairs and an investigation. It 
was determined that the whole system would need to 
be to be brought up to standard. 
This was going to be a costly undertaking. Wiring 
within individual units was fine to stay as it was but 
everything leading up to each unit’s breaker box 
had to be replaced. Bus-conduits bringing power to 
each floor, transformers, and distribution panels on 
each floor, and all the wiring to each unit’s breaker 
panels had to be replaced. Most of this could be 
done without tearing out the ceiling on each floor, 
but drywall did have to be removed at some places 
to give electricians access to electrical conduit. Each 
block of development in CityPlace was developed 
with a shared podium, containing the parking garage, 
amenities and transformer vault for all the towers 
within that block. While each of the towers on the 
block had their own transformers and could be 
retrofitted independently, a building-system audit 
determined that the neighbouring Neo Condos, 
also owned by T.C.H.C. and the commercial spaces 
in the podium would need to have their electrical 
systems overhauled as well. This significant and 
unforeseen cost to the maintenance of the project and 
caused a shift in the municipality’s attitude towards 
the ex-condominium programs. As the inner-city 
economy was reaching new heights, the city was 
dedicating much of its attention to high-profile civic 
improvement and public infrastructure projects, 
with little patience for such costly but less exciting 
projects of maintenance. 
In order to make up for the sudden cost of the 
electrical overhaul, the TCHC moved to temporarily 
suspend some community programming and 
maintenance of common spaces within the tower. 
Committee members already had ambivalent 
feelings about the pool. Some felt that as what was 
technically a city pool, a lifeguard should be present 
during fixed hours of operation, to avoid lawsuits. 
Most other TCHC properties didn’t have pools. 
Furthermore, as it had been some time since the pool 
had been renovated, the deck area and changerooms 
were in bad shape. Tiles were coming up around the 
hot-tub, rust was peeling paint off the steel structure, 
and most of the change-cubicles were missing doors. 
Without public consultation, the committee voted 
to close the pool and gym until further notice. The 
property representatives committee found their 
budget for community events halved. The on-site 
super-intendant was replaced with a new digital 
portal where tenants could report maintenance issues. 
Property maintenance once again fell to state that 
was constantly trying to catch up; management lost 
touch with the daily needs of the community in the 
tower.  
In this rift between the external management of the 
tower and the ever-growing community within, a 
dichotomy emerged. While the municipality thought 
about the tower from the outside-in, as a stack of 
identical floorplates, serviced by an economic spine 
of services, the community had a much different 
conception. They viewed their daily life to be at odds 
with the serializing efficiency of the management, 
seeking, if only subconsciously, little opportunities 
to express their lives in the community. Social 
connections crossed the boundaries of units; people 
used their neighbour’s laundry when theirs went 
unrepaired for months on end. Shoes on the floormat 
in the hall were an invitation to stop and say hi, 
the lemon tree revived on the neighbor’s balcony a 
reminder that that get-well-soon card was no longer 
needed. A complex community emerged in spite 
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A condominium’s Description is the document that 
legally defines each unit in the tower as a distinct 
free-hold property, allowing one tower to be owned 
by many different stakeholders. When TSCC-2016 
(Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation) 
was bought out by the city, the corporation was 
disbanded, and the description no longer had legal 
effect on the tower. The property became owned 
by a single entity – the city. When the city took full 
ownership of the tower, the Description was voided, 
giving T.C.H.C. free reign to adapt and combine 
units according to their housing agenda. The removal 
of the Description also signifies that the power of 
decision-making is no longer distributed throughout 
the tower. There was no longer the relationship 
between ownership, occupancy, and control. 
Control:
When the city bought out the condominium 
corporation, control over the tower was centralized 
in T.C.H.C. as a single administrator. Many of 
the management team’s decisions were based on 
efficiency, economy, and predictability, rather than 
habitability. While on paper, the community was 
given some voice through consultation about big 
decisions, these efforts weren’t sustained in a way 
that would positively affect daily operations of 
the building or its transformation into a thriving 
community. External control of the tower eventually 
alienated the purpose of management for the tower 
and became an extent of political negotiation.  
Use-relationship:
Because the tower and all its units were removed 
from the real-estate market, the dwelling units in the 
tower were de-commodified. They therefore became 
used as homes rather than as assets for accumulation. 
The public and de-commodified ownership of the 
tower also affected how people appropriated the units 
as their own. While on one hand, the bureaucratic 
standardization of units for management efficiency 
gave all the units a more rigid formulation and 
prevented tenants from modifying the physical space 
by moving walls, because the tenants no longer 
had financial stake in the units, they were much 
more open to using spaces as they wanted or saw 
necessary. Laundry on balconies, shoes lined up in 
hallways, mis-matched drapes, and well-used lawn 
chairs on the rooftop patio were only some of the 
material evidence that the tower had become a home 
for many.
Common Spaces:
The good ambitions for the committee that was 
responsible for the conversion of the condominium to 
affordable housing were lost as the years progressed. 
While the economic agenda was moderately 
successful – affordable housing allowed people to 
find jobs and rebuild the inner-city economy – much 
of the community programming and spaces that the 
politicians had used to sell the project, were now 
underfunded. The pool and gym were completely 
out of commission. Inconvenient booking and event 
policies resulted in the common rooms being largely 
abandoned. Hallways and lobbies were poorly 
maintained. This is not to say that communities and 
societies did not emerge within the tower, but when 
they did, it was often in un-sanctioned meeting 
spaces; a cluster of parents at one corner of the 
patio, a group of seniors sitting on the edge of, a 
raised planter-bed outside the front door, or a group 
of teenagers sitting on the floor of the  hall on the 
17th floor, community emerged outside the exacting 
structure of the rental tower. 
Condition and Maintenance:
As the conversion for the condominium into an 
affordable housing project aged, the vision for the 
tower also aged and lost much of its transformational 
drive. This was in large part, due to ever-decreasing 
funding from the city. Maintenance of the tower 
was economized. The building was safe, halls were 
well-lit, if units leaked or heating units failed, a 
serviceperson usually came within the week or two – 
three at most depending on the urgency of the repair. 
It was the common spaces, however that bore the 
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Over 2020 and 2021, mortgage interest rates, lowered 
by the Bank of Canada to increase liquidity in a 
stagnating economy, prompted a surge in housing 
prices across southern Ontario. The exception to 
this growth was the prices of condominiums in 
downtown Toronto which fell by 8%,  caused largely 
by people’s desire to leave the city and the temporary 
decline of rental demand.  Rents decreased around 
20%. By the summer of 2022 with wide-spread 
vaccination, people returned to downtown Toronto 
to live, work, and study. Despite the strength of the 
rebounding condominium market, the Covid-19 
pandemic had undermined investors’ faith in the 
condominiums. People had seen how quickly and 
unpredictably markets could shift. 
Within the robust but cooling investment interest, 
the board of Montage Condos was doing its best 
to maintain the appeal of the units in their tower. If 
CMHC had difficulty predicting what the markets 
were going to do, the seven directors on the board 
felt especially unprepared. They worked with the 
condo manager to balance between investing enough 
to keep the building systems operational and the 
communal elements looking fresh and vibrant, while 
not over-extending the operating budget or breaking 
into the reserve fund for something that a future 
board could justifiably pay for.  Having received 
complaints from some residents who were looking 
to sell their units, the board turned their attention 
to the amenity spaces which hadn’t been renovated 
since the tower was completed in 2009 and were 
looking tired. Early in the spring of 2023, the board 
finalized plans for the complete renovation of these 
spaces. They committed a little over $800,000 to this 
work of retiling the pool and replacing the pumps, 
reorganizing the locker-rooms to be universal, 
replacing the furniture in the party room, new 
barbecues on the roof, and fresh flooring and paint 
everywhere. The cost represented almost one third of 
the corporation’s annual revenue from maintenance 
fees, totalling the past three year’s contribution to the 
reserve fund.  The work took a little under a year to 
complete but when it was finished, it made the tower 
community feel almost as good as new.  
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Over the next few years, the prices of condominiums 
continued to rise slowly, spurred on by the market 
appeal returning to the city. Suburban house prices 
were stabilizing after the pandemic rush in 2021. 
The re-balancing of demand allowed for many 
young people and households who had bought 
condominiums as first-time homes, to now sell 
their units and move out of the downtown core. 
Buyers were taking advantage of the rebounding 
condominium demand to invest in property 
downtown. While some of them were young urban 
professionals, who like their predecessors, were 
trying to buy into the real-estate market, many condo 
buyers were prompted by the ongoing increase in 
rental demand, upheld by the Federal Government’s 
Immigration 2023 policy. Montage Condos, with 
its freshly renovated amenities spaces, was highly 
competitive in the warming market. 
2026
Throughout this time, the board continued to work 
to keep the building operating smoothly. The tower 
was now 17 years old and some of the main systems 
were showing age. The water distribution pumps 
which had been replaced in 2018 needed to be 
overhauled again. There were ongoing issues with 
the buildings drainage system. An obstruction in 
one of the drainage stacks had caused water damage 
in several penthouse suites. Parts of the façade 
had to have sealants replaced. To keep up with the 
ever-increasing maintenance costs, the board was in 
a constant game of slowly increasing condominium 
fees, juggling discontent condo owners and tri-annual 
warnings from the auditor that their reserve fund 
was ill-equipped to deal with sudden lawsuits or 
emergency repairs. 
In October 2026, two of the five elevators suddenly 
stopped working. As some of the most used 
machinery in the building, they were subject to 
frequent maintenance, but a technician sent by Otis 
told management that because of the building’s age, 
replacement parts could not be sourced. Emergency 
work needed to be done to bring them up to standard; 
the system would need to be completely overhauled. 
Rather than paying for the work by leveraging 
a special assessment which nobody wanted, the 
board decided to pay for it in a lump-sum and raise 
condominium fees to facilitate a quick recovery of 
the books. As one of the board members reasoned, 
while nobody wanted yet another increase in 
condominium fees, this would at least push the bulk 
of the cost for this necessary work down the road. 
While most people accepted that the elevator 
overhaul was a necessity, some owners were angry 
over the dramatic increase of the condominium fees. 
As the building continued to age, these emergency 
repairs were going to become increasingly common. 
Wanting to disincentivize the board from repeating 
this, a group of owners petitioned the directors to 
enact a borrowing by-law that would permit the 
corporation to secure financing in the case of another 
emergency.  The special interest group was adamant. 
They personally collected enough proxy ballots to 
pass the by-law by a 50% majority at the next annual 
general meeting. It was not difficult for them to 
convince their fellow unit condo owners; allowing 
the board the option of financing repairs gave the 
corporation greater budget security and allowed for 
the condo fees to be kept low. 
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The winter of 2027 was particularly warm with 
temperatures hovering around freezing. Under the 
many freeze-thaw cycles, the membrane under the 
rooftop terrace finally gave way. The recent Reserve 
Fund Audit had found the membrane to be rapidly 
approaching the end of its lifespan. The grocery store 
under the podium had been complaining about leaks 
for a few years. In the past, these could be fixed with 
patching but the damage from this winter required a 
full replacement of the membrane. 
The board saw this damage as an opportunity, once 
again, to boost the market appeal of the building. The 
shine had worn off the amenity spaces, renovated 
five years previous and the board members that 
had overseen the project had since moved on. The 
board and building management decided to retain 
a landscape architect to re-imagine the roof-top 
amenity space. Still hesitant to use their new capacity 
to loan against the building – it reflected poorly on 
the condo’s Status Report – they planned to finance 
the project using a combination of loan and special 
assessment. There was some hesitancy about the cost, 
but the board felt that the pros in re-sale outweighed 
the cons.
In early September of that year, the board sent a copy 
of the proposal to each of the unit owners, along 
with the breakdown for the mixed project financing. 
They expected people to be pleased. The reaction 
they received, however, was quite negative. Most 
unit owners thought that paying for the upgrades with 
a special assessment was not in their best interest. 
A special assessment would disrupt their mortgage 
payments of younger owners and rental income of 
investors. The owners requisitioned a meeting with 
the board.  
The board and the unit owners who attended the 
meeting reached a compromise to cover the entirety 
of the project by a loan to make up the difference by 
economy-engineering many of the proposed features. 
Because many of the concerned owners leased out 
their units and did not see the use-value of the roof 
space, were not to be convinced of the advantages of 
additional landscaping, even for marketability. 
In the end, the project was completed on about 
two-thirds of the original proposed budget with the 
decreases used to reduce the special assessment, 
rather than the loan.   
Terrace renovations
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In March of 2033, it became too much. The façade 
was starting to fail so badly that it could no longer 
be maintained with patch repairs. Many owners 
were reporting mould, water damage in the drywall, 
and bad condensation between the panes. Shrinking 
and broken seals caused draughts, making the units 
expensive and difficult to keep warm in the winter. 
The façade of the tower was also starting to look 
terrible from the outside, damaging market appeal. 
That spring, the board of two residents and five 
landlords  worked with the condo management 
team to prepare an RFP for a contractor, capable of 
replacing the façade.
The board awarded the contract to the lowest bidder. 
Even the lowest bid would consume nearly a decade 
of the boards total operating budget. The reserve 
fund was in no shape to handle even half of the cost 
and with the pre-existing loan from the roof-top 
replacement, the board could not find a brokerage 
that would secure a loan for the entirely of the repair. 
They were left with no choice but to levy a special 
assessment against the unit owners for the bulk of the 
repair costs. 
Many residents and owners simply could not 
afford the special assessment and were forced to 
sell their units. Some tried to hold on until after 
the renovations were complete so that they could 
take advantage of the new façade to reclaim lost 
market value. Those that could not secure short-term 
financing were left trying to sell their unit with a 
significant lien against it. Because part of the façade 
restoration had also to be covered by loan, the board 
felt pressure to increase the condominium fee. 
Overextended, unit owners were vocally opposed 
to this. The state of both the reserve fund and 
maintenance in the rest of the building slowly started 
to decline.  
During the replacement, units needed to be vacated, 
two weeks at a time.  Landlords, now owning a little 
over eighty percent of the building, took this as an 
opportunity to raise rents under the allowance for 
renovated units. Landlords who had to re-finance 
their mortgages at higher rates found ways of 
framing additional bedrooms out of the living spaces 
that could be used to generate additional revenue. 
Most of these retrofits were done without approval 
from the board.  
2034
Then in January of 2034, the economy went into a 
recession. Foreign corporate investment had been 
waning since the late 20’s which was devaluing the 
Canadian dollar and inflating national debt. In an 
effort to calm fleeing investors, the Bank of Canada 
increased interest rates by 8%. While the theory was 
sound, it initiated a wave of mortgage foreclosures 
and gutted small business and innovation. Rising 
unemployment, increased cost of living, and 
skyrocketing costs of mobility outside of city 
centre prompted many younger people to move 
downtown. For the first time since 2018, detached 
homes significantly decreased in price. For those 
who recognized these trends early and had money to 
invest, the increased demand for down-town rental 
units properties created a utilitarian appeal in the 
condo apartments. Middleclass owners living in the 
towers on floating mortgage rates were forced to sell 
to incoming landlords. 
While many of the amenity’s spaces and sellable 
features were showing their age, nobody complained 
about them. Investors were not bothered as long as 
rental demand was rising. Tenants could not afford to 
be picky. To sustain the appeal of Montage Condos, 
the board just made sure that the status certificate that 
was in good shape – signalling, if only symbolically, 
some financial stability in uncertain times. The status 
certificate had been deeply damaged by the façade 
repairs and increasing proportion of leased units. In 
order to increase competitiveness with surrounding 
buildings, many of which were in the same state 
anyways, and to gloss over any inquiries into the 
status certificate, the board voted to stall any further 
increases in raising HOA fees. Lowering monthly 
costs also provided an antidote to the increased cost 
of monthly mortgage payments for those seeking a 
larger margin of return on rental properties
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As the state of the towers continued to decline, so did 
their market value. Montage Condos was not alone 
in this. While the rental shortage was ongoing, it was 
becoming increasingly evident that rapidly escalating 
costs of maintenance negated any of the original 
benefit of investment. While the condominium units 
were radically depreciated, their cost was still more 
than most people could afford with the extreme 
mortgage rates. Because of increasing maintenance 
costs, banks considered units to be very high risk. 
Accordingly, mortgages became unattainable for the 
average person or family looking to buy a home. It 
was understood that the only investment value for 
condominium was for the extraction of rent. 
The board took several drastic measures to direct 
as much capital to keeping the building systems 
operating properly as economically as possible 
while avoiding fee increases. Landlords would pass 
increased fees directly on to tenants. If rent went too 
high, tenants would stop paying, landlords would 
go into arrears on their condominium fees and the 
corporation would be left even more stretched for 
cash. It had happened a few times already, where 
international investors who could not be bothered 
to close on the units now radically depreciated, 
simply stopped paying condo fees and stopped all 
communications with the board. In such situations, 
tenants were obliged to pay their rent directly to the 
corporation while the board managed the long and 
expensive process of liens and power of sale.  Power 
of sale units often ended up being purchased at a 
major discount by a landlord who already owned one 
or two other units in the tower. By now, 485 of the 
521 units were owned by landlords in the secondary 
rental market. The board was comprised entirely of 
landlords. 
In 2039, in a bid to reclaim profitability to the 
tower, the board moved to replace the condominium 
management team that had been with Montage since 
the tower was built. They found a new property 
management company that focused on finding 
efficiencies in the building’s management; ways of 
cutting costs and maintaining positive cash-flow. 
Knowing that they were dealing mainly with tenants, 
rather than free-hold residents, the new management 
made it their specialty in being ruthlessly economic 
and selective with the maintenance that they deemed 
necessary. This suited the board quite well. Cleaning 
of the common spaces was all but stopped. Carpet 
was thread-bare and in some places, removed all 
together to expose concrete. Burnt out lightbulbs 
were seldom replaced. In less than a year, the pool 
was drained and locked. The hallways became dark 
and inhospitable places in which tenants actively 
avoided each other. In order to promote security and 
stabilize the internal community, the board agreed 
to add locks on the stair doors so that people would 
only have access to their own floor. The space of the 
tower was further stratified.  
As a result, many dimensions of interpersonal 
relations in the building continued to break down. 
Relations between tenants and landlords became 
increasingly stressed as the unit maintenance 
continued to decline. Maintenance complaints filed 
to the management team were rarely acted on. Leaky 
faucets, broken heating units, and plagued life in the 
tower.
Rough repairs
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By 2044, another economic cycle came to a 
shuddering end. Relentless inflation outpaced 
income. The economy was slowly and painfully 
grinding to a halt. There was widespread 
unemployment and displacement. This was unlike 
the recession of 2032 in which large groups of 
young individuals moved into the city as renters to 
find work. Toronto was now one of the few cities 
in Ontario where work could still be found. As a 
result, tenants were no longer just young workers and 
students – single – but whole families. Over the next 
few years, landlords adapted their units to the shifting 
demands by re-configuring walls and fitting in ad-
hoc kitchens and washrooms where they could, to 
appeal, albeit spartanly, to families of tenants. Water 
pressure in the tower was always low, the waste 
system was often overwhelmed, the garbage chute 
had not worked in months. Only three of the original 
five elevators were consistently maintained – one for 
the lower twenty-five floors and two for the upper 
twenty. The buildings legal residential capacity had 
long been exceeded but nobody did anything about 
it. The downsized municipal staff did not have the 
means or time to inspect. Even if they did and were 
certainly to find the tower in illegal condition, what 
could they do about it? At best estimate, the condo 
now housed upwards of 3000 people who would all 
have to be resettled if the tower were condemned. 
Setting the precedent, countless other towers across 
the city would have to be condemned. There were not 
the resources to rehouse so many families. 
Unit prices were buoyed only slightly by occasional 
individuals thinking that they had a clever new 
way to still turn a profit from rent. This was usually 
accompanied with some alteration of the unit – doing 
as little as necessary to accommodate as many 
tenants as possible. They were not ‘easy money,’ and 
difficult to sell. Many of the units started to violate 
the condominiums maximum occupancy standard 
by-laws, either by having more than the prescribed 
2 people per bedroom, or by creating new bedrooms 
below the legal area  and without windows.   While 
each landlord knew that each of their fellow 
landlords was violating the community by-laws and 
rules, they all knew that it was necessary to turn a 
profit against the unmanageable maintenance costs. 
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Shortly after the new façade had been installed, 
it had become abundantly clear that the board 
selected the most economic of the three window 
wall selections. Within the first few years, several 
corporate-action warranty claims were filed against 
the façade consultants. It was mostly patching and 
re-applying of sealants. Thirteen years on, the façade 
had all but failed. The units on the south and west 
facades – the sunny and lake-exposed sides of the 
building – windows seals were visibly pulling out 
of their frames. On rain driven surfaces, water was 
seeping through nearly every joint and under the 
lapped flashings. Flooring was swelling, drywall was 
sagging, hardware was rusting and seizing. Window 
condensation had long been a problem throughout 
much of the building. With degrading low-e coatings 
and failed argon seals, the units quickly became 
frigid in the winter and unbearably hot in summer. 
Seized window fixtures made the units impossible to 
ventilate. Many tenants had to rely on space-heaters 
at astronomical rates to keep their units habitable. 
Utilities were not usually covered by rent. In an effort 
to decrease living costs, tenants and landlords tried 
to insulate and re-seal the façade ad-hoc from the 
inside. 
With depleted books and little support for taking 
out a loan against the corporation, the building 
manager sent out a decisive statement on repairs 
that the corporation would and would not pay for, 
to the owners as well as the tenants. If life-safety 
was clearly an issue, if water was visibly pouring 
into the interior, if any other building systems were 
put at risk, the corporation would try to repair. 
Drafts, mould, discolouration because of moisture, 
“superficial problems,” were no longer the priority 
of the board and would not be addressed at this time. 
The budget was over-extended. 
To help pay for maintaining this baseline tenability, 
the board converted many of the amenity spaces 
into leasable commercial space. The declaration 
already classified most common spaces in the tower 
as ‘units’ for ease of management, so converting 
the spaces required fairly little administrative effort 
or illegal activity. The lobby along Telegram Mews 
was converted into a storefront which has since been 
subdivided into a small convenience store and barber. 
The “exclusive penthouse lobby” became a cafeteria-
eatery which has become popular with tenants. In 
summer, when cooking in the poorly ventilated units 
becomes unbearable, people buy a cheap dinner 
and eat out on Iceboat Terrace, overlooking the 
abandoned rail corridor. 
Some landlords also informally assembled titles for 
spots in the parking garage to be rented out as cheap 
workshops – no welding, fire or compressed gases. 
Some landlords are vocally opposed to this because 
the risk of liability seems so much higher but at the 
end of the day, it was paying the bills. 
The amenity pavilion was renovated into as 
budget office space. Owned under a Shared 
Facilities Agreement with the neighbouring Neo 
Condominiums (TSCC 2009), the two boards of 
landlords had to work together to determine the best 
way to do this and to share the profits. Not many 
tenants complained, or if they had, the manager had 
not forwarded their complaints. The pool had been 
out of commission for years anyways. 
Life goes on
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After forty-two years, the tower Description was 
still firmly intact, with 527 individual residential 
titles. New terms of lease were added in order to 
convert the common spaces into rentable commercial 
space, but the basic spatial definitions of the 
original description still upheld the towers matrix of 
individually owned real-estate titles. 
Title Control:
None of the units were lived in by owners. As such, 
the entire tower existed in an absentee-landlord-ship. 
Any economic benefits of ownership were displaced 
from the community of the tower itself, and were 
dispersed across southern Ontario and, to an extent, 
around the world.
With ownership of the real-estate titles falling 
entirely with landlords away from the tower, all 
powers of decision making were also alienated from 
the urban space of the tower. The residents had 
no say in the maintenance and management of the 
spaces that they occupied. The owners – landlords 
– themselves did not engage with the board unless 
decisions made were going to jeopardize their margin 
of profits from rent income. 
Use-relationship:
By 2051, none of the units were lived in by their 
owners. Each one was under a subsequent, if not 
entirely legal, rental tenancy agreement. While some 
tenants sought to make homes in the rapidly decaying 
tower, the actual owners of the unit titles had no 
interest in creating places of home and belonging. 
They regarded the units solely as a mechanism for 
extracting rent-capital. 
Condition and Maintenance:
A lack of long-term planning in the early life 
of the tower situated the current owners in a 
continuous game of catch-up. On-going attitudes 
of rent extraction exacerbated this condition. While 
people still lived in the tower out of desperation, 
it’s difficult to say that the condition of the tower 
was tenable. Over time, the management team had 
just slowly given up on maintaining many of the 
common elements of the building beyond what was 
absolutely necessary. Central heating and fresh air-
supply no longer worked, only one elevator worked 
consistently, and the façade did little to keep wind 
and rain at bay. The roof-top terrace, once planted 
with trees, grass, and geraniums, now resembled a 
prison recreation yard.  
Public Space:
By-laws intended to stabilize the security of the 
tower as an asset greatly restricted the movement and 
sociability of the tower’s tenants. Not only had the 
amount of public space been physically decreased 
through this and through the leasing of the amenities 
spaces as commercial units, but the maintenance and 
quality of the spaces that remained – mostly hallways 
– was greatly declined. Poor lighting, bad ventilation, 
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In the late summer of 2021 Canada, like much of the 
rest of the world, was in a race against a new variant 
of Covid-19 that was targeting broader segments of 
the population and seemed undeterred by anti-bodies. 
Housing markets came to a standstill, particularly in 
the high-density urban market. With the race for even 
more effective vaccines underway, work and learn-
from-home seemed to be indefinite futures. Global 
migration halted. Rent demand began to fall again. 
People were trying desperately to move out of dense 
urban areas and suburban house prices continued to 
rise. Condominium values fell nearly 20% by mid 
2022.  While many condo owners wanted to sell, 
especially younger people who had bought units as a 
means of breaking into the market,  they were largely 
stuck, unable to find willing buyers. Many of them 
looked forward to the near future, either when new 
vaccines would once again be rolled out or the virus 
became endemic, and for public life to fall back to 
a semblance of normality. While a small number of 
unit owners sold out at a loss, most accepted their 
small units as their home for now. 
As the recovery from the pandemic dragged on, 
the transfer of condos stayed depressed. Residents 
–  especially young people – felt trapped, not only 
in their economic outlook, but also in their daily 
lives. Cycles of lockdowns had decimated “city 
life.” Many restaurants had closed or become very 
expensive; concerts; festivals and gatherings were 
few and far between. Within the halls of the tower, 
people fell into daily rhythms of life, establishing 
routines and forming social circles. Encounters in the 
gym turned into book clubs. Asking the neighbour 
across the hall for two cups of flour turned into a 
walking group. Slowly, societies emerged among 
the floors. Curiously, there was some social mixing 
between resident-owners and renting tenants of 
similar ages, but mobility of rental tenancy inhibited 
a full integration. While many of the rental units 
had initially been left empty in the first year of the 
pandemic,  the rental market was slowly recovering. 
2023
As the prices of condominiums were approaching 
the bottom of the curve, residents of the tower and 
the board of directors took a very conservative tack 
on the maintenance of the property. Aware that their 
units were losing value, they were reluctant to invest 
more than what was absolutely necessary to keep the 
building functioning. Maintenance was economized 
wherever possible. The immediate implications of 
this economization weren’t drastic. Business carried 
on more-or-less as usual, but small preventative 
maintenance jobs fell off the board’s to-do list. 
Hallways were vacuumed less frequently, light-bulbs 
stayed burnt out for a little bit longer, some building 
inspections were pushed off indefinitely, and the 
repainting of the front lobby was postponed.  In 
this atmosphere of delinquency, condominium fees 
hovered, unchanged, for a few years; the reserve fund 
grew slowly as people looked towards the time when 
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Four years after the pandemic, it was taking much 
longer for things to get back to normal than what had 
originally been hoped. Financial optimism was low 
and condominiums were slow to regain their market 
traction. 
As markets thawed, young couples and families 
the tower held on to their plans to move out to 
the suburbs in the near future and prospects were 
looking up. Investment interest was slowly returning 
to the city. Some developers were renewing permit 
applications for condo projects that had been shelved 
at the end of 2021. Unit prices were slowly returning 
to pre-pandemic highs, but of course with moderate 
inflation and rising suburbs, there were still gains 
to be made before they reclaimed their original 
selling power. Suburban house prices had leveled. 
Many investors who had also felt locked into their 
condo ownerships were eager to sell off units. Pre-
pandemic, the rule of thumb had been to hold on to a 
new-build for no longer than seven years.  Montage 
Condominiums was now 16 years old, and many 
investors had been holding out for ten or twelve 
years. Some had managed to sell to a growing trickle 
of a hopeful new generation, looking to get into the 
market.
In this growing optimism, some enterprising 
landlords on the board proposed to revitalize the 
condo’s image by renovating the amenity spaces 
which they claimed was long overdue. Renovation 
projects that had previously deemed too expensive 
were now considered wise investments to restore 
Montage Condo’s appeal in the market upswing. 
The gym had gotten quite a lot of use as health 
restrictions were slowly being lifted. While the event 
room and guest suites had gotten less use, they were 
also due for an update, along with the theaters, card 
room and lobbies. 
When the board published their intentions for the 
renovation in the newsletter, they had not expected 
the feedback that they would receive on what the 
new space should achieve. Many of the investors, 
who formed the majority of the ownership, were 
proposing a face-lift or modernization of what was 
already there; fresh paint, new furniture, up-to-date 
fixtures. There was a small but enthusiastic minority 
of owners who lived in the tower, however, that was 
advocating for changes that they wanted to see made 
to the spaces – things that they thought would make 
the amenities more useable and marketable based 
on their experience. They wanted the integration of 
a family change-room for the pools, more stackable 
chairs and tables for the event room, and for one 
of the theaters to be converted into a craft room 
for kids. Someone proposed that the ‘study’ off 
the ground floor lobby be turned into a locker for 
strollers, a surprisingly polarizing suggestion. The 
board felt that some of these changes would send the 
wrong message about the community and undermine 
resale value. Strollers in the lobby was effectively 
advertising the presence of noisy children in the 
building. While everybody agreed that renovations 
were required to boost the market value of their units, 
there was wide-ranging disagreement about what that 
should look like. 
2025
All throughout the fall of 2025, the board held 
consultations with the voting members of 
the condominium. While attendance at these 
consultations was generally low, there were two 
small but dedicated groups of residents who dutifully 
attended all of the meetings. These groups were 
broadly categorized into landlords, advocating for 
a straightforward face-lift of the amenity spaces, 
and resident-owners who believed that making the 
amenities more family and child friendly would 
improve marketability. Beyond the nature of the 
renovation, these two groups also participated in 
discussions about the financing of the project. While 
contributions to the reserve fund had been declining 
over the past few years, the two interest groups 
agreed almost unanimously, that a special assessment 
would not be a good idea to pay for this project. 
Rather, they agreed it best for the corporation to 
pay for the project through a loan. With the market 
looking upwards, any future cost of servicing the 
loan would be easily offset by appreciation of the 
units’ values. The market disadvantage of having 
the corporate loan against the corporation would be 
offset by an intact reserve fund and with fresh and 
bright common spaces in the tower. 
The board secured a loan, and the renovations were 
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Five short years later, the economic optimism of the 
mid 20’s dried up, the housing bubble across Canada 
finally burst and value of the condominiums began 
to fall, slowly but certainly. Not only housing, but 
Toronto as a city was slowly losing its appeal on the 
world stage as global economies turned. It wasn’t a 
crash, but a kind of sclerosis; the slow emptying of 
a shell. The inner city was feeling it the strongest. 
Many people still hoped and believed that this was a 
“crisis” – the trough in an undulating cycle – and that 
things would again swing upwards. While they were 
in some sense correct, the upswing would never-
again, return the city to the conception of itself that 
had been lost. Slowly, residents of the tower came to 
the realization that the units were virtually unsellable. 
2031
In 2031, with falling employment in the city centre, 
rental demand also fell. Under growing financial 
pressures, maintenance in many of the towers 
was falling behind. In September, four of the five 
elevators in Montage went out of commission for 
over a month. There was a problem with the control 
panels, but the repair contractor was having difficulty 
sourcing replacement electrical components. While 
these broken elevators would have been a problem at 
the best of times, many senior occupants of the tower 
had increasingly limited mobility and depended 
on the elevators to get to their units. Likewise, the 
increasing number of young parents in the tower, 
unable to move to suburbs, relied on the elevators to 
move strollers to and from their units. To alleviate 
some traffic from the single operational cab, parents 
started leaving strollers along with the growing 
number of bikes in the lobby.  Some owners and 
landlords complained about the unsightly troupe 
of strollers in the lobby but at then end of the day, 
people realized it was a matter of necessity. 
Nevertheless, significant work had to be done on 
the elevators. In the constant hope of a recovery, 
condominium fees had not been raised for the past 
four years despite having been used for several 
emergency repairs. The reserve fund was now going 
to take a severe hit. The condo board needed to 
raise emergency funds for the repairs. Many of the 
absentee owners wanted to take out another loan to 
cover the cost of the work, to maintain the state of 
the reserve fund and keep condo fees low. Resident 
owners, on the other hand, were starting to worry 
about constantly pushing off costs. With fading 
prospects of selling their units, they were reluctant 
to saddle their community with more debt. They 
lobbied the board to pay for the repairs from the 
reserve fund and significantly increase the monthly 
condominium fees for a quicker recovery. Though 
financially risky, the residents wanted to keep capital 
within the tower, and avoid debt servicing. In the 
long run, it was deemed to be a wiser use of money 
but was risky for several reasons. First, it would 
leave the condominium relatively ill-equipped to deal 
with emergencies in the immediate future. Second, 
the rapid increase to condominium fees  was certain 
to displace some residents and tenants. Taking 
advantage of the still wide-spread disengagement 
of many landlords and residents from the decision-
making of the condominium, this small and vocal 
group successfully pressured the board to pay for the 
repairs up-front and restructure the reserve fund. 
2032
Condominium fees in Montage were now tactically 
above the average of surrounding towers to rebalance 
the reserve fund. Any landlord-investors that were 
still investing in the collapsing market were taking on 
enough risk as it was and were not eager to buy into 
a tower were high monthly fees would compromise 
their cash-flow. This decrease in relative demand, 
in turn, lowered the purchasing threshold for units, 
opening them up to buyers with smaller down 
payments. The units were by no means affordable; 
the increase in condominium fees counteracted any 
decrease in mortgages. Nevertheless, the shifting of 
payments, began to favour those who were looking 
for a place to live, rather than those who were 
looking specifically for investment returns. 
In that year’s board elections, the small group of 
vocal residents submitted their names as candidates 
for the board and rallied their neighbours to vote. 
The resulting composition of residents to absentee 
owners on the board was, four-to-three. In their daily 
operations of the tower, the new board slowly began 
to favour the qualitative liveability of the tower over 
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The economic melt-down of 2030 hadn’t exactly 
been a crash; nothing so spectacular, nowhere exactly 
to point fingers. It was more of a slow rot that took 
some time to work its way through the whole tree. In 
the spring of 2033, the grating decline was reaching 
its slow end. The “knowledge economy” which had 
driven Toronto’s building boom in the 2000’s, had 
shrunk to a few key corporate headquarters; there 
was some young entrepreneurial activity happening 
on the fringes of the downtown, but many mid-sized 
employers had closed offices in Toronto to move 
around the world. In their place, tertiary economies 
began to grow into the urban framework. While 
the economies outside of the downtown core were 
still relatively strong, suburban real-estate had 
stayed unaffordable. There was a small and subtle 
movement of younger households and individuals 
moving back into the downtown core, out of 
necessity more so than desire.
At that time, there was a group of three young 
families on the ninth floor who had been involved 
with the decision not to get financing for the elevator 
repairs. They were finding condominium living 
increasingly confining. They were unable to move 
out of their one- and two-bedroom units as their 
families grew and the outside world of the city 
contracted. The units were ill suited to their lives. 
Some residents on other floors managed to purchase 
adjacent units and join them but adjacent units were 
rarely available, and few individual families could 
afford the mortgage on a second unit.
One evening, as this small group was sharing dinner 
together, as they did about once a month, someone 
mentioned unit that was being sold on their floor by 
power-of-sale for arrears in condo fees. Jokingly at 
first, they talked about co-purchasing the unit and 
turning it into a shared space for all of them – a 
shared kitchen, an office space by day, play area for 
kids in the evening. While they realized they would 
be giving up some individual conveniences to share 
a kitchen, they felt that the move could free up space, 
allowing to better use their own units. With a solid 
dose of idealism, they put an offer in under asking 
price and got it. 
While there were certainly problems that had to 
be worked out – many of them interpersonal –the 
shared kitchen was largely a success. Over the next 
three years, seven other communal kitchens and 
‘living rooms’ emerged across 46 storeys of the 
tower, varying in use and community composition 
based on the needs and desires of different groups. 
Many of these nodes in the tower thrived, so much 
so that for a flicker in time, prices within the condo 
rose. Internal desire created demand. As a result, 
new shared spaces slowed. After an initial optimism, 
many of communal kitchens had their problems to 
iron out. One ended in fighting and was sold, and 
one unit was converted back into a rental apartment 
that the co-owners managed together. The collapsing 
communities sobered the ecstatic development 
of these ad hoc shared spaces for both residents 
and owners. At the same time, the small thriving 
communities that were growing around these spaces 
wanted to keep growing in a way that could include 
more people in the tower for greater leeway. While 
the kitchens were communal, they were reserved for 
only the few families that co-owned the repurposed 
units. Even residents who weren’t co-owners started 
contributing to book and tool libraries. Friends of 
friends were often invited to join for dinner.
Both investors and residents of the tower noticed this 
trend with mixed reactions. On one hand, investors 
and landlords who were more engaged with the 
board, tried to increase by-laws and restrictions that 
would limit the purchasing of multi-owner kitchen 
units. They realized, correctly, that these communal 
spaces would continue to push down unit prices as 
they destabilized both the financial security  and 
the aesthetics of the tower. At the end of the day, 
however there was very little within the constitution 
of the O.C.A. that could be done to limit the use of 
units to such a degree, and new restrictions were 
often opposed by the board, which was now often 
controlled by resident-owners, and an increasing 
number of non-board members who were diligently 
attending condo meetings. A strong political 
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As the micro-communities throughout the tower 
evolved and grew, there emerged among them, 
a coordinated group of individuals who worked 
together on small maintenance projects in the tower, 
fixing water heaters, caulking windows, and painting 
hallways on a volunteer basis. They wanted to take 
ownership of their home while helping the board 
to decrease the operating budget. In the high-rise, 
however, there were many specialized maintenance 
tasks that needed to be contracted out to specialists 
such as elevator repairs and maintaining the bigger 
plumbing and electrical systems. The system of 
greatest concern to the board was the façade. 
Accumulating an intimate knowledge of the building, 
the self-appointed maintenance committee had been 
involved with inspecting the facade to advise the board 
and building manager but in 2039, the system decay 
got too bad for simple patch-and-mend maintenance. 
The board, now made up of seven residents and three 
land-lord owners, sent out an RFP for the replacement 
of the window wall. They received three proposals 
at varying price-points, all too expensive. The board 
planned to move forward with the lowest bidder. Even 
with the high condominium fee and a robust reserve 
fund in place, the lowest bid would have consumed 
nearly six years of the boards total operating budget.  
The reserve fund was in no shape to handle even half 
of the cost and with pre-existing loans from other 
repairs, the board could not find a brokerage that 
would secure a loan for the entirely of the repair. 
They were left with no choice but to levy a special 
assessment from the unit owners for the bulk of the 
repair costs. In early May, they sent out a notice of the 
special assessment to the of the condo community.
Many households were living paycheck to paycheck 
and would be unable to pay the full amount of the 
special assessment. The notice was discussed around 
communal dinner tables throughout the tower. A group 
of residents from the twenty-eight floor reached out to 
the communities on the ninth and seventeenth floors 
and a movement started. The group requisitioned a 
meeting with the board to discuss the viability of the 
special assessment.  
The meeting was scheduled for a warm Wednesday 
evening in April. The board had booked the event 
room, arriving early to set out one-hundred chairs.  As 
start-time approached, however, they quickly realized 
that was not going to be enough seating. Owners and 
residents had mobilized in full force to discuss the 
issue of the façade special assessment. In the end, the 
meeting was held outdoors on the rooftop patio so that 
everyone could participate. 
By the end of the meeting, the board had reached 
several strategies to work through, for bringing down 
the special assessment. The first was to recognize that 
not all of the building envelope was equally in need 
of replacement. All the flat roofs had to be redone as 
soon as possible. The south façade, facing the lake 
and the sun, was in bad shape and would have to be 
completely replaced. The east and west façades had 
weathered quite poorly along the top and bottom and 
were only a few years behind the south façade, but 
the middle portions were still in passable condition. 
Second, perhaps more contentiously, the board had 
taken for granted, to replace the existing window-wall 
with an architecturally comparable system to maintain 
the external continuity of the building. A few residents 
pointed out, however, that to maintain the image 
of the building in this way came at a premium that 
many of them could not afford. The expanses of glass 
were both costly, and would continue to compromise 
the building’s performance, increasing utilities and 
environmental costs. They proposed a replacement 
system that used wall panels and punched windows 
instead. These would also require less maintenance in 
the long term. This would have both immediate cost 
benefits and decrease costs for the future.
At the end of various rounds of discussions, research, 
and proposals over the following months, the 
community voted on a phased façade replacement that 
would defray the cost of the project over twenty-
five years. The board worked with a contractor to 
find a replacement wall system that was both high 
performance and could be deployed without the need 
for costly additional infrastructure. 
2040
Despite all these things, the project was going to 
be costly. The board did need to acquire corporate 
loans which, in turn increased condominium fees, 
threatening yet again to displace some residents the 
tower. After months of debating different options, 
people realized that there was no way to finance the 
façade work so that nobody felt the pinch. As a result, 
members of the various communities rallied to support 
their neighbours in any way they could. Sharing meals, 
offering child-care, and in some cases helping with 
condo fees, helped to fortify the community in the 
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By 2044, the condominium reached a critical tipping 
point where 90% of the units were lived in by their 
lawful owners. The board had been supportive of 
the development of community hubs in the tower 
for some time, through less restrictive rules and 
regulations. They felt that it was now in the best 
interest of the community to formalize these hubs 
as public, to be used by the whole community. This 
required the purchasing the units by the corporation, 
from the individual ownership groups. In time, the 
hubs had evolved from the insular multi-family 
kitchens to become important community centres 
with special identities throughout the tower. The hub 
on floor 3 had the greatest book exchange. People 
often took the stairs to floor 3 on their way home 
from work, to pick up some new evening reading. 
The community group on the 16th floor somehow 
got a small grand piano up to their floor. They made 
rules about no playing after 8 pm on weeknights, but 
on Fridays, it was common to hear small ensembles 
playing well past midnight. People gravitated 
towards their ‘local’ hub, usually within three floors 
above or below their own, but a cycle of community 
events brought people from round the tower 
crowding to certain spaces on certain occasions. 
Following the negotiations of the façade replacement, 
the board also recognized that these nodes were 
important points of discussion and decision-making 
in the tower. Through them, people became invested 
in the problems of the whole community. To this 
end, there was a movement in the tower to ratify the 
‘community hubs’ as common elements within the 
tower.
While title ownership had already become mostly 
a legality for many of these co-owned community 
hubs, these spaces were very much the extension 
of owners’ homes. It was understandable that they 
didn’t want to relinquish any control of these spaces. 
Everyone wanted to make sure that each micro-
community didn’t feel as though it had lost control 
or identity of its own space. Combined with the 
conviction for productive discussion that everyone 
had witnessed during the façade negotiations, 
the community conceived of a new structure of 
management within the tower. Like wards, each 
community hub was assigned one director to the 
board with whom they met monthly. While the 
monthly meetings usually just turned into social 
events, their importance became clear when there 
were serious questions pertaining to the maintenance 
and future of the tower. The meetings provided a 
framework for the board to get input from the entire 
community thoroughly if not quickly. In this way, 
the board could operate with the certainty of support 
from the community, and not feel like they were in a 
position of managerialism. 
These changes also impacted how modifications to 
the condo’s Description were made. Because these 
changes require 90% approval from the votership, 
they were often very difficult to pass, if only for a 
lack of participation in the vote. Nevertheless, the 
approval majority provided a valuable backstop for 
accountability. Within the new framework, applicants 
proposing amendments were required to present and 
discuss their proposal with each of the community 
groups. This was an inconvenience and immense 
investment of everyone’s time, but it ensured a 
healthy dialogue and awareness about changes 
coming to the tower, and the investment of time 
ensured that people only pursued amendments that 
they firmly believed to be worthwhile and necessary. 
As part of this restructuring, some community 
members also proposed a by-law amendment that 
expanded voting rights, not limited to unit ownership, 
but rather for every ‘permanent’ resident of the 
tower, age fifteen and over. This by-law amendment 
was struck down by the Land Registry Office as 
it completely overstepped the parameters of the 
Condominium Act.  The board is still trying to appeal 
the amendment to the province. The 10% of residents 
who were still renting tenants would also be granted 
the right to vote, as registered residents, which was 
significant, but made the landlords of their respective 










By 2044, the condominium reached a critical tipping 
point where 90% of the units were lived in by their 
lawful owners. The board had been supportive of 
the development of community hubs in the tower 
for some time, through less restrictive rules and 
regulations. They felt that it was now in the best 
interest of the community to formalize these hubs 
as public, to be used by the whole community. This 
required the purchasing the units by the corporation, 
from the individual ownership groups. In time, the 
hubs had evolved from the insular multi-family 
kitchens to become important community centres 
with special identities throughout the tower. The hub 
on floor 3 had the greatest book exchange. People 
often took the stairs to floor 3 on their way home 
from work, to pick up some new evening reading. 
The community group on the 16th floor somehow 
got a small grand piano up to their floor. They made 
rules about no playing after 8 pm on weeknights, but 
on Fridays, it was common to hear small ensembles 
playing well past midnight. People gravitated 
towards their ‘local’ hub, usually within three floors 
above or below their own, but a cycle of community 
events brought people from round the tower 
crowding to certain spaces on certain occasions. 
Following the negotiations of the façade replacement, 
the board also recognized that these nodes were 
important points of discussion and decision-making 
in the tower. Through them, people became invested 
in the problems of the whole community. To this 
end, there was a movement in the tower to ratify the 
‘community hubs’ as common elements within the 
tower.
While title ownership had already become mostly 
a legality for many of these co-owned community 
hubs, these spaces were very much the extension 
of owners’ homes. It was understandable that they 
didn’t want to relinquish any control of these spaces. 
Everyone wanted to make sure that each micro-
community didn’t feel as though it had lost control 
or identity of its own space. Combined with the 
conviction for productive discussion that everyone 
had witnessed during the façade negotiations, 
the community conceived of a new structure of 
management within the tower. Like wards, each 
community hub was assigned one director to the 
board with whom they met monthly. While the 
monthly meetings usually just turned into social 
events, their importance became clear when there 
were serious questions pertaining to the maintenance 
and future of the tower. The meetings provided a 
framework for the board to get input from the entire 
community thoroughly if not quickly. In this way, 
the board could operate with the certainty of support 
from the community, and not feel like they were in a 
position of managerialism. 
These changes also impacted how modifications to 
the condo’s Description were made. Because these 
changes require 90% approval from the votership, 
they were often very difficult to pass, if only for a 
lack of participation in the vote. Nevertheless, the 
approval majority provided a valuable backstop for 
accountability. Within the new framework, applicants 
proposing amendments were required to present and 
discuss their proposal with each of the community 
groups. This was an inconvenience and immense 
investment of everyone’s time, but it ensured a 
healthy dialogue and awareness about changes 
coming to the tower, and the investment of time 
ensured that people only pursued amendments that 
they firmly believed to be worthwhile and necessary. 
As part of this restructuring, some community 
members also proposed a by-law amendment that 
expanded voting rights, not limited to unit ownership, 
but rather for every ‘permanent’ resident of the 
tower, age fifteen and over. This by-law amendment 
was struck down by the Land Registry Office as 
it completely overstepped the parameters of the 
Condominium Act.  The board is still trying to appeal 
the amendment to the province. The 10% of residents 
who were still renting tenants would also be granted 
the right to vote, as registered residents, which was 
significant, but made the landlords of their respective 









In 2047, the condominium faced another challenge. 
The rooftop air-handling unit that supplied fresh 
conditioned air to the core hallways broke down. 
The maintenance committee had been effective in 
keeping the system in good condition for many 
years now, but the roof-top unit would soon need 
to be entirely replaced. To replace the unit was 
going to require the erection of a crane to lift it into 
place. The community within the tower was still 
adjusting to increased operational and debt costs 
from the façade replacement. While the Canadian 
economy was now stable, the CAD had never 
recovered in exchange against the US dollar and 
shipping replacement units from the States would 
be prohibitively expensive. There was one other 
concern growing within the tower which was that of 
fire safety. The original communal gathering spaces 
had been contained within units – enclosed fire 
compartments. As the community nodes continued 
to grow to reflect the increasing importance of 
gathering in the life of the tower, some of these fire 
enclosures had been compromised. Ducts for the 
central air supply had fire and smoke dampers but the 
de-compartmentalization of the places where people 
commonly cooked was technically illegal and made 
everyone a bit anxious.
The solutions presented themselves simultaneously. 
When the tower was constructed, it made sense, for 
efficiency, that fresh air was piped down to each 
floor from the roof. As floors slowly began to evolve 
and change, however, this centralized approach 
was no longer the best solution. Instead, the board 
contracted out an order for 47 small-institutional 
air-supply units – one for each floor. These were fit 
discreetly into common spaces and vented through 
the replacement façade on each floor. Not only could 
these new units be hooked into existing vents floor 
by floor, but they provided an additional capacity of 
fresh air, improving supply to expanded common 
areas that the roof-top unit had never been sized for. 
The ducts running from floor to floor were fire-sealed 
and allowed for even greater liberty in modifying and 
appropriating the floor plates. 
As management of the tower became increasingly 
less centralized, the floor plates continued to evolve. 
As communal kitchens and living areas got larger and 
became more central, units and private living spaces 
became smaller and smaller, reflecting what residents 
understood to be ‘enough’. Within the concrete 
framework of the tower, they merged and subdivided, 
creating new units according to what they needed 
to live comfortably. Though kitchens were mostly 
centralized, many households preferred to have a 
small kitchenette. Some residents insisted on keeping 
their own laundry, while others wanted just a bed, 
and a desk, willing to share even a washroom. These 
usually maintained a sub-lease structure within a 
collectively owned unit as selling a unit without a 
washroom would have been difficult.
Around these multiform homes, patterns of life 
and interaction emerged. People knew when their 
neighbours had breakfast and planned their mornings 
accordingly. There were often conflicts, but they 
were usually worked out and negotiated before they 
could evolve into serious issues. Life in the tower 
became messy and undefined. There was very little 
that could be done that didn’t require some kind of 
negotiation; outside the privacy of your unit, there 
were few places of solitude within the building. It 
was in many ways inconvenient; it didn’t work for 
everyone, but in time, the community worked and 
evolved the structures to take ownership of them and 
care for them in a way that gave back and made them 
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washroom would have been difficult.
Around these multiform homes, patterns of life 
and interaction emerged. People knew when their 
neighbours had breakfast and planned their mornings 
accordingly. There were often conflicts, but they 
were usually worked out and negotiated before they 
could evolve into serious issues. Life in the tower 
became messy and undefined. There was very little 
that could be done that didn’t require some kind of 
negotiation; outside the privacy of your unit, there 
were few places of solitude within the building. It 
was in many ways inconvenient; it didn’t work for 
everyone, but in time, the community worked and 
evolved the structures to take ownership of them and 
care for them in a way that gave back and made them 





At a certain moment, representation within the tower 
shifted from being title-based to being registered 
as a resident of the tower. This by-law undermined 
the significance of the description of parcels as a 
structure of power when daily life in the tower was 
no longer defined strictly between the privately 
owned unit and the common space, principally as 
circulation. Once life expanded beyond the bounds 
of the unit, it became increasingly important that 
everyone who participated in the public space, had 
representation in how it was shaped and managed.  
Title Control:
The title control became mostly internal. A few 
landlords still owned units in the tower but high ratio 
of condominium maintenance fees to the average rent 
in surrounding towers made it difficult to maintain 
rental units in the tower with a worthwhile cash-flow. 
Most landlords who still held onto units and voting 
rights within the tower lived in the suburbs but were 
curious to be a part of what was happening within the 
tower. For the rest, titles were held by their residents. 
A more open attitude towards the forms of the units 
and the tower’s Description allowed for many of 
the units to be merged and subdivided quite freely. 
Voting rights were de-coupled from ownership rights 
to sidestep complications with cooperative owned 
parcels. Registered residents now vote on the affairs 
of the tower. 
Use-relationship:
In 30 years, the building was transformed by the 
restoration of use-value over exchange value. The 
“unremarkable actions” of daily life changed the 
building’s internal morphology from a stack of 
standardized floorplates into a complex and diverse 
3-dimensional extension of the city. Once the 
socio-political structure of the tower community 
was opened to accommodate the particular spatial 
needs of a heterogeneous community, each floor 
was individually adapted to reflect the needs of 
the emerging communities from floor to floor – 
remarkable in its banality. 
Condition and Maintenance:
This tower was, in theory, no cheaper to maintain 
than any of the condominiums around it. Yet it 
was better maintained in many regards. The first 
reason for this was the rebalancing of condo fees 
to mortgage payments within the tower. While unit 
prices in the tower were undermined, lowering 
the cost of mortgages, the increased condominium 
payments effectively made tenants no better or 
worse off than their neighbors in adjacent towers. 
More capital was maintained within the tower itself 
to be used for maintenance and repairs. The second 
reason for improved maintenance was a shifting of 
priorities. In the early days of the tower, the board 
had struggled to maintain the marketable image of 
the tower as an asset, spending substantial capital 
on cosmetic repairs. While comfort and quality of 
space were still considered important after thirty 
years, the maintenance team was no longer chasing 
an external ideal of what the spaces should look like. 
The final, and most significant cause for improved 
maintenance was a newfound understanding of the 
building’s durability. Residents were now committed 
to the longevity of the tower and made maintenance 
decisions accordingly, taking a long view. Rather 
than trying to maximize value extraction from 
the tower, owners were now willing to invest in 
proactive and preventative maintenance, bringing 
down operational costs in the long term. 
Public Space:
With more fluid unit relations, the tenants and board 
had few objections for the corporation re-possessing 
vacant units for development into collective space. 
While many of the common spaces were open 
access, their centrality to daily life of the people in 
the community ensured that visitors were always 
engaged in the community. Likewise, the segregation 
caused by the many floors of the high-rise, created 
natural barriers to space. While you could go down 
and hang out at the community hub on the 22nd floor, 
you wouldn’t without good reason because it was 
too many flights of stairs down. In this way, people 
naturally organized themselves to their general 
topographies; two flights above and two flights below 
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In the first ten years of the Narrative I exploration, extreme economic conditions, 
paired with owners’ collective desire to make money from the tower, created 
an economic grid-lock. Because those who lived in, and made decisions for the 
tower were unable to balance individual financial gain with the maintenance 
of the tower itself, the tower fell into disrepair. Once this gridlock was broken 
by government intervention, the transition of the units from condominium to 
rental effectively de-commodified the property. Because the principal powers of 
decision-making were held by city employees outside the daily life of the tower 
itself, the physical tower as an urban artifact did not evolve to reflect the changing 
needs of the occupants. Nevertheless, the occupants made the most of the space, 
modifying and appropriating spaces in small habitual ways that would probably 
not have happened, had they perceived of their homes as first-and-foremost 
commodity assets. 
Narrative II:
Narrative II explores a 30 year scenario in which the ownership of the 
condominium was sustained and the implications of this ownership on the tower 
itself. Even though the tower remained entirely owned by private individuals, 
ownership of the tower was extracted from the tower itself by absentee landlords, 
so the financial value of the tower became exchanged for the value of home. As 
rent extraction became increasingly necessary to maintain the tower as profitable, 
it was done increasingly at the expense of maintenance and livability of the 
tower. By the end of the scenario, individual units had been subdivided into five 
or six bedrooms or micro-units with bad ventilation, little temperature control, 
insufficient plumbing and electrical, and a complete lack of natural light for the 
individual tenants. Most units did not have their own kitchen or washroom. While 
the boundaries of the original unit ownership remained largely unchanged,  within 
the boundaries of the units, the floor plans were altered to accommodate more 
rentable sub-units.
Narrative III:
In Narrative III, residents of the tower had to reconcile with the decreasing 
asset value of their units, and the inability to move out of the tower. There was a 
migration of values from the financial value of the unit to its ability to function 
as a home. In search of space and livability, they allowed their lives and societies 
to spill out past the boundaries of their individual units to occupy the common 
spaces of the tower. Over the thirty years of this exploration, the growing social 
importance of this common space for those who live in the tower, allowed for the 
radical transformation of the material tower and the relation of the individuals to 
the society of the tower as a whole. To this end, the boundaries of the individual 
units and the morphology within the tower became increasingly negotiated and 
modified to suite the evolving needs of the occupants. In time, the perceptions 
and uses of the tower were adapted and conformed to the need of the residents. 
Daily life within the condominium is comprised of 
sets of pre-existing structures, from the structures 
of your community, management, and decision-
making, to the physical structure of the condominium 
tower, to the structure of your unit. These structures 
shape our daily experience within the condominium 
tower. Our rituals for getting to and from work are 
structured by movement through the elevator and 
lobby; how we use the amenity rooms are structured 
by the board’s booking policies and if we feel 
comfortable in the rooms; our social awareness of 
the tower is structured by how we make friends 
with the people on our floor that we run into in the 
hallway. These structures aren’t static things and in 
the lifespan of the tower, they form only a starting 
point for a not-so-distant future. In time they can 
and will evolve into radically different forms; either 
like something explored in one of these stories, or 
something completely different, not yet imagined.
What we have learned through our explorations 
of different futures of the tower, is that our daily 
decisions – how we interact with the different 
structures of living in the condominium –shape 
this shared future, no matter how insignificant 
our decisions currently seem. Over ten, twenty, 
or thirty years, the smallest attitudes compound 
into radically different pictures of the future. The 
starting point is your own framework for making 
decisions; how do you understand your relationship 
with your home and to your city? How do you 
understand your relationship with the community in 
your condominium and how do these relationships 
influence the decisions you make in regard to your 
home? 
As our condominiums continue to age in the heart 
of Toronto, how we live in them and maintain them 
will undoubtedly change the future of the city.  As 
we continue to make our homes downtown, let’s 
carefully consider what a city we would want to live 
in looks like, and how our daily lives contribute to 
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2�3  Conclusion 
As condominiums are the defining artifact of Toronto today, their implicit structures are 
setting the new stage for what the city will become in the near future. Having investigated 
four different aspects of this new urban stage, I would like to conclude by pointing to the 
need for urgency of architects to become interested and invested in the future of these towers. 
As advocates of space, architects must pay attention to the implications of the condominium’s 
paradoxical structures on the vital life of the city. The social, political and financial structures 
that enable condominium property ownership rely on the strategic alienation of the life and 
culture of spatial practice. This need becomes all the more urgent in the context of Toronto, 
which traditionally thrived in a strong cultural pluralism. A product of Toronto’s role as a 
gateway city for immigrants into Canada, this pluralism has influenced both the practiced 
cultural, and morphological fabrics of the city. As the built city becomes increasingly fixed in 
structures that commodify and suppress diverse practices of daily life, what space will be left 
for appearance, representation, and appropriation by the people who live there? Because of 
their abundance and economy in the city, condominiums pose a threat to the emerging culture 
of daily life in the gateway city through their power to marginalize and exploit. On the other 
hand, their density provides unprecedented opportunities for individuals and cultural groups 
to reclaim enclaves of the city, synthesizing new and valuable spatial practices within the 
fabric of the city. Finally the uncertainly between these two futures prompts architects to look 
for new ways to engage with the city of towers that Toronto has become. 
Affordable housing is an important feature of arrival cities, and on their trajectory of 
unmanageable decay, condominiums will likely fall into this position in the fabric of Toronto. 
Structured and maintained on a strong cultural hegemony of a curated urban experience, the 
condominiums will not form a city that promotes the pluralist expression of a diverse but 
vulnerable immigrant population. The threat of condominium towers becoming instruments 
of both economic and cultural suppression is foreshadowed in the mid-century modernist 
towers. While the mixing of diverse populations into the structure of condominiums creates 
certain vulnerabilities, it also creates unique and exciting opportunities for the future of 
Toronto. Looking districts built over time by specific cultural groups, we can see how 
the architectural expression of daily cultural pluralism builds a city that is welcoming, 
meaningful, and interesting. In the broad horizon of possibe futures, threats and opportunities 
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of condominiums, architects must work proactively to advocate for this more optimistic 
future. The first step of this is to understand the strategic coding of the condominiums – the 
legislation, hegemonic institutions, and architecture that allow them to exist as urban fabric. 
Only in knowing these codified structures, can architects begin to act tactically upon them. In 
exploring future narratives of the towers, architects can subvert and recode the hegemonic-
normative cultures of the new urban dweller, and advocate for these people in the writing 
and amendments of public policies in the city. It is within the context of a new hyper-urban 
matrix of appearance and representation that architects will find urgency and opportunity to 
act. The advocacy of architects can set the trajectory of Toronto to either thrive within the 
diversification of people or relegate the condominium towers to states of exploitation. 
At the crossroads of real-estate economics and diverse domestic spatial practices, Toronto’s 
important role as a key gateway city in Canada328 makes the future of the condominium 
towers a crucial point of development and adaptation for the near future. In his 2011 
book, Arrival City, Doug Saunders documents settlement patterns of many immigrants 
in low-income rental housing in arrival cities around the world. In recent years, this need 
for affordable housing by immigrants has been fulfilled with modernist rental towers like 
Thorncliffe Park. Privately owned, mid-century towers have become notorious for poor 
maintenance and the isolation of immigrant communities struggling to engage with the 
city.329 In our pessimistic projections for the highly structured space of condominiums, it is 
likely that vast enclaves of Toronto’s new towers will also become affordable rental housing 
in the near future. While affordable housing plays an important role in the migration of 
populations, the synthesis of economic exploitation, paired with the disciplinary structures 
of condominium corporations may well cause the condominiums to become a landscape, not 
only of economic exploitation, but additionally of the suppression of cultural practice. 
As we have seen, the hegemonic frameworks within which the condominiums were 
conceived, preclude specific and personal representation in space, be it cultural or economic. 
These frameworks will expel culturally significant performance from the public space 
328. George Baird, “Thoughts on “Agency”, “Utopia” and “Property” in Contemporary Architectural and Urban 
Theory, 2013,” Writings on Architecture and the City, (London: Artifice, 2015): 150-1
329. Doug Saunders, Arrival City: The final migration and our next world city, (Toronto: Allen & Unwin, 
2011): 314-5.
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of the towers. Something as simple as drying laundry from a balcony to minimize utility 
costs, could be a prohibited behaviour which, in its own unassuming way, perpetuates 
unaffordability and marginalization. As the condominium towers fall increasingly into decay, 
their cultural codification will ossify the space of the tower based not only on economic 
othering through the landlord-tenant relationship, but also suppress discreet yet important 
cultural practices of the daily lives of those seeking to build homes for themselves in Toronto. 
The space of the decaying tower, reserved for those who cannot afford to play into the real-
estate game, will only ever-increasingly exclude the political action and representation of 
cultures that might disrupt it, diminishing their right to exist politically and autonomously 
within the space of the city itself. Unless the socio-political structures of the condominium 
can be decoupled from the commodification of dwellings in the city, multiculturalism will 
remain only an aestheticized dimension of the conceived urban experience, rather than a 
legitimate dimension of daily life. 
Nevertheless, within the richly diverse city of Toronto, the new urban stage of the 
condominium towers presents the possibility for an exciting urban future of unprecedented 
cultural synthesis and architectural improvisation. The condominium tower is recreating the 
city of Toronto for unprecedented densities of human coexistence, and with un-precedented 
conditions of cultural and individual plurality. With so many unique people living, 
conflicting, and interacting in such a high density, the condominium towers hold the potential 
for immense social complexity and cultural synthesis, if only the plurality of cultures 
becomes part of daily life. When we consider unique urban conditions like Kensington 
Market as a work – a palimpsest of distinct successive immigrant groups negotiating and 
appropriating the urban framework into a highly nuanced urban enclave – we begin to see 
the urban armatures of the condominium towers holding the potential for similar spatial 
phenomena to unfold in time; the practices of daily life take over from conceived design. 
As many cultural enclaves in Toronto like Little Portugal or Chinatown are in decline due 
to gentrification, commercialization and the aestheticization of the cultures that made them 
distinct,330 the abundance of condominiums might provide the ideal medium for a renaissance 
330. Goonewardena and Kipfer criticize the aestheticization of cultural practices for the sake of “neoliberal” 
schemes for the urban city. These efforts to sell diversity neutralize bona fide cultural practice and 
representation in the grip of a culturally stabilized city. Kanishka Goonewardena, and Stefan Kipfer, 
“Spaces of Difference: Reflections from Toronto on Multiculturalism, Bourgeois Urbanism and the 
possibility of Radical Urban Politics,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 29, no. 3 
(September 2005): 672.
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of democratic action and non-aestheticized representation in the space of the city. Privately 
ownable and cooperatively managed, entire condominium towers might become new 
enclaves of culturally specific and unique practices of daily life where collective cultural 
values of dwellings supplant the real-estate economy. Practices of daily lives that do not 
conform to the current neoliberal hegemony of the new Toronto, would disrupt the rigid 
structures of the towers. What this will look like cannot be said. The bay-and-gables of 
Kensington afforded their inhabitants a generosity of space that the concrete towers don’t. 
Improvisations on the tower will likely not be as architecturally apparent or consistent, 
but regardless of emerging material expressions, playing outside the cultural codes of the 
commodified condominium will provide both their challenges, and their opportunities to 
become vital and meaningful communities within the city. As successive communities make 
their homes in these towers according to their own cultural practices, the buildings will 
themselves, evolve to become expressions in architecture, of the life of the pluralist city. 
As advocates of space, architects have a vital role to play in how this new concrete 
topography will evolve in time and under emerging cultural and economic pressures. While 
the future is vast and uncertain, there are two generally concluded possibilities; the first is 
the eventual decline and exploitation of the tower architecture under the fixity of neoliberal 
real-estate values, and the second is the enabling of architectural appropriation of the 
towers through decommodification. To ensure that this new landscape does not become 
instrumentalized for economic exploitation of vulnerable populations, architects must 
advocate for the ‘restoration’ of the right to appear in the city. There are no “magic wands” 
by which to restore representation, cultural salience, and habitus to the city, especially not 
within such deeply ingrained pre-existing political, economic, and built structures. Rather, 
only when people use, appropriate, and take ownership of these spaces tactically – playing 
outside the rules – can the highly structured space of the condominium be restored as space 
of urban appearance and negotiation. It is the architect’s urgent task to decode the implicit 
rules of space that constrain them, to reveal contradictions and opportunities of improvisation 
within them but more importantly, to shed light on them so that the actors of space can 
confront them in their own daily decisions and actions. Architects can advocate for the urban 
actor in the space of the condominium in three ways; understanding the cultural origins 
and structures implicit within the form of the condominium, the envisioning of alternative 
futures, and advocating for meaningful policy changes that reflect lessons being learned from 
condominium communities in real time. 
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Firstly, architects must acquaint themselves with the cultural background, the actual structure 
and operations of the condominium and with the O.C.A.-98, allowing them to design 
tactically in the new urban fabric. It is my hope that the opening sections of this thesis began 
this undertaking. It is not enough to simply deem condominiums as unhealthy urbanism. 
Rather, recognizing the systemic contradictions that doom many of these towers to decay and 
abandonment, we must work to understand tall-building systems, structures, and mechanics, 
along with politics, policy, management, and real-estate laws that govern condominiums. 
In working to understand these things, we learn to read the new city with a mind for tactic 
and an eye for opportunity. Renovations, retrofits, adaptations, and modifications, and 
advocating for the individual resident within (or against) the corporation, become important 
tactics for revolutionizing the single unit, the whole building, or the entire city of Toronto. 
As the mid-century towers give us an example of decay through structures that stagnated, 
they also provide a model for beginning work on the condominiums through Graeme 
Stewart and the Tower Renewal Partnership. The Partnership’s rigorous and multifaceted 
approach to improving lives in and around the towers, and strategies for upgrading building 
environmental performance, demonstrate the necessary far-reaching understanding of the 
complexities that impact the wellbeing of the city at the scale of the building and the block. 
Such understanding and expertise cannot be achieved when the architect works in isolation, 
but it relies on cooperative knowledge-sharing with experts and community members, each 
bringing their own perceptions of the patterns of the city. Only in understanding the rules by 
which the city of condominiums is being built and inhabited, can we learn to play and design 
by a different set of rules. 
This deep knowledge of the various structures within condominiums allows architects to 
write exploratory narratives. Unlike tactical design, which acts on the architecture in the 
present or near future, speculative narratives project condominiums into the pluriform 
uncertainty of the distant future. In both the cooperative writing and the telling of future 
narratives, architects generate discourse and awareness around the asphyxiating structures 
of strategic urban space. While this discourse promotes, on one hand, discussions and 
explorations of urban theory surrounding the future of the Toronto condos, recalling de 
Certeau’s emphasis on the importance of daily action in creating revolution in the city, 
these explorations will move people to a new active understanding of their high-rise homes. 
With a new critical understanding of the condominiums, urban citizens will be empowered 
and emboldened to act tactically within the structures, seeing them for what they are, as 
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the artifact of a specific and detrimental cultural practice. Daily improvisation upon these 
structures according to ‘othered’ and external daily cultural practices will restore habitus, 
‘maximal difference,’331  and patterns of personal significance to the urban skeleton. The 
recoding of space will be no longer reserved for the tactical design of the architect, but 
restored to the tactical everyday life of the urban citizen. 
Finally, as condominiums across the city begin to evolve and take on lives of their own with a 
critical movement of tactical action and design, the knowledge of the architect as a specialist, 
will be paired with the accumulated knowledge of the daily activist, empowering architects 
to advocate on behalf of the community for real policy change. The manipulation of policies 
such as the O.C.A.-98 is necessary to deconstruct the deep-rooted systemic factors that 
maintain the neoliberal grip on the space of the city and the realm of political appearance. 
There is no doubt that we can and should already advocate for innumerable policy changes 
in how condominium are built and managed, but policy discussions will continue to be 
more-or-less an extent of theoretical discourse and ideology until policy writing becomes the 
reflection of what people need rather than the hegemonic guise of the neoliberal organization 
of space. Listening to the banal, yet infinitely interesting daily life within these evolving 
towers, architects can promote policies and a city that is the opus of its inhabitants. 
By engaging with real populations and structures of the condominium tower, there is an 
ever-increasing recognition that any production of architecture is only just a beginning. In 
becoming the site of habitus and of daily life, what is designed and built becomes merely a 
framework for the innovation and appropriation of others, and so it should be if spaces are 
to become truly socially and politically valuable. To peel back singular conceived narratives 
of condominiums as urban utopias, architects can look to the power that Michel de Certeau 
affords memory and narrative. Stories of everyday life are not radical in-and-of themselves, 
nor do they appeal to some urbane experience, but simply because in their banality, they 
subvert the preconceived narrative of a stable and well-curated experience on which the 
reproduction of neoliberal space depends. In decoding the structures of the condominium 
through the investigation of possible futures, we create the possibility for narratives in space, 
not that make appealing renderings, drive investment interest, or win competitions, but that 
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appeal to people in their capacity to tell stories of an engaged and purposeful urban life. A 
small booklet of such stories could create within the community, very small and unassuming 
changes which, in time, could precipitate the transformation of the tower from an economic 
proposition into a place to dwell. In being empowered to take ownership of their space, not 
simply economically, but actually in their daily lives and actions, an affirmative practice of 
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